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When a foreigner enters the immigration department in Rio de Janeiro and 
places an asylum request, a complex legal machinery is put in motion to decide 
if this claim for protection is warranted or not. The process of status 
determination begins. The end comes a few months later, when the asylum 
seeker sits across from a police officer and is informed of whether the claim for 
refugee status has been accepted or denied. Request and decision are the two 
poles of this narrative. But how is the difference established between those who 
deserve and don’t deserve protection? Thematically, the research seeks to enrich 
our understanding of how refugees and migrant are distinguished during status 
determination. Conceptually, the study serves as an opportunity to reflect on the 
shortcomings I see in how the scholarship on migration and borders usually 
conceives the notion of ‘decision’. Drawing on a series of arguments developed 
in the field of Science Studies, the thesis puts forward a case for approaching 
asylum decisions in a way that is less focused on the discretion exercised by 
decision-makers and more attentive to how contingency and heterogeneity 
impact the enactment of refugees.
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‘W hat is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for 
you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about 
some abstruse questions of logic, etc., and if it does not 
improve your thinking about the important questions of 
everyday life ( .. .) ’
Ludwig Wittgenstein
‘Simplicity is not a simple thing.’ 
Charles Chaplin
Introduction
Refugee Status Determination is a rather formal name for a very sensitive task. 
Refugee status can change a person’s story, bring an end to suffering and allow 
the newly declared refugee to start a safe and dignified life. Hannah Arendt was a 
refugee, as were Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. W hat would have become 
of our arts and sciences, of our philosophy and politics, had they been denied 
refuge? Yet it is perhaps when asylum is denied that the delicate nature of status 
determination is made plain. For a negative decision can quite literally mean 
death for the asylum seeker. Gloomy stories of failed applicants being received 
with torture after deportation or being kept for years in humanitarian camps are 
not as uncommon as we would like to believe.1 For the person awaiting a ruling, 
as for the officers examining the case, few policy decisions can be more vital 
than answering the very simple question that the words ‘status determination’ 
represent: after all, is this person a refugee or not?
This study is about the practices through which an answer to this question is 
produced. It is a study on how the legal condition of being a refugee is granted 
or denied to men and women. Is this asylum seeker a refugee and therefore 
allowed to stay and seek reinsertion in the political community? Or is this 
foreigner a bogus applicant, better characterized as an economic migrant, and 
therefore outside the grasp of refugee protection? This study dwells on how this 
distinction is established in practice during the work of deciding whether to 
accept or deny asylum requests.
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To examine this topic, I propose to undertake an ethnography of asylum 
decisions, taking as a setting the work of status determination in Brazil. Two 
reasons make the case ideally suited for research. First, studying status 
determination in Brazil will allow us to learn more about how migration is 
governed beyond Europe and North America, as much of the literature on 
International Relations is still limited to these regions. Second, as Brazil is a 
democracy and a former European colony, its legal system will be fairly familiar 
to western readers. A study of how migrants and refugees are set apart in Brazil 
can thus offer interesting contrasts for those studying the work of controlling 
borders and governing migration from the Global North.
As in other western democracies, the issue of refugee protection has been 
gaining salience in Brazil. The number of asylum requests has increased almost 
tenfold between 2010 and 2014.2 Like their counterparts in the Global North, 
Brazilian politicians struggle to balance the conflicting political pressures linked 
to this increase. On the one hand, in order to protect Brazil’s reputation as a 
liberal country, they are expected to protect asylum seekers and respect hum an 
rights. On the other, they seek to appease those who start to voice concerns over 
the costs and social impacts supposedly associated with the increase in arrivals.3 
A ‘fair and efficient’ determination process is hailed by the government as a way 
out of this tight spot, making it possible to distinguish ‘genuine refugees’, who 
are protected by international law, from ‘other kinds of migrants’, who are 
subjected to different regulations.4
Thematically, the primary aim of the research is to enrich our understanding 
of how refugees and migrant are distinguished during status determination. 
Conceptually, the study will serve as an opportunity to reflect on the 
shortcomings I see in how the scholarship on migration and borders has tended 
to conceive the notion o f ‘decision’. Drawing on a series of arguments developed 
in the field of Science Studies, the thesis will put forward a case for approaching 
asylum decisions in a way that is less focused on the discretion exercised by 
decision-makers and more attentive to how contingency and heterogeneity 
impact the enactment of cases.
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To articulate this alternative approach, the study will contrast it to what I call 
the ‘declaratory picture’ of asylum decisions. This picture is a composite of 
assumptions about who takes part in asylum decisions and about where and 
when these decisions are made. This picture is not something to which 
practitioners subscribe without nuances. But it does express some proclivities in 
reasoning that struck me as recurrent during my encounters with asylum seekers 
and case examiners.
Judging by this declaratory picture, decisions to grant or deny requests are 
made by decision-makers as the final product of a series of determination 
practices, which are designed to disclose the legal fit, empirical support and 
internal consistency of the case. At the end of the determination process, the 
reality of the asylum seeker as a migrant or as refugee is not so much decided by 
decision makers as it is declared by them.
I shall contend in this study that this way of accounting for how migrants 
and refugees are distinguished relies on an understanding of decision which is 
not only conceptually poor, but also politically disengaging. W hat this picture 
tells us about how the border between migrant and refugee is enacted is not only 
hard to sustain, but also disempowering. It forecloses the possibility of 
contesting this border by diverting our attention from how contingency and 
heterogeneity impact the outcome of requests.
In contrast to this declaratory picture, I want to show that determination 
practices do not just disclose the anterior reality of the asylum seeker, but rather 
enact what comes to count as this anterior reality. I want to encourage 
scepticism  towards the use of legal fit, empirical support and consistency as 
justifications for denial. And I hope to persuade the reader that it is im portant to 
decentre the way we conceive decision when studying the work by which 
migrants and refugees are set apart.
To encourage the adoption of this enactment approach, the argument will 
have two dimensions -  one deconstructive and one reconstructive -  both of 
which will run in parallel. In an exercise of cross-fertilization, I shall borrow 
concepts from the field of science studies and put these to use in the discussion 
on whether migrants and refugees represent different social groups.
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Deconstructively, I will adapt this science studies toolset to problematize some 
usual ways in which examiners justify their decisions. Reconstructively, I will 
allow this toolset to inform my ethnographic stories, in order to highlight the 
impact that contingency and heterogeneity exert over the outcome of cases.
I see my role in this study as that of mechanic who picks apart a complex 
legal machine and then reassembles it. Depending on how the pieces are put 
back together, the machine that comes out of this reconstruction looks very 
different from the original. In this study, I use sceptical arguments to 
disassemble asylum decisions and adopt the enactment approach that is 
outlined below to put these decisions back together in a different way.
In respect to the argument’s intended reach, perhaps the best way to explain 
it is to say that the argument is both about Brazil and hopes to go beyond it. 
While considering how migrants and refugees are set apart, I make an effort to 
highlight what is particular about the practices I discuss. A consequence of this 
localization of my thinking is that the argument becomes dependent on its 
original setting. At the same time, however, I have the ambition that the study 
will encourage authors to adopt an enactment approach when studying other 
instances of border-making.
As the next section explains, by bringing arguments from the science studies 
field to bear upon the question of how migrants and refugees are set apart, my 
aim is to contribute to those studying more broadly how migration and borders 
are governed. This contribution lies in the conceptual vocabulary organized 
around the notion of enactment, which, I hope, will make readers better 
equipped to appreciate the role played by contingency and heterogeneity in 
setting the border between welcome and unwelcomed subject.
In the remainder of this chapter, I set the scene for the inquiry that follows 
by telling more about the question, case and m ethod on which the ethnography 
is built. I begin by tracing how the distinction between migrants and refugees 
became contested among those studying migration and borders, which allows 
me to position the thesis in relation to this scholarship. I then identify some of 
the particularities I see in the Brazilian case, before giving a first glimpse of what 
an ethnography of asylum decisions done through enactment lenses looks like. I
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conclude with an overview of the science studies arguments developed in each 
chapter. My hope is that, after reading this introduction, the reader will have a 
strong sense of what is to come in the next chapters and why.
The research as a contribution to the study of migration and borders
In a quote repeated in many articles that deal with the political significance of 
refugees, the political philosopher Giorgio Agamben notes that by ‘breaking up 
the identity between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the 
refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty’.5 As status 
determination is one of the policy areas in which belonging is most explicitly in 
question, the procedure is indeed linked to a set of passionate debates. The 
challenges posed by refugees to the understanding of citizenship as a legal status 
and to the model of states as territorially sovereign contribute to some of the 
liveliest among these discussions.6 As part of this broad scholarship on how 
migration is governed, authors who study asylum have been warning us that 
newcomers are increasingly locked in a double bind: rendered either as victims 
in need of protection or as a security problem to be managed.7 In this section, I 
trace how the distinction between migrants and refugees became contested in 
this literature.
I start from the suggestion that asylum seekers are increasingly treated as a 
security problem. In a way, it would be a truism to say that the work of status 
determination has a security dimension. As a legal procedure involved in 
deciding who is welcome to the state, status determination can be rendered as a 
security practice in a quite straightforward sense. If we think of the border of the 
state as a protective line, it is easy to see the eligibility officer as a security agent 
who is responsible not only for protecting the refugee, but also for keeping the 
threatening stranger outside.
As authors who study borders have been telling us for years, however, this 
way of conceiving the border as a protective line doesn’t hold much water in the 
world we live in.8 For a Brazilian citizen, for instance, the image of a neighbour’s 
army marching across the border sounds considerably less likely than the 
prospect of a drug dealer crossing the border into the Amazon. O f even greater
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concern is the figure that epitomizes the outlaw in the West today: the terrorist. 
Which agency is responsible for catching this outlaw: the police or the military? 
I doubt the separation of internal and external security has ever been black and 
white beyond the minds of classical political theorists.9 Even if it was, these two 
spheres are nowadays so ‘dis-differentiated’ that it is hard to say which agency is 
responsible for what.10
Now, when we are comfortable in the belief that the threat waits for us at the 
border, it seems easy to guarantee the security of those inside. All we would 
have to do is to make sure that the threat lurking at the border remains outside. 
Things change when we come to believe that the threat is not the tank driving 
over barbed wire, but the drug dealer crossing the border at the airport. A new 
form of governing migration seems to become necessary when we see all 
movement across borders as a source of insecurity.11
If we stick to the common-sense way of thinking about the border as a line of 
protection, one possibility is to bring up a fortress around the country and make 
sure no unwelcome figure comes in.12 But even if this way of governing 
migration were not a logistic impossibility, the fortress solution would be self- 
defeating in a world in which a nation’s wealth is measured by its capacity to 
attract investments, allure workers and elicit tourism.13
The alternative, it seems, is to govern migration in a smarter and more 
targeted way.14 The policy response we are left with seems to make ubiquitous 
the work of governing migration. In practice, this might justify collecting 
information about people -  all the people -  before, during and after they cross 
the border, so that we can identify risk elements and act pre-emptively.15 It 
might also be necessary to read civil rights ‘less strictly’ and to put ‘selfish’ 
concerns with privacy in second place.16 At the end of the day, governments 
keep telling us, all these sacrifices are required to keep us safe.
Of course, this picture is but an ironic sketch of how the scholarship on 
migration to which I subscribe describes the current predicament of mobility in 
western societies. I shall say more about this tendency to associate mobility and 
insecurity below. Even this brief sketch, however, already allows me to highlight 
the change of emphasis in the way asylum is conceived in public discourse. In 
place of a humanitarian concern with the protection of asylum seekers, which is
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supposed to have motivated the existing protection regime, public interest in 
asylum is increasingly informed by a sense of unease in face of the security and 
socio-economic drawbacks allegedly triggered by newcomers.17
Status determination, it would seem, is no exception to this change of 
emphasis. The security dimension of the determination work has been gaining 
salience.18 Asylum screening exists to make sure that men and women in need of 
international protection will receive it. But it is also increasingly justified as a 
necessary filter that allows governments to grant status to the genuine refugee 
while keeping the unwelcome figure outside. Among these unwelcomed figures 
whom the work of status determination is expected to filter, we find the drug 
smuggler, the terrorist and -  in spite of all arguments against lumping these 
together -  the economic migrant. All are reduced to the figure of the bogus 
applicant.19
Set against this background, the question of what distinguishes refugees from 
other kinds of migrants comes forcefully to the fore. We can assume that, if a 
person is caught smuggling a bomb through a check-point, the Brazilian police 
will arrest this person and press charges for terrorism. Likewise, it would make 
sense to expect that a person caught in the airport with cocaine strapped to the 
body would be arrested and charged with drug smuggling. Now, what about a 
migrant trying to enter Brazil without a visa? How can a border authority tell 
whether this foreigner is an economic migrant, trying to enter Brazil irregularly, 
or rather a genuine refugee?
If we look at the numbers, it would seem that there must be a way of 
answering this question. Historically, classifying the asylum seeker as an 
economic migrant has been the main reason why the government has denied 
asylum requests in Brazil.20 In 2013, the primary refusal rate in the country was 
above 85%.21 This figure shows that eligibility officers in Brazil are somehow 
able to set the contrast. So how can they know? How can they tell the difference 
between migrant and refugee?
There is a legal answer to this question. If we follow the Geneva Convention, 
the basis for distinguishing migrant from refugee lies in the reasons that lead the 
person to migrate. The convention reserves refugee status to that foreigner who
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‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted [...] is unable or [...] unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country’. This legal definition thus 
seems to answer the question by distinguishing migrants, who make a calculated 
decision to move, from refugees, who are forced to move to escape persecution.
Translated into the day-to-day tasks of status determination, this definition 
suggests that if a foreigner is asking for asylum to avoid human rights violations 
or escape persecution for the reasons set forth by the Geneva Convention, then 
that person is to be acknowledged as refugee. In turn, if a foreigner has chosen 
to migrate for other reasons and is asking asylum, that person would not be 
considered a refugee.
Forced displacement equals refugee, voluntary displacement equals migrant. 
The idea that migratory drives can be separated into such binary configurations 
is today highly contested in the migration literature.
Telling the difference between migrants and refugees
Even as a heuristic model, the idea that it is possible to arrange migration in a 
spectrum of choice, using voluntary and forced migration as the poles, has been 
charged as grossly simplifying. The motives that drive people to migrate are 
never black and white.22 Depending on how old migrants are, for instance, or 
how extensive is their support network, persons might experience events as 
more or less threatening.23
Trying to organize migration in terms of forced and voluntary has also been 
criticized for leaving vague the reach of international protection. Authors have 
argued that the definition of refugee as a migrant forced  to move can be shown 
to apply to a greater proportion of the migrant population than that usually 
accepted under the remit of the Geneva Convention.24 The plight of internally 
displaced persons, for instance, is often mentioned in this vein.25
Among those scholars who criticize attempts to distinguish refugees from 
migrants, the complexities involved in unravelling migratory drives and 
specifying the reach of protection have translated into the argument that the 
term ‘refugee’ is better understood as a bureaucratic label then as a social 
category.26 The conclusion is expressed succinctly by Italian anthropologist
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Giulia Scalettari in her suggestion that ‘what concretely distinguishes refugees 
from other migrants is precisely the fact of being labelled as such. It is the 
refugee label itself that creates a distinction between refugees and other 
migrants’.27
Interestingly, we find similar suggestions being made by authors who defend 
the idea that the refugee experience is essentially different from that of other 
migrants. Scholar of international law James C. Hathaway, for example, has 
made the point that the forced/voluntary binary doesn’t explain the difference 
between refugees and migrants. At the same time, he seeks to retain the 
distinction by characterizing refugee-hood in terms of a shared legal status. ‘In 
the real world’, Hathaway claims, ‘legal status -  and the rights that go with 
various forms of legal status -  routinely identify and constitute fundamental 
social and political categories’.28
I will look more closely at the debate on whether the refugee definition is 
clear-cut enough to distinguish refugees from migrants in Chapter 1 .1 will dwell 
on the concept of indeterminacy and argue that, when connected with the issue 
of rule-following, the phenomenon places a stronger challenge to the possibility 
of differentiating migrants and refugees than the literature on migration and 
borders has considered so far. At this point, however, what I want to highlight is 
the change this controversy has entailed in the way the term refugee is 
conceived. As opposed to understanding refugee-hood as a social category, the 
condition of being a refugee is increasingly recognized as a legal and 
bureaucratic label. However convincing the existing arguments concerning the 
possibility of distinguishing migrants and refugees might be, this change in how 
the term is conceived has a crucial consequence to how we approach the topic.
To treat the term refugee as a label, as scholar of internal development Roger 
Zetter explains, ‘is to focus on how and with what consequences people becomes 
labelled as refugees within the context o f  pub lic  po licy practices f  A  label, in 
Scalettari’s precise phrasing, ‘does not say as much about the people to whom it 
refers as about the system that produced the label; therefore, i t  calls po licy  in to
,* 5 30question .
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The basic idea that, in order to account for how migrants and refugees are set 
apart, we need to bring policy into question has been finding echo in the 
migration literature.31 Over the last few years, a number of arguments have been 
made to that effect. In in their discussion on what would be the key tasks for 
those concerned with the ffactioning of migration figures, migration scholars 
Vicki Squire and Stephan Scheel have asked for ‘further work diagnosing how 
particular figures of migration emerge and become institutionalized as 
categorizations of migrant groups’.32 Beyond the debate on wh th e th e 
distinction between migrants and refugees is sociologically sound, evidences 
good policy or is even ethically desirable, as American sociologist Adam 
Saltsman puts it, a consensus seems to be emerging that ‘it is the process of 
determining refugee status which deserves scholarly scrutiny, as it reflects the 
transformation from laws and policies into practice’.33 
In the words of the Spanish anthropologist Olga Jubany:
Exploring the work of those implementing the rules, enforcing the laws and 
making frontline decisions is key to understanding the asylum screening process, 
but too often is hidden from the public eye and ignored by academic and 
political debate. [...] A sociological approach [is required] to unravel the rules 
regulating migration controls and asylum seekers’ lives to look beyond the 
surface of the legal shield and the rhetorical concepts of political discourses.34
By stressing that migration figures are not natural categories, these studies are 
helping turn the difference between migrants and refugees into an object of 
research. The case they make for studying the bureaucratic creation of these 
migration figures explains to a great extent why I have chosen to approach the 
work of status determination through an ethnography.
In the chapters that follow, I seek to endorse the suggestion that migrants 
and refugees do not represent distinguishable social groups. I attempt to heed 
requests for further work on how migration figures are created. At the same 
time, however, I also try to open up the question of how refugees are set apart 
from other migrants in the process of asylum application itself.
Arguments in favour of exploring the work of those applying the rules and 
making frontline decisions underscore the need for grounded research. But they
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also retain a rather conventional understanding of what there is to decide, who 
takes part in this decision, and where and when the decision is made. In 
problematizing this underlying understanding of decision, I invite scholars 
interested in how migration is governed to consider the possibility that talk of 
decision ‘as something people do’ is itself invested in the bordering work.
Conceptually, my contribution lies in the vocabulary I adapt from science 
studies and the challenges this vocabulary poses to our understanding of 
decision. My hope is that the reader will leave the study not only with a stronger 
sense of the problems surrounding attempts to distinguish migrants and 
refugees, but also a fresh outlook on how this distinction is so routinely enacted.
Why Brazil?
So far, my brief review of the literature on migration and borders has served to 
raise the question of how the distinction between migrants and refugees is 
established during status determination. As the Geneva Convention doesn’t 
prescribe a universal model for determination procedures, this question seems 
to require a localized research. In this section, I tell why I find the Brazilian case 
is a good one for tinkering with this issue. I offer a brief history of refugee 
protection in the country. And I isolate a few distinctive features that I believe 
make status determination in Brazil worth a more detailed investigation.
My interest for the Brazilian case was stirred by different kinds of reasons: 
some of them practical, some conceptual and others related to the political 
leaning I have tried to give this work. On the more practical register, the fact 
that I am Brazilian and the many advantages this represents for ethnography -  
language, contacts, familiarity with places and customs etc. -  have certainly 
influenced my decision to take status determination in Brazil as my focal point.
There is also, I believe, a certain informality in the functioning of Brazilian 
bureaucracy that makes it especially amenable to ethnography. This has to do 
with its openness towards research, which made examiners perhaps more 
welcoming, or perhaps simply more indifferent, to the idea of having an 
academic doing some vague observation of their everyday lives. This perhaps 
explains why so many innovative anthropologists -  from Claude Levis-Strauss
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visiting the Caduveo and Bororo tribes in Mato Grosso to Bruno Latour 
following biologists and soil scientists into the Amazon -  have chosen Brazil as a 
laboratory for their ethnographic incursions.
In one of his studies, Latour makes a case for an anthropology of the 
moderns whose terms are, I think, still very much applicable to Brazil. 
Ethnographic research about Brazil has translated into excellent studies on 
isolated societies living deep in the Amazon forest. We have learned about the 
social cosmology of the Arawete people and have come to appreciate 
Amerindian Perspectivism. On the other hand, as Latour says, ‘relatively few 
attempts have been made to penetrate the intimacy of life among tribes which 
are much nearer at hand’.35 By choosing Brazil as the setting of my stories, I have 
sought to benefit from the familiarity or indifference mentioned above, and also 
to visit the less exotic tribes living in ministry buildings and law offices in 
Brazilian cities.
In addition to these practical drives, the issue of status determination in 
Brazil also seems to me a good choice for the political relevance it has. For it 
offers, I believe, an opportunity to look at how the work of demarcating 
welcomed and unwelcomed subjects is done in  a so ft way.
W hat I mean by a ‘soft’ way of making borders is more easily grasped if we 
compare the evolution of refugee protection in Brazil to that of countries whose 
asylum policies are considered restrictive. In a nutshell, the implementation of 
refugee protection in Brazil was part of a broader campaign to restore Brazil’s 
image as a democratic nation following 24 years of military dictatorship 
(between 1964 and 1988).36 In theory, Brazil had been committed to refugee 
protection long before this campaign. The country ratified the Refugee 
Convention in 1961 and signed the UN Protocol on the Status of Refugees in 
1972. However, until the end of the dictatorship, these agreements existed more 
in theory than in practice.37
This gap between legal commitments and the practice of refugee protection 
is exemplified by the fact that the military government denied the status of 
International Organization to the UNHCR office in the country. The military 
government didn’t grant UNHCR this status, for doing so would commit it
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internally to international law.38 The practical consequence of this lack of status 
was that UNHCR had to conduct its efforts to resettle those fleeing political 
persecution in the region almost as a clandestine organization.39 The more 
visible work of dealing with asylum seekers and attending to their pastoral needs 
had to be taken up by charities run by the Catholic Church (Caritas and the 
Justice and Peace Commission, among others). This explains in part why these 
organizations continue to play a key role in the procedures of refugee status 
determination today.40
Until the return to democracy, Brazil was more a country of transit than one 
of refuge. Things started to change around the 1980s, in the period known in 
Brazil as ‘distension’ (distensao). Under increasing pressure from civil society, 
the military regime started a gradual transition back into civilian government. In 
1982, the regime granted the status of International Organization to UNHCR.41 
In 1984, Brazil signed the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, extending refugee 
status beyond the 1951 definition to include people fleeing their countries to 
escape ‘gross violations of human rights, foreign aggression, internal conflicts or 
other circumstances which threaten their lives, security or liberty’.42 
Democratization was concluded during the second half of the 1980s, with the 
adoption of a new federal constitution in 1988 and the holding of elections for 
president in 1989.
This liberalization of refugee protection in Brazil culminated in 1997, with 
the promulgation of Law 9474, known as The National Refugee Act.43 The Act 
established the procedure for refugee status determination that is followed in 
Brazil today, in which the Federal Police, the UNHCR, Conare, and civil society 
agencies like Caritas work together to process asylum requests.44 The Act also 
identifies Conare as the agency responsible for ruling on refugee status. In the 
following chapters, we are going to look at the refugee status determination 
process in detail. The point for now is that the 1997 Act is a mark in the broader 
effort to re-establish Brazil’s image as a western liberal state.
This attempt to change the overall image of the country seems to have 
succeeded. The refugee population now living in Brazil remains small compared 
to those of the big receiving countries in the Global South. Brazil had, in 2014, a
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population of 5,208 refugees,45 which is a very modest number in comparison 
with the 1.6 million refugees that today live in Pakistan.46 But this number is 
increasing considerably: between 2010 and 2014, the number of new refugees in 
Brazil has increased 1.255%.47 And, according to the UNHCR, this figure will 
most likely go up.48 This is explained in part as a consequence of Brazil being 
increasingly perceived around the world as a growing economy and a country of 
refuge; it is sometimes even touted as a model for the South American region 
when it comes to refugee legislation.49
The fact that the Brazilian government presents the country as a receptive 
nation strikes me as an interesting contrast between the Brazilian case and hard­
line countries like Australia, France, Spain, UK and the US, which are constantly 
admonished for their restrictive posture towards asylum. The more 
comprehensive definition of no-return now in effect in international law (which 
operates on the basis of reasonable grounds and extending to forms of indirect 
return) is accepted to amount in practice to a duty to admit all asylum seekers 
until the validity of their cases has been determined.50 In this light, the no-entry 
policies adopted by these states -  extra-territorial border checks, the 
intensification of visa requirements and, most crudely, the system of buffer 
states and extra-jurisdictional detention -  can all be said to violate the Refugee 
Convention, as they deny access of potential asylum seekers to their 
jurisdictions.51
Much of the sociological literature on asylum seeking has focused on these 
hard-line countries. There is today an important body of literature that reacts 
critically to the tendency in the Global North to criminalize not only asylum, 
but most forms of migration. Authors writing in neighbouring disciplines, like 
criminology, security studies and surveillance studies, have brought to the fore 
the many ways in which this criminalization is taking place. These authors have 
warned us about a more ostensive rendering of asylum seekers as an existential 
threat for national security and social order.52 And they have shared their distress 
in face of the more perennial absorption of asylum into a continuum of 
insecurity, through its association with well-established sources of unease, such 
as terrorism and human trafficking.53
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To justify my interest in the Brazilian context, I could have resorted to a kind 
of translation exercise, by making refugee protection in Brazil look more like 
that of these hard line countries.54 That -  I’m sorry to say -  wouldn’t be so hard 
to do. For if Brazil is praised as an example when it comes to legislation, it is far 
from exemplary when it comes to the support it actually gives to asylum seekers. 
I could say that the asylum process in Brazil is not as welcoming as the 
government would have us believe.55 I could pass on the message that ‘Green 
and Yellow’ xenophobia is, in fact, on the rise.56 I could tell you of the many 
indignities that asylum seekers have to endure in terms of the bureaucracy and 
lack of financial support, or of the many cases in which refugees had to bring 
their families to live in slums.57 And I could also, as startling as it is, tell stories of 
refugees who asked to be sent back to humanitarian camps when they found life 
in Brazil to be harder than in the war-torn countries.58
Yet there are, I think, good reasons not to make this translation the main 
purpose of the study. Above all, I am convinced that this attempt to emphasize 
the association with hard-line countries would risk importing arguments and 
reproducing critiques that, although absolutely necessary in their original 
contexts, are not transferrable to Brazil. It is time perhaps for a critique made 
from the Global South concerning the specificities of problems of the Global 
South.59 That is why I would prefer to emphasize what is different about the 
Brazilian case instead of its resemblance to the northern experience. From a 
political point of view, attempting to create interest by emphasizing similarity 
would risk losing sight of what is perhaps most interesting about the Brazilian 
case: the opportunity to look at how a country considered ‘of refuge’ and ‘a 
regional example’ creates the border between welcomed and unwelcomed.
Finally, in the conceptual register, what I mean by this soft making of borders 
is closely related to what French philosopher Etienne Balibar calls a ‘civil’ 
production of difference. Balibar tell us that the emergence of the citizen as a 
historic figure is the product of a two pronged process: on the one hand, a 
violent exclusion, achieved mainly through what he calls a ‘quasi-military 
enforcement of borders’, and, on the other hand, a “‘civil process” of 
elaboration of differences’.60 Increasingly, Balibar tells us, it is the combination
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of security borders and these ‘m ere administrative separations ’ that ‘recreates 
the figure of the stranger as political enemy’.61
Citizenship theorist Engin Isin makes a similar point in his Being Political\ 
when he argues that political thought in the West has focused too much on the 
alienating relation between friend and foe. Isin considers unproductive this 
disproportional emphasis on the friend and foe dialectic. He defends a relational 
image of how the concepts of citizen and outsider are defined, inspired by an 
understanding of language as a system in which significance is attributed to 
arbitrarily chosen signifiers through contrast. For Isin, this focus on the 
alienation between friend and enemy is limiting because it directs our attention 
precisely towards the dynamic in which the citizen and its outsider interact the 
least. This is, for him, perhaps the least political of all possible relational 
strategies for the formation of identity, as there is little exchange and, therefore, 
little possibility of establishing significance through relational contrast. Instead 
of looking to the relation between the citizen and its distant outsiders, Isin 
proposes that we look more carefully to the relation between the citizen and its 
‘immanent others’.62
The case of status determination in Brazil offers, I believe, a good 
opportunity to look at this more immanent way of making borders. Much of the 
literature on asylum has been concerned with these more violent forms of 
alienation, with many works being written on topics like detention, expulsion 
and deportation.63 In contrast, not so much has been said about the not so 
harsh, ‘almost civil’ administrative work in which the difference between the 
welcomed and the unwelcomed is established. This is another specificity of the 
Brazilian case that makes it both conceptually and politically interesting.
As the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman and Balibar remind us, ‘all societies 
produce strangers; but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, 
and produces them in its own inimitable way’.64 In this study I take the process 
of refugee status determination as an example of how the welcoming, happy, 
receptive country that Brazil is said to be establishes the difference between 
welcomed and unwelcomed subjects in  its own inim itable way.
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Research strategy
In asking how migrants and refugees are distinguished in practice, I am 
consciously avoiding an abstract reflection on the political significance of 
refugees. Instead, following the advice of Malaysian anthropologist Aihwa Ong, 
I seek to trade on specificity.
When discussing the encounter between newly arrived refugees and the 
American state in Buddha is hiding, Ong criticizes authors who treat the relation 
between the state and the refugee as one of linear exclusion, as if the state would 
always seek to exclude refugees in order to reinforce its prerogative to dictate 
what life is worth living.65 Against this black and white image, Ong argues that, if 
we look more closely to the encounters refugees have with state agencies, what 
we see is that these agencies do not necessarily treat refugees as complete 
outsiders to the norms of the host country. Instead of this absolute exclusion, 
Ong shows us that the different agencies involved with the assimilation of 
refugees in the United States operate with particular norm s of what it is to be a 
good citizen and adopt particular practices to try to mould the refugee’s 
behaviour according to these norms.
For Ong, these nuances in the treatment of refugees ‘cannot be revealed by a 
study of formal laws or by relying on a notion of citizenship as something that is 
simply possessed (like a passport)’.66 Rather, for her, these specificities have to be 
highlighted ‘through an ethnographic investigation of the political reasonings 
and practices that assess groups differently and assign them different fates’. Like 
Ong, I am interested in difference and nuances. As Ong, I am convinced that the 
particularities of determination practices are better grasped through an 
ethnographic investigation of asylum seeking.
Mine, of course, is not the first attempt to conduct an ethnographic study of 
asylum procedures. Although the number of publications is still small, country- 
specific studies have been gaining traction, giving rise to timely questions 
concerning the involvement of medical doctors and social scientists with border 
control in countries like Canada,67 Denmark,68 France,69 Spain70 and the UK.71 
Also, in Brazil, studies exploring the work of ‘managing and governing’ exerted
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by state bureaucracy are gaining space in international relations and 
anthropology departments.72
Many of these works are outstanding and it is not my intention to prove 
them wrong in any way. If I see a difference in how I seek to approach status 
determination, it has to do more with the adoption of what I have been calling 
an ‘enactment approach’, and the change of focus that comes with it, than with a 
correction of the existing accounts.
To put it as directly as possible, what I see as particular about the way I seek 
to study status determination is not the ethnographic approach alone. The 
contribution I seek to make lies in the conceptual apparatus of enactment, 
which I adapt to generate my ethnographic account.
In science studies, the notion of enactment has been used as a covering term 
for a set of methodological principles. First among these, to study cases with an 
enactment approach involves avoiding reference to intrinsic qualities when 
accounting for the request’s outcome. For example, to say that a case was 
dismissed as weak ‘because it clearly lacked legal fit’ is not acceptable in this 
approach.
Accounts that point to intrinsic qualities are considered to have a ‘black- 
boxing effect’, to borrow Latour’s term. Like a technology that works too well, 
the more evident the decision is deemed to be, the more obscure its internal 
functioning becomes.73 Black boxing accounts of this kind are eschewed in 
favour of what is described in science studies as a ‘symmetric take’; the same 
kind of factors that would be explored to account for the case’s outcome had it 
been considered controversial must be taken into consideration when the 
decision is consensual and straightforward.74
A second enactment principle consists of extending symmetry to the kinds of 
factors that must be taken into consideration. When accounting for why a case 
came to emerge as weak, for example, it is not enough to make reference to the 
examiner’s ‘social position’ and ‘social background’. This would be to presume 
that only social factors have impact. In an enactment approach, enacting 
refugees is treated as a material practice as much as a social one. The way a 
police officer asks questions is treated as a relevant aspect of why the case is
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dismissed, for example, but the impact exerted by a broken scanner or a fading 
photograph is taken in consideration too.75 ^
Finally, adopting an enactment approach means to pay attention to how 
different enactments of a case are arranged in relation to each other. So, for 
example, instead of presuming that a negative decision is consensual because ‘all 
examiners are looking at the same weak case’, an enactment approach demands 
us to check how this consensual assessment is maintained in practice. Maybe 
questions that would have led the case to emerge in a different shape were never 
asked. Perhaps arranging the interviews in a certain order contributed to 
keeping this alternative enactment out of sight. Studying status determination 
with an enactment approach involves being attentive to the impact exerted over 
decisions by little ‘coordinating’ arrangements like these.76
I hope that adopting this enactment toolset will allow those studying 
migration and borders to develop a sensibility for how contingency and 
heterogeneity impact the outcome of asylum requests. In contrast with the 
declaratory model, which speaks of the difference between migrant and refugee 
as something people decide at some point, this enactment approach highlights 
how this border is brought about in a decentred way.
I justify my adoption of this enactment approach in a series of arguments 
that run through the study. In each of my chapters, I develop one aspect of the 
enactment toolbox to illustrate the difference it makes in how we see the 
procedure. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to discuss some questions 
about method and give a first glimpse of what an ethnography of asylum 
decisions seen through enactment lenses looks like.
Reflections on fieldwork in Brazil
Not all authors who publish under the rubric of science studies think alike, of 
course. But for most of the names you will find below, the saying ‘translation is 
betrayal’ works a bit like a motto. The basic message is simple. No matter how 
hard a scientist tries to copy a particular laboratory elsewhere, something will
26
change during the process of copying. Some things are carried on and translated 
into the new setting. Others are left behind, betrayed.77
The same motto, I want to say, applies to ethnographic accounts. In the 
ethnographic stories that follow, I try to stay close to the words I heard and to 
the things I saw in Brazil. It shouldn’t be forgotten, however, that it was me 
doing the hearing and me doing the looking. My views on what matters came 
into play, which means that parts of these practices were considered in this study 
while others were left out. It would be a mistake to approach the ethnography as 
a mirroring report. It is inescapably partial in that sense.
Although none of this should be surprising, I believe there are good reasons 
to underscore it. If kept in mind, the motto invites me to reflect on the betrayals 
effected by my own writing.
Sometimes, when we read academic narratives, we get the feeling that the 
author is not there. The styles with which reports are written are meant to 
encourage the impression that the narrative is writing itself.78 That, as you will 
see, is not how I have chosen to proceed. Instead of keeping the pretence that I 
am the good and neutral scientist, a ghost-writer of nature, or the modest 
witness, as cultural theorist Donna Haraway describes it, I choose to be open 
about my presence in the stories I tell.79 Instead of hiding them in the 
background, I bring the challenges and disconcertments I experienced to the 
front stage. /
Among these challenges is one issue that is central for an ethnography that 
follows objects and people around, although it usually remains hidden. It is the 
issue of how much ‘stuff I should hope to include. While in Brazil, basically 
without realizing it, I saw myself involved in what is described in current 
anthropological jargon as a ‘multi-sited’ ethnography. Considering in retrospect 
what is entailed by this way of researching, I came to learn that, if left loose, talk 
of multi-sited ethnography risks inviting some problematic connotations.80
Matei Candea, the social anthropologist, has noted that to talk of an 
ethnography as multi-sited invokes a certain aura of holism. It encourages the 
perception that the research can somehow ‘cover it all’. Perhaps more damaging
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is the fact that, when we think of research as multi-sited, we risk forgetting that 
each site is multiple in itself.81
Following Candea’s advice, I want to warn the reader that my account of 
status determination in Brazil is not only incomplete, as it doesn’t aspire to be 
complete. While writing it, I have sought to give a sense of the path that asylum 
cases usually follow. I also, however, left a lot of other practices unmentioned. 
And the same is true for each practice I describe. Each determination practice is 
multiple in itself. The way I unpack them gives a sense of what I found 
important, but also leaves a lot out of sight. Instead of as self-enclosed reports 
on self-enclosed events, I like to think of my snapshots as ‘windows into 
complexity’, to borrow Candea’s expression.82
As I betray aspects of the practices I talk about, I also betray my informants. 
Often kept out of sight in final reports is the author’s role in establishing the 
balance between ethnographic voices. Here, again, I think it is better to be open 
about my role in establishing this balance than to keep the pretence that my 
informants are somehow speaking for themselves.
A more technical aspect of this betrayal has to do with the selection I effect 
between those aspects of my informants’ speech to which I choose to attend. In 
many of the stories that follow, I comment on exchanges between asylum 
seekers and case examiners and talk about conversations we had. As these 
asylum seekers can be harmed if identified, most of these conversations couldn’t 
be recorded. A consequence of this is that much of their emotions ended up 
being betrayed. Even though I tried to attend to pauses and tones while writing 
my account, my snapshots leave out m uch of the phonetic movements and 
conversation breaks that would be required were I to try a formal conversation 
analysis.
Perhaps more relevant, when selecting what conversations to report, I also 
expose myself to the charges of intellectual vassalage, as sociologist of science 
Michael Mulkay once called it. I impose my own ‘cut’ over my informants and 
build a partial bricolage of our conversations.83 Here, again, all I can do is plead 
guilty and tell the reader my reasons.
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So I can better justify myself, allow me a geographical metaphor. If 
cartographers were to try and be ‘100% faithful’ to what they see -  if we grant 
such a thing is even possible -  they would need maps as big as the countries 
themselves.84 So they make maps smaller, simpler and with more or less detail. 
They craft the maps according to the practical purpose at hand. This is a way of 
thinking about the purpose of descriptions that is a lot different from a 
comparison in terms of empirical accuracy. Instead of how correct, right, true to 
reality it is deemed to be, what makes a map good or bad in this way of thinking 
is how productive it is given the task at hand.
I prefer to think of the relation between this account and other accounts in 
these terms. I have studied my informants’ comments not so much for their 
value as descriptions of reality. Instead, I have selected those remarks that allow 
me to highlight their role as discursive devices: as ways of talking and reasoning 
that contribute to making the bordering of migrants and refugees possible.
Again, I hasten to add that all this should sound self-evident. Yet, among 
authors who study the work of controlling borders and governing migration, 
calls for research sometimes sound rather positive in their empiricism. Turns to 
practice and ethnography are justified as sources of ‘better descriptions’ of what 
agents ‘actually do’.
To be clear, the study is pitched as a polemic against tint declaratory picture 
of asylum decisions. The arguments I make are meant to support the conclusion 
that the understanding of decision implicit in the declaratory picture should be 
dropped in favour of an enactment one. So comparing the merits of alternative 
descriptions is a central aspect of what the study sets out to do.
The criterion I use for merit, however, is not fidelity to reality. I do not claim 
that my description of status determination should be favoured because it is has 
more empirical support (in fact, questioning the use of empirical support as an 
arbiter to choose between theories is one of the arguments the study develops). 
If my account is to be favoured, it is rather because it helps to problematize 
rather entrenched assumptions about how the border between migrant and 
refugee emerges. Crucially, if my account is to be favoured, it is because it invites 
migration scholars to consider more carefully the possibility that our way of
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speaking about decision ‘as something examiners do’ is part of the bordering 
work as well.
To be so explicit about the political leaning of an ethnographic narrative 
would seem to violate the standard methodological stricture of non­
involvement. One could see my comments so far as a sign that I have 
overstepped the fine line between participating and crossing over.
As a reply to this charge, perhaps the best answer is one adopted by British 
sociologist of science John Law. ‘We all go native’, Law tells us, whether we 
realize it or not.85 We all become cogs in the networks we study. The real 
question is not whether to get involved, but what effect we might want to have. 
On the other hand, as Law adds, to be open about our preferences is not the 
same as being uncritical.86
Following Law’s advice, I think the best I can do is to let the reader assess the 
extent to which my personal preferences have added to or impoverished the 
account.
What does it look like?
In this study, I constantly stitch conceptual arguments to a series of stories that I 
experienced during my time in Brazil. During the four years I worked on this 
thesis, I took an internship position in one of the legal agencies responsible for 
guiding asylum seekers through the maze of status determination. I followed 
asylum seekers in their encounters with the Brazilian Federal Police, in meetings 
with lawyers and case owners and in trajectories that took me through multiple 
sites: from Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo, from Sao Paulo to Brasilia and back 
again. I watched while men and women from all over the world -  old and 
young, Angolans, Colombians, Syrians, Afghans -  inscribed their lives on forms 
and handed in fading documents. I listened while they told their stories, 
sometimes in Spanish and Swahili, sometimes in French or in English, 
sometimes over laugher and sometimes amid tears. I observed while lawyers 
opened new files, filled them with notes and emitted their initial judgments after 
being more or less persuaded by the applicants’ reports. And, after a long and
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hard negotiation, I also gained access to a beautiful arched building designed by 
Oscar Niemeyer in Brasilia, where Conare members reopen those files and emit 
final rulings about people’s lives.
And what did I see while following asylum seekers through society? I found 
an equally heterogeneous array of applicants and documents, poorly printed 
forms, lawyers and case owners, national treaties, old computers, yellow folders, 
fading stamps, interpreters, hum an rights records, ministerial representatives, 
oral accounts, cold meeting rooms and, sometimes, colder police officers, all 
coming together to enact or deny the refugee status of asylum seekers.
To be sure, for the sake of full disclosure, I went out looking at these 
practices already convinced that the definition of whether the asylum seeker is a 
migrant or refugee cannot be traced back to a single and isolated event -  a 
sovereign decision by a petty sovereign.87 Instead, I assumed this distinction to 
be the effect of heterogeneous and decentred practices, in which a striking range 
of people and things are somehow mingled together, thereby allowing an official 
ruling to emerge.
The French philosopher and anthropologist Bruno Latour argues that this 
elusive thing we call ‘the essence of law’ lies not in a definition ‘but in a practice, 
a situated, material practice that ties a whole range of heterogeneous 
phenomena in  a certain specific w a f.88 The challenge, Latour tell us, is in 
unravelling the particular way in which such heterogeneous elements are 
brought together to make a legal decision possible.
Following Latour’s advice, I sought in this study to bring into focus the 
totally specific ways in which the different practices involved in examining 
requests -  and all the heterogeneous elements that come with them -  are 
brought together during status determination in Brazil. Little by little, my desire 
to understand how an asylum seeker succeeds or fails in achieving the refugee 
reality translated into an effort to look at how subjects and objects are stitched 
together, to create the kind of coherent and credible case that examiners are 
looking for.
Here is what I found.
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A breakdown
The ethnography adopts the old fashioned rhetorical format of a travel journey. 
It opens at the first encounters between asylum seekers and the Brazilian 
authorities in Caritas. It closes at the governmental meeting in the capital, 
Brasilia, when cases are brought to a vote and official rulings are published. The 
conceptual argument is arranged as a reflection on what I believe are five 
defining aspects of the declaratory picture of asylum decisions.
Chapter 1, Following the Law, develops a thought experiment to encourage 
scepticism about the use of legal support as a justification for denial. It considers 
arguments made in the scholarly literature on migration concerning the legal 
basis for distinguishing migrants and refugees and it connects these to the 
discussion in the science studies field concerning the notion of rule-following. 
The chapter argues that attempts to justify the demarcation of migrant and 
refugee are stricken by a stronger form of indeterminacy than the scholarly 
debate on migration has considered so far.
Chapter 2, Gathering Evidence, adds a further layer to the sceptical case by 
disputing justifications for decisions that rely on the measurement of empirical 
support. The chapter puts forward a case for a symmetrical approach to asylum 
decisions. It connects snapshots on controversies in the assessment of asylum 
requests to arguments developed in science studies concerning empirical under­
determination and regress. The goal is to highlight a proclivity in examiners’ 
speech to shift registers when justifying decisions with which they agree and 
decisions they dispute.
Chapter 3, Declaring Strength, gives an ontological spin to the arguments 
developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It tells stories to illustrate the impact that 
contingency and heterogeneity have over the outcome of requests. It dwells on 
the implications of the sceptical problems of strong indeterminacy and regress 
to the understanding of asylum decisions as declaratory. The chapter spells out 
the argument that what counts as the case’s anterior reality is enacted in the 
determination practices and not disclosed in them.
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Chapter 4, Judging Consistency, takes the narrative to Sao Paulo and Brasilia 
to discuss how an enactment approach changes the way we see the relation 
between determination practices. Taking issue with the use of consistency as an 
indicator of credibility, the chapter makes a case for attending to how different 
enactments of a case are practically coordinated. It ties these arguments to 
stories about inconsistencies in asylum requests to illustrate how coordination 
might make alternative ways of enacting a case hard to see and thus steer a 
request towards denial.
Chapter 5, Making Decisions, closes the ethnography. It brings the narrative 
into the headquarters of the Brazilian National Committee for Refugees, where 
asylum requests are ruled upon. The chapter establishes a parallel between the 
discussion on the discretionary nature of asylum decisions and the discussion on 
science studies concerning the notion of phase-work. The chapter shows how 
talk of decision as ‘something examiners do’ is turned into a rhetoric device to 
shut down the possibility for dissent and effect practical closure.
Finally, Chapter 6, Enacting Refugees, goes back to the conclusions derived 
from the previous chapters and arranges them around the themes of scepticism, 
enactment and decentring. An enactment approach, the conclusion suggests, 
does not only enrich our understanding of how the border between migrants 
and refugees is built. It also makes us more aware of how our habit of talking 
about decisions as something that examiners do is itself invested in the 
enactment of this border.
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[Picture 1 - Arriving at Caritas]
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1
Following th e  Law
Arriving at Caritas for the first time, a woman crosses the bricked corridor between 
the gate and the reception desk. She is carrying a child, a girl. Caritas’s receptionist 
listens while she tells her story, m ingling words in French and Portuguese as she 
goes along. Stuttering, the woman says she was born in Kinshasa, DR Congo. 
Recently arrived in Rio, she speaks m ainly Lingala, the regional idiom o f  the Congo 
River’s bend. Communication proves difficult, so I  decide to intervene, f  learned a 
few  days earlier that Lingala was deeply influenced by Belgian colonizers and that 
Lingala and French speakers usually manage to communicate. 1 walk to the woman 
and ask i f  she would be ok repeating her story in French. She nods and goes over her 
story again.
‘We are fleeing the war’ she says. ‘Rebels attacked m y  village in North Kivu. L lost 
m y father and m y  husband, and 1 had nowhere to go. A priest go t m e a place in a 
boat and L arrived here. ’
A fter querying her about her child, L ask the receptionist for a French version o f  the 
official Questionnaire for Asylum Request. The receptionist gives the woman a pen  
and a pad, and L advise her to fill in the form as precisely as she can. Besides 
personal details, the form  asks questions like ‘H ow did you enter Brazil?’, ‘Have you  
been granted asylum somewhere else before?’ and ‘What made you leave your 
country o f  origin?’ 1 explain that the answers she will give to these questions will be 
later checked to decide on her refugee status. 1 help with some awkwardphrasings, 
the result o f  a hasty translation from Portuguese. A nd  the woman starts to write, in 
French, taking her time. When all the answers are in place, she hands the form  back 
to the receptionist, who makes copies o f  it  with the help o f  an old Xerox machine. A 
cover letter is stapled to the form  and both documents are handed back to the 
woman, to be delivered to the police unit where she will file her case. Final words 
are exchanged -  ‘Thank you, good bye, good luck’. She takes her daughter’s hand, 
and she goes away.
When she walks back in the street, this woman is not yet an asylum seeker 
before Brazilian law, but she is no longer an invisible alien, either. Her story has 
now been inscribed in an asylum request questionnaire. Her reality as a refugee, 
although yet very fragile, has been mentioned for the first time in the cover letter 
sent to the immigration police. And, although it is not yet entitled to a folder in
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the open case’s archive, her form now merits a place in the ‘potential asylum 
seekers’ pile, which grows at Caritas’s crammed entry hall. This woman, who 
was up to that point virtually invisible to the Brazilian state, has now a slightly 
more visible reality as a potential refugee. The work of deciding on her refugee 
status has begun.
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[Picture 2 - Caritas's Entry Hall and Archive]
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Some months and a lot of bureaucracy later, status determination comes to an 
end.
The fax machine blips. Caritas’s receptionist adds paper to the drum. Another blip 
and the machine starts to print. An A4 sheet ends up sitting in the printer’s tray. The 
receptionist brings the page to the office, where Caritas’s lawyer is typing at her 
laptop. ‘Thanks’, the lawyer says, her eyes still fixed on the screen.
The letter does not bring good news:
Process SR/DPF/DF
1
Claimant: M rs A
Announcement
I  herewith announce for all due purposes that the National Committee for Refugees 
-  Conare, in its Plenary M eeting realized at 19 April 2012, decided to reject your 
request for the recognition o f  the refugee status, given it was n o t proven the 
existence o f  a well-founded fear o f  persecution compatible with the eligibility 
criteria fixed by art. 1° from Law9.474, from 22 July 1997.
General Coordinator 
Conare
This is an unhappy ending. After months of deliberation, Conare has ruled that 
Mrs A is not a refugee. Her asylum request has been denied. Her name has been 
marked in an official letter announcing that she and her daughter will not be 
brought under refugee protection. She may appeal, if there is room for appeal. 
But, as for most cases, having her name printed in this header means she is faced 
by the proverbial choice between the rock and the hard place -  irregularity or 
deportation.
Caritas’s lawyer gives the letter a quick look. One could expect an outburst, bu t the 
work has to go on. There are more cases to examine and more claimants to 
interview. The lawyer hands the letter back to the receptionist and asks, ‘Can you  
tell Mrs A to come down to the office, please? I  need to tell her that her asylum 
request was denied’.
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This is a serious decision to take, to deny asylum. It cannot be made lightly. In a 
very concrete sense, the life and freedom of the applicant might be at stake. At 
the very least, it can halt someone’s hopes of a better life. So, in face of such an 
important judgment, it is only natural to ask: how, after all, is i t  decided?
When foreigners enter Caritas’s office in Rio de Janeiro and fill out asylum 
request questionnairesT^range of practices is put in motion to decide whether 
their claims for refugee reality are warranted. The process of status 
determination has a start. The end comes six or more months later, when 
asylum seekers sit in the chair facing Caritas’s lawyer and are informed that their 
claims have been accepted or denied. Statement and decision are the two poles 
of our narrative. But how is the difference between those who deserve and don’t 
deserve refugee protection established in the meantime?
A declaratory picture
[From a procedural handbook used in Caritas:] In assessing the overall 
credibility of the applicant’s claim, the adjudicator should take into account such 
factors as the reasonableness of the facts alleged, the overall consistency and 
coherence of the applicant’s story, corroborative evidence adduced by the 
applicant in support of his/her statements, consistency with common knowledge 
or generally known facts, and the known situation in the country of origin. 
Credibility is established where the applicant has presented a claim which is 
coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, and therefore is, 
on balance, capable of being believed.89
The procedural handbook mentions law, evidence and credibility when 
accounting for how cases are decided. Examiners are expected to disclose the 
asylum seekers pre-existing reality as a migrant or as an asylum seeker by 
following a sequence of steps, which are designed to assess the case’s internal 
consistency, legal fit and empirical support. At the pinnacle of the determination 
work, decision makers are expected to bring together the evidence and legal 
opinions produced during these steps and rule on the claim. The distinction 
between migrant and refugee is linked to this moment, when Conare members 
come together in Brasilia and decide.
38
Refugee status determination means an examination by a government authority 
or UNHCR of whether an individual who has submitted an asylum application 
or otherwise expressed his or her need for international protection is indeed a 
refugee -  that is, whether his or her situation meets the criteria specified in the 
applicable refugee definition. A person does not become a refugee by virtue of a 
recognition decision by the host country or UNHCR, but is recognized because 
he or she is a refugee. In other words, the recognition decision is declaratory: it 
acknowledges and formally confirms that the individual concerned is a refugee.90
Follow the rule, gather evidence, judge consistency, assess strength and decide. I 
hope to show in this study that this way of accounting for asylum decisions is 
misleading in all aspects. Breaking away from this declaratory account, which 
talks of deciding subjects making decisions at a pivotal event, I will argue that 
the demarcation of migrant and refugee is enacted in a decentred way. I contend 
that a case’s weakness doesn’t emanate from the case, no matter how evident an 
assessment might seem. Understanding how migrants and refugees are set apart 
requires us to study the social and material array in which the case emerges. 
This, I argue, applies not only when the decision becomes contested, but also 
when the case is deemed to be straightforward.
1. The decision is arrived at by contrasting the case to the refugee definition 
and following refugee law;
2. The decision is arrived at by assessing whether the case is supported by the 
evidence available;
3. The decision is arrived at by assessing if the case is consistent;
4. The decision is declaratory. If free from error, the determination procedure 
discloses the case’s strength;
5. The difference between migrant and refugee is set at the end, when decision 
makers sit together and rule on the request.
This list is a breakdown of the declaratory picture I have drawn out from 
practitioners’ remarks and procedural handbooks. I will take it as a contrast to 
develop my account. This chapter opens up the inquiry by dwelling on the first 
item on this list: the suggestion that ‘refugee status determination consists in 
assessing whether an asylum seeker’s case meets the refugee definition’.
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Following the law: the very act
If they are to do their work well, examiners are expected to obey the refugee 
definition established in the 1951 Geneva Convention, in its 1967 Protocol and 
in the regional agreements assimilated in Brazilian law. The resulting refugee 
definition is given by the National Refugee Act. It adopts the definition fixed by 
the Geneva Convention and expands on it to include migration triggered by 
hum an rights violations. Refugees are defined in Brazil as all individuals who:
I -  due to well-founded fear of persecution motivated by race, religion, 
nationality, belonging to a social group or political opinion find themselves 
outside their country of nationality and cannot or choose not to avail themselves 
of the protection of such State;
II -  lacking nationality and being outside their country of usual residence, 
cannot or choose not to return to their country, due to the reasons 
mentioned in the previous clause;
III -  due to severe and generalized hum an rights violations, are forced to 
leave their country of nationality and seek asylum in another country.
For the non-specialist, a bullet point definition like this might make it seem as if 
deciding on asylum requests were a fairly cut-and-dry process. The law offers a 
clear list of the experiences a person has to go through to be declared a refugee. 
On top of this, examiners also work according to guidelines and clarification 
notes published by Conare and the United Nations, which define the standard 
of proof and establish how vague expressions are to be read and how special 
cases ought to be dealt with. In face of all these rules, it would make sense to 
assume that examiners can decide by considering whether a case meets the 
refugee definition. But does the refugee law determinate the outcome of a 
request like Mrs A’s? Can the refugee definition settle the difference between 
migrant and refugee?
Faced with this question, a first possibility would be to answer in the 
affirmative and insist that the refugee law is determinate enough to settle asylum 
decisions (affirmative version). A second possibility would be to attenuate this
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answer and acknowledge that, although the law is certainly clear-cut enough for 
the majority of cases, there is some degree of flexibility in it that makes cases 
indeterminate som etim es (weak indeterminacy version). Finally, a strong 
answer in the negative would consist in saying that there is something about the 
work of status determination that makes asylum decisions legally indeterminate 
all the tim e (strong indeterminacy version).92
The suggestion I put forward in this chapter is that the work of status 
determination is indeterminate all the time. I try to show that, whatever decision 
is taken for a case, it can be shown to be in agreement with the law. This, I 
suggest, undermines attempts to justify denial by saying that a case lacks legal fit.
According to the letter sent to Caritas, Mrs A’s request was denied because ‘it 
was not proven the existence of well-founded fear of persecution compatible the 
eligibility criteria fixed  by art 1, Law 9474’. To put forward the indeterminacy 
thesis is to question the validity of a justification like this.
To say that asylum decisions are legally indeterminate is to say that refugee 
law (which includes not only the National Refugee Act but all other clarification 
notes and procedural guidelines) is not determinate enough to define whether a 
particular asylum seeker is a migrant or a refugee. ‘A legal conclusion is 
indeterminate if the materials of legal analysis [...] are insufficient to resolve the 
question, “Is this proposition or its denial a correct statement of the law?”’93 In 
the next sections, I take this first definition as a starting point to contrast the 
weak and strong versions of the indeterminacy thesis.
The argument will move as a pendulum, swinging back and forth the idea 
that refugee law is determinate enough to distinguish refugees from other 
migrants. The next section opens with two stories I experienced in Brazil: the 
cases of Mr B and Mrs C. In a first step away from the declaratory picture, I 
discuss how these two stories challenge the idea that decisions on asylum 
requests can be arrived at by submitting the case to law. I dwell on what causes 
indeterminacy in these two cases and discuss how consequential examples of 
indeterminacy like these are to the work of status determination.
These two examples, I suggest, illustrate a weak sense in which the work of 
status determination can be said to be indeterminate. In what concerns its
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source, the kind of indeterminacy that these two examples illustrate is linked to 
the ‘open texture’ of the language with which the refugee definition is written. 
Concerning its reach, what makes this first kind of indeterminacy weak is the 
fact that it restricts the phenomenon of indeterminacy to hard cases. This brings 
the pendulum close again to the idea that asylum decisions (at least in the 
majority of easy cases) are indeed legally determinate.
Having characterized the stories of Mr B and Mrs C as examples of a weak 
form of indeterminacy, I move next to discuss the second and stronger version 
of the phenomenon, which I find more consequential to the determination 
work. While the weak form of indeterminacy has to do with difficulties related 
to defining a refugee, the strong version I discuss has to do with the notion of 
rule-following.
Conceptually, the chapter will seek to establish a dialogue between the debate 
on forced migration concerning the value of the migrant/refugee distinction and 
arguments developed in science studies concerning the notion of rule-following. 
This allows me to distinguish the strong form of indeterminacy, which I seek to 
highlight, from the weaker version, which is more familiar to the forced 
migration literature.
The open texture of refugee law
Case #3: M r B, 33 years old, citizen o f  Angola, asking asylum to avoid political 
persecution. Location: A Caritas m eeting room. Starting the eligibility hearing, 
Caritas’s lawyer asks why M r B left Angola and came to Brazil. ‘Soldiers invaded m y  
villa and took m e and m y  brother when we were young. I  lived as a soldier ’, M r B  
says. Caritas’s lawyer asks about his life as a soldier and M r B hesitates. The stories 
he tells are n o t easy to hear. He claims his brother and he were forced to com m it 
crimes: murders, forced recruitment, rape. M r B insists that he had no choice, 
however. ‘I t was do or die!’he says.
Case #4: M rs C, citizen o f  the Ivory Coast, asking for asylum to avoid political 
persecution. Location: Annex II, Justice M inistry building, Brasilia. Conare 
members are gathered in the capital to discuss M rs C’s request. Representing the 
M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs, a diplomat argues for denial. According to him , the 
situation in Ivory Coast was alarming until 2011, bu t now, after a cease-fire, the 
country is safe. He claims that M rs C’s fear o f  political persecution ‘is n o t well- 
founded’.
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Representing civil society, a Caritas lawyer reacts and defends a positive 
recommendation. She rejects the diplomat’s suggestion that M rs C’s fear o f  
persecution is n o t well-founded and dismisses as irrelevant his mention o f  a cease­
fire. She points out that Mrs C was subjected to torture and witnessed murders. 
Whether the country is safe or n o t is n o t the point, the lawyer claims. What matters 
is that Mrs C ‘is genuinely afraid’.
Contrasted to the image of examiners submitting case to law, stories like these 
prove disconcerting. For all the criteria and guidelines examiners have at their 
disposal, cases such as these seem to indicate that the refugee law cannot fully 
constrain how requests are decided.
The declaratory account of the process indicates that examiners do not 
define whether the asylum seeker is a migrant or a refugee. Rather, asylum 
rulings are expected to declare a refugee status that the migrant already has.
Cases like Mr B and Mrs C destabilize this image. They remind us that, at 
least in some cases, this declaratory way of accounting for asylum decisions does 
not hold. Examiners can be equally well informed about the country of origin 
and well versed in refugee law and still disagree on which outcome is the right 
legal answer for the case.
British philosopher of law H.L.A Hart coined the term ‘open texture’ to 
speak of situations like these. As any form of linguistic exchange, laws are built 
using general terms. This, Hart noticed, opens law to language-related sources of 
indeterminacy, like vagueness and ambiguity. Hart considered this kind of 
indeterminacy to be a general feature of hum an language. ‘Uncertainty at the 
borderline [between different readings of a term or of a set of rules] is the price 
to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of communication 
concerning matters of fact.’94
The kind of indeterminacy illustrated by Mr B and Mrs C’s cases seems to fit 
well this uncertainty that Hart attributes to the ‘open texture’ of language. When 
considering how to decide on Mr B and Mrs C’s requests, examiners seem to be 
confronted with this sort uncertainty in at least two ways: in Mr B’s case, when 
the refugee regime embraces rules that point the determination process into 
conflicting directions; and, in Mrs C’s case, when a particular term in the 
refugee definition proves vague.
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Indeterminacy in the Forced Migration Literature
As in the cases of Mr B and Mrs C, the current controversy in the forced migration literature 
concerning the distinction betw een migrants and refugees can also be described as an example 
o f the kind o f 'openness' anticipated by Hart.
Oliver Bakewell, Giulia Scalettari and Nicholas Van Hear, among other authors who criticize the  
distinction, have suggested that 'definitions of categories o f people (such as "refugees", 
"migrants'^...]) are not necessarily m eaningful in the academic field'.95 On the other hand, 
scholars of international refugee law, like Guy Goodwin-Gill and James C. Hathaway, insist that 
the term 'refugee' defines a distinctive social group: refugees are 'by definition both seriously at 
risk and fundamentally disfranchised', as they are 'within the unconditional protective 
com petence o f the international community'.96
Among the critics, three main arguments have been developed to  attack the distinction betw een  
migrants and refugees.97 The first line can been described as historic. It consists in bringing the  
distinction into question by showing that it was m otivated by policy instead o f humanitarian 
needs. The distinction is put into question in this first line for being the outcom e o f bureaucratic 
disputes -  am ong the post-war United States governm ent and the United Nations, for instance -  
and for having its origin not in protection but in m anagem ent concerns.98
A second critique directed to  the migrant/refugee distinction is normative, taking the form of 
either policy-normative or research-normative arguments. Research-normative arguments 
criticize the distinction for hindering the study o f migration-related phenom ena. The gist o f the  
critique is that, when it com es to  studying migration-related topics, like diaspora, repatriation 
and culturally driven migration, treating refugees as different from migrants gets in the way o f a 
better understanding. Empirical studies are invoked as a source of authority to  substantiate the  
claim.99
Policy-normative critiques adopt a similar reasoning, but dispute the distinction by emphasizing 
its negative consequences for policy. The basic insight is that policy makers should not insist on 
the distinction because it hinders their ability to  protect the broader category of 'displaced 
people'. The basic argument is that refugees have the sam e human rights needs as other  
migrants and that policy would be more efficient if it centred on protecting th ese  needs.100
Finally, a third line of critique that has been directed against the refugee/m igrant distinction can 
be described as analytic. Closely intertwined with normative critiques, this argument charges the  
distinction with being built on problematic sociological assumptions. Research-normative 
arguments note that the distinction betw een migrant and refugee is bad for research. The 
reasoning in this analytical line o f critique is slightly different from the normative line. It 
maintains that the distinction is bad research. This claim has been made in tw o main ways. The 
first is to  say that the distinction betw een refugees and migrants is poor research because it 
inherits a bias from the study o f international relations, thus favouring state-centrism  and 
sedentarism and treating mobility as pathologic.101 The second and more recurrent analytic 
critique sets its target on the 'voluntary x forced' binary in which the distinction betw een  
migrants and refugees is often based.102
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This last line o f critique is perhaps the m ost com m on attack m ade against the migrant/refugee 
binary. Much of the policy discussion works under the assumption - as UNHRC states - that 
'migrants are fundamentally different from refugees' because 'migrants, especially econom ic  
migrants, choose to  move in order to  improve their lives', while 'refugees are forced to  flee  to  
save their lives or preserve their freedom '.103
Authors that adopt this line o f critique challenge any clear-cut demarcation betw een forced and 
voluntary m ovem ent. This argument has been developed both through conceptual arguments 
about agency and through empirical research. The basic claim is the obvious but often  
overlooked fact that decisions to  migrate always involve both choice and com pulsion.104
Moving now to  those authors who defend the contrast, James C. Hathaway offers what is 
perhaps the m ost detailed reply to  the critiques outlined above.105 The crux o f Hathaway's 
argument is his attem pt to  circumvent analytic critiques and justify the m igrant/refugee  
distinction on new  grounds. Hathaway reacts to  these  critiques by acknowledging their potential 
merit while at the sam e tim e dismissing them  for being focused on the wrong target. Hathaway 
agrees that persecution and state inability are not distinctive enough features to  set refugees 
apart from other migrant categories. Although it is often assum ed that these  are the tw o  
features that distinguish the refugee condition from the migrant condition, he claims that this is 
a mistake. Nevertheless, Hathaway insists that there are at tw o other features that distinguish 
refugees from other migrant categories.
The first o f these  features is what Hathaway calls 'double deservingness' or 'double merit'. 
Hathaway argues that refugees are different not only because they are forced to  migrate (merit 
1), but also because they are forced to  migrate due to  fundamental disfranchisement within the  
hom e community (merit 2). In other words, what distinguishes refugees from migrants is that 
the human rights violations they endure involve denial o f rights ('disfranchisement'). Hathaway 
explains that the operative notion in this argument is discrimination. 'A citizen 1 has access to  a 
right [R]. Citizen 2 is denied right [R] by dint of, say, her religious preference.' Following 
Hathaway's double rule o f refugeehood, citizen 2 would count as a refugee, as she m eets the  
tw o merits o f persecution and social disfranchisement.
Hathaway anticipates that it would be possible to  challenge the use of double merit as a 
distinctive feature o f refugeehood by showing that groups o f forced migrants also fulfil this 
requirement. To foreclose this objection, he invokes the notion of unqualified access. Hathaway 
claims that, besides double merit, a second feature that differentiates refugees from migrants is 
that refugees are under the 'protection-reach' of the international community (outside their 
state of birth or usual residence). As he puts it, 'Refugee status defines a class o f persons to  
whom the international community can, as a matter o f practicality, undertake to  provide an 
unconditional response'.106
Hathaway leaves behind the commonly invoked features o f forced mobility and protection  
failure but immediately replaces them  with tw o new features that he claims set refugee and 
migrants apart. He argues that the combination o f double merit and unquestioned access gives 
us a 'sound principle not to  lump refugees with all forced migrants'.107
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Mr B’s case can be read as an example of ambiguity in refugee law triggered 
by a difference in emphasis. Considering the grounds for denial, the Brazilian 
Refugee Act determines that ‘individuals who committed crimes against peace, 
war crimes, or other heinous crimes [...] shall not be granted refugee status’.108 
In a similar vein, Article IF of the Geneva Convention fixes that refugee 
protection must be denied to ‘he [or she] who is guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations’.109 At the same time, however, 
the United Nations encourages examiners to treat ‘duress’, ‘superior orders’ and 
‘coercion’ as extenuating circumstances. In its guideline on application of the 
exclusion clause, UNHCR urges examiners to keep in mind that ‘applicants may 
have a valid defence to a crime or act committed’.110 The form of indeterminacy 
that this creates is triggered by a potential ambiguity involving alternative 
readings of refugee law that give different emphasis to the rules on exclusion and 
extenuating circumstances.
In Mrs C’s case, indeterminacy is triggered by the vague way in which the 
refugee law defines ‘well-founded fear’. If the expression is read as meaning 
‘well-founded in facts’, then the Caritas lawyer and diplomat could perhaps 
agree that the Ivory Coast is safe and conclude that Mrs C is not a refugee 
because her fear is not ‘well-founded’. On the other hand, if well-founded is 
read as meaning ‘the well established presence of the psychological state of fear’, 
then examiners might conclude that, because Mrs C’s fear is ‘well-founded’ by 
its authenticity, she is indeed a refugee. We can thus read Mrs C’s case as an 
example of indeterminacy linked to the vagueness of the notion of well-founded 
fear, which can be read with either an objective or subjective spin.111
Should the violence endured by Mr B mitigate his crimes? Does well-founded 
fear mean fear that is founded in facts about the country of origin or fear that is 
genuine? The fact that status determination involves dealing with this sort of 
question suggests that -  at least in some cases -  the refugee law is not clear-cut 
enough to determine the procedure’s outcome.
So far in this section, I have relied on Mr B and Mrs C’s cases to illustrate this 
first sense in which status determination can be said to be indeterminate. These 
examples have allowed me to take a first step away from the declaratory image of
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status determination, which accounts for asylum decisions as a matter of 
‘assessing whether an asylum seeker’s case meets the refugee definition’.
The bottom line of this discussion is that there is no right answer ‘disclosed’ 
by examiners and that the work of status determination should not be treated 
mechanically, as a matter of submitting cases to law. This argument, I’m  sure, 
will come as no surprise. The more relevant question I want to prompt, 
however, is the one that comes next: even if we accept that the work of status 
determination involves navigating instances of indeterminacy, there remains the 
question about how significant this form of indeterminacy is. Beyond some hard 
cases, does the fact that asylum decisions are not fully constrained by the law 
allow us to claim that decisions justified in terms of legal fit are untrainable? The 
next section will assess this issue by dwelling on remarks made by examiners in 
Brazil concerning the differences between easy and hard cases.
Easy and hard cases
Mr B and Mrs C’s cases illustrate a first sense in which the refugee definition can 
be said to be indeterminate. The kind of indeterminacy the two cases exemplify 
has its source in the open texture of the language with which refugee law is 
written, which gives rise to vagueness and ambiguity. The discussion on the last 
section has focused specifically on the issue of source (where does this kind of 
indeterminacy come from?). In this section, I will take the narrative back to 
Brazil to dwell on the issue of ‘reach’ (how significant is the phenomenon?). I 
will argue that what makes this first kind of indeterminacy weak is the fact that it 
restricts the phenomenon of indeterminacy to hard cases.
Consider the remarks below, in which examiners discuss the differences 
between cases they see as complex and cases they see as straightforward.
[An examiner] You know, when you go and look at the decision, when you follow it 
through, sometimes you find  that i t  could have gone either way I  don’t  know. M y  
experience is that although this is very deep, the categories organize this protection 
somehow. You kn o w ... ‘thisperson is closer to this category or to that one’, and all 
that. I f  the case has clear basis for asylum, you can recommend recognition with 
more certainty. But i f  the guy is in this frontier here [drawing line with hands] that 
has this economic issue, then, depending on the case, you pretty much know  it  will 
be denied.
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In itself, to recognize that the work of status determination involves dealing with 
moments of indeterminacy doesn’t imply that the phenomenon prevents the 
ultimate task of distinguishing migrants and refugees. Examiners can recognize 
that episodes of indeterminacy occur every now and then. They can concede 
that there is something very deep about the refugee definition that makes it 
‘open’ somehow. And still, in spite of acknowledging all this, they can insist on 
justifying denial by talking of a lack of legal fit.
The Brazilian law has this overtone that considers human rights violations as basis 
for asylum, so there is some wiggle room for you to try to defend this sort o f  case. 
But, o f  course, there are cases that are more evident, you k n o w ... cases when you 
know  for sure that the person will be labelled an economic migrant and an irregular 
migrant and will have the request denied. A nd  there is the other extreme too, o f  
course. You kn o w ... the guy comes from DRC, brings a lo t o f  documents, etc. etc. 
... the story is coherent, you have reports that his hometown is going through 
problems, etc. etc. Naturally, you can suppose this guy will m ost likely be accepted 
as a refugee.
A remark like this, about ‘overtones’ and ‘wiggle room ’, acknowledges that the 
assessment of legal fit is stricken by indeterminacy -  at least sometimes. It 
reminds us that deciding on a request is not so simple a matter of contrasting 
case against law. At the same time in which it brings up indeterminacy, however, 
the reaction makes the phenomenon a little less biting. By contrasting the case in 
which there is wiggle room from the case that is ‘more evident’, this remark 
simultaneously hints at indeterminacy and restricts its reach.
Cases when the person brings elements which are clear enough and when all 
elements indicate that there is basis for asylum; these I  would count as evident. I f  the 
person is coming from a region known to be a region where there is persecution or a 
long-lasting conflict, for instance, or i f  the persecution is well documented... And, 
also, there are cases when it is pretty evident that there is no basis for asylum. I t also 
happens. Sometimes we have already examined 10, 20, 50 similar cases, and all the 
applicants made a, say, very weak argument, without any elements indicating 
persecution. These cases are evidently more prone to denial. We study them  
carefully, o f  course. We look at all the information. B ut it  doesn't make sense to 
linger too much.
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In some cases it is indeed hard to tell whether the person is a migrant or a 
refugee. In other cases, however, establishing the difference is pretty 
straightforward. Examiners's remarks on indeterminacy would often develop 
in this way. Examiners would start by telling me of cases in which they found 
themselves torn between vague terms and conflicting rulings. And then they 
would follow these stories with appeals to some sort of tacit knowledge, insisting 
on their ability to distinguish cases that are hard from cases that are 
straightforward.
I  am talking about cases that are pretty evident here. Sometimes the person even 
believes that she is entitled to asylum, but the argument is very w eak ... there is no 
element o f  persecution involving her. I ’m  no t saying that the decision is completely 
obvious, o f  course. The interview is made in all fairness; I  want to stress that. But 
more often than n o t there is no basis for asylum. You have to remember that the 
examiner is doing this all the time; thinking about cases, doing research, etc. And, to 
a great degree, cases are similar to each other. So we need to trust the examiner that 
is there, everyday, doing the work.
I dwell on the examiner’s ability to distinguish hard and straightforward cases in 
Chapter 2. For now, what I want to bring out in these remarks is the bouncing 
movement of acknowledging and restricting indeterminacy at the same time. If 
we connect these remarks to how the indeterminacy phenomenon has been 
dealt with in legal theory, one way of making sense of this bouncing movement 
is found in Hart’s contrast between easy and hard cases.
Although acknowledging indeterminacy, Hart claims that the phenomenon 
is of limited significance. The search for a shared understanding of the law can 
indeed give rise to indeterminacy, he claimed. But this phenomenon will affect 
only a relatively small number of cases in comparison with the vast majority of 
cases in which the laws will be precise enough to determine the ruling. In a 
classic example, Hart asks us to imagine a scenario in which, invoking a legal 
rule that forbids the presence of vehicles in public parks, a case is opened asking 
that bicycles be forbidden in a certain park. Hart suggests that indeterminacy is 
triggered in this case by the term ‘vehicle’, which gives room for doubt on 
whether or not bicycles fit this category. Hart insists, however, that in spite of
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this potential indeterminacy, there is a majority of cases in which the meaning of 
vehicle’ will be clear enough to determine whether the prohibition applies or 
not. For instance, if a truck drives through the grass in Hyde Park it will be clear 
that the prohibition against vehicles in public parks is being violated.
Hart establishes two contrasts to express this insight: the first opposes the 
‘core’ and the ‘penumbra’ of legal meaning. The second contrasts ‘easy’ and 
‘hard cases’. A word like vehicle, he explains, has a core of determinate meaning 
and penumbra or ‘fringe’ of indeterminate meaning. Easy cases would be those 
in which the legal text can be read in its core, being clear enough to determine 
whether a legal rule applies. Hard cases, in turn, would be those in which the 
reading of this legal rule falls in this fringe. In Hart’s definition, in spite of 
whether the decision took a lot of paper work or was relatively quick, what 
makes a case hard is that its outcome will ultimately consist in a discretionary 
decision by the adjudicator.112
A consequence of accepting that indeterminacy holds only in a certain 
number of cases is that this number can be reduced to an extent at which the 
phenomenon stops being relevant. That is the strategy adopted by scholar of 
constitutional law Ronald Dworkin in his reaction to indeterminacy. In his 
Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin attacks the notion of hard cases for giving too 
much room for uncertainty. The error, Dworkin argues, is caused by the fact 
that the conception of law used to define hard cases is too restricted. For 
Dworkin, the discussion on whether the law can determine the outcome of 
cases ought to define law beyond the prima facie legal rule, including also 
‘principles, policies and other standards’ on which adjudicators might rely.113 
The idea of precedents -  the way similar cases have been dealt with in the past -  
plays a key role in this reaction to indeterminacy. A precedent, Dworkin claims, 
‘is the report of an earlier political decision; the very fact of that decision [...] 
provides some reason for deciding other cases in a similar way in the future’.114
These arguments are meant to show that, when examiners distinguish 
‘complex’ and ‘evident’ cases, they are speaking about indeterminacy in a way 
shared by legal theorists. The kind of indeterminacy illustrated by cases like Mr 
B and Mrs C’s affects the declaratory way of accounting for decisions. These
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cases show that refugee law is not always clear enough to work as a rule on 
which examiners can rely to separate migrants from refugees. And yet, as the 
remarks above indicate, to acknowledge this kind of £open-texture 
indeterminacy’ doesn’t stop examiners from relying on legal fit to justify their 
decisions. When talking about the difference between complex and 
straightforward cases, examiners’ discourses move in something like a swing: 
they acknowledge that indeterminacy affects hard cases while retaining the use 
of legal fit as a credibility indicator in more evident claims.
So far, the argument has followed this motion, starting with arguments that 
highlight indeterminacy and later discussing how the phenomenon can be 
constrained. I took as a starting point the assumption that ‘status determination 
consists in assessing whether an asylum seeker’s case meets the refugee 
definition’. I then discussed how this picture comes under pressure, both as 
expressed by examiners and in the forced migration literature. And, in this 
section, I sought to unpack a way of talking that enables examiners to react to 
indeterminacy while retaining legal fit as a justification for decisions.
Having introduced this first form of indeterminacy, I turn now to a stronger 
version, which I believe is more significant to status determination. In the next 
section, I characterize strong indeterminacy around the same axes I relied on to 
characterize the weak version: the phenomenon’s source and reach. The weak 
form of indeterminacy I have been discussing so far is triggered by the open 
texture of legal language. The strong version I discuss next has its source in the 
act of following a rule. Weak indeterminacy is restricted to hard cases. Strong 
indeterminacy has a general reach, affecting cases that might at first be 
considered straightforward. The question prompted by this stronger version of 
the indeterminacy thesis is not whether the refugee law is determinate enough to 
fix the outcome of a case, but whether the absence of legal fit can be offered as a 
justification for the asylum decisions it is meant to support.
Strong indeterminacy
W hether human behaviour can be justified in terms of rule-following has been a 
topic of discussion in the field of science studies from the literature’s outset.
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Science studies gained visibility in the 1970s, with its proposal to study 
empirically topics that were until then considered the domain of the theory of 
knowledge. The work of Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of 
the main sources of inspiration for this project. Wittgenstein’s work on the 
notion of rule-following proved particularly relevant, and gave rise to a rich 
discussion on the social implications of linguistic indeterminacy. One topic 
proved particularly controversial among sociologists -  that of how we can 
believe in indeterminacy and account for the fact that human behaviour is 
nevertheless orderly most of the time. Different approaches to this question 
were derived from different readings of Wittgenstein’s work.115 Some authors 
went on searching for an answer by studying the power of conventions, 
common training and social positioning to inform individuals’ dispositions and 
organize behaviour.116 Other authors sought to account for the possibility of 
orderly behaviour by studying aspects that are intrinsic to the practices analysed: 
the way actors talk, how actors behave when communicating and what other 
methods actors use to organize their day-to-day interactions.117
My interest in the everyday work of status determination places this study 
closer to this second approach. I justify my focus in the detail of determination 
practices in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The point now is to give a sense of how my 
concern with strong indeterminacy is inspired by the broader project of the 
science studies field. In this section, I want to suggest that the work of status 
determination is stricken by a strong form of indeterminacy first identified by 
Wittgenstein. This form of strong indeterminacy challenges the distinction 
between easy and hard cases and has its source in the very act of following a rule.
Let us go back to the case of Mrs A, which we came across at the start of the 
chapter. Consider again the justification given by Conare for denial. According 
to the justification letter, Conare’s plenary decided to reject Mrs A’s request 
because ‘it was not proven the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution 
compatible with the eligibility criteria fixed by art. 1° from Law 9.474’. The 
picture here is one in which examiners took into consideration whether Mrs A’s 
case met the refugee definition as fixed by article 1 and, after studying her case, 
concluded that the eligibility criteria were not fulfilled. The decision for denial is
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attributed to this lack of legal fit. Notice that, in justifying denial this way, 
examiners are making reference to a sense of requirement. There is a sense that 
Conare ought to deny Mrs A’s request if the eligibility criteria fixed by article 1 
was to be respected.118
Now, implied in this justification is the assumption that examiners are in a 
position to tell when a case is ‘compatible’ with the intended meaning of article 
1. Mrs A’s request amounts to the claim that her case fulfils the refugee 
definition. In accounting for a negative ruling in terms of lack of legal fit, 
Conare’s plenary is claiming that it doesn’t. But what evidence can these 
examiners give to show that this conclusion is right? How can they show that 
they are respecting the intended meaning of the refugee definition when they 
decided to deny Mrs A’s request? A strong kind of indeterminacy comes to the 
fore when we ask examiners to demonstrate the basis for this conclusion.
To make this strong form of indeterminacy easier to grasp, I will put the real 
case aside for now and make use of what is known in academia as a thought 
experiment. I will create a mental picture of how Mrs A’s case could have 
progressed, in order to help readers experience strong indeterminacy, instead of 
trying to explain it in abstract. As historian of science Thomas Kuhn once put it, 
the function of thought experiments is not to arrive at some sort of deeper truth 
about the issue at hand. Rather, by positing a situation that, although thinkable, 
might otherwise not occur in a natural way, a thought experiment is meant to 
highlight ‘misfits between experience and implicit expectations’ and provide 
‘clues’ on how to rethink the situation.119 That is what my thought experiment 
consists of: by positing a situation that, although perfectly possible, will 
probably sound absurd, I want to highlight an implicit assumption about the 
determinacy of the refugee definition and offer a clue on how we can look at 
status determination in a fresh way.
To start with, let us imagine that a fierce controversy broke out in the plenary 
meeting around Mrs A’s case. As protagonists, we have a diplomat and a rather 
sceptical lawyer. The diplomat’s position is that, if Conare is to follow the 
intended meaning of the refugee definition, it m ust deny Mrs A’s request. The 
sceptical lawyer, on the other hand, disagrees with this conclusion and argues
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that, if the plenary is to follow the refugee definition, Mrs A’s request m ust be 
accepted. My starting point is the question: what evidence can the diplomat 
produce to show that a negative decision would be consistent with the intended 
meaning of the refugee definition? I will consider two ways in which the 
diplomat can try to justify denial. Each of these attempts is followed by 
arguments the sceptical lawyer could make to reject these justifications.
Let us consider a first way in which the diplomat might try to convince the 
sceptical lawyer that a negative decision would be the right one.
[Diplomat, voting for denial] We are deciding for denial because we are following 
the refugee definition. I f  you doubt that, all you have to do is to look at this list o f  
precedents, which shows how  the refugee definition has been applied before. I  
guarantee that, i f  you look at these precedents, you w ill see that the refugee 
definition has been interpreted in the way we are interpreting it.
This is a first way in which the diplomat could try to show that a negative 
decision is in line with refugee law. In this first reaction, the diplomat justifies 
the negative recommendation by making reference to how the refugee definition 
has been applied in the past. Once again, at stake here is whether the diplomat 
can show that denial is in line with the intended meaning of the refugee 
definition. In this scene, the diplomat insists that, in denying Mrs A’s request, 
Conare would be interpreting the refugee definition the way it has been 
interpreted before and, to prove this, offers a list of precedents.
[Diplomat] I  am interpreting the refugee definition in the same way it has been 
interpreted before. This brings m e to the conclusion that M rs A ’s case doesn’t  m eet 
the criteria o f  well-founded fear o f  persecution fixed by the law. That is why I  am 
voting for denial.
Note that, in answering like this, the diplomat is giving an answer that is similar 
to Dworkin’s reaction to indeterminacy discussed in the last section. Dworkin 
suggested that a decision might seem legally indeterminate, but that the use of 
precedents, together with other standards and principles, allow adjudicators to 
arrive at the right ruling. The diplomat in this scene is following a similar logic: 
trying to show that a negative decision is supported by the refugee definition by
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showing that a negative decision would be consistent with the way similar cases 
have been decided before. The assumption here is that, if the diplomat can show 
denial to be justified using the definition as it has been used before, this would 
be enough to overcome the doubts raised by the sceptical lawyer.
Having looked at this first attempt to justify the denial of Mrs A’s case, I want 
now to illustrate how strong indeterminacy undercuts it. Consider the scene 
below. The sceptical lawyer reacts to this first attempt by the diplomat to justify 
denial. Even after the diplomat offers this list of precedents, the lawyer continues 
to question that Conare is following the law in denying Mrs A’s request. 
Answering the diplomat, the lawyer defends a new way of interpreting the 
refugee definition and dismisses the interpretation made by the diplomat as 
wrong. The lawyer claims that, in the previous cases, the decisions only seemed 
to be in line with the diplomat’s reading, but they were actually in line with this 
alternative interpretation.
[The lawyer, answering the diplomat] There is this way o f  interpreting the definition 
(#1) that you use. B ut there is also another interpretation (#2), which is the one I  
use. In all these precedent cases you ju st mentioned, we would have got to the same 
conclusion by interpreting the refugee definition according to interpretation #1 or 
according to interpretation #2. M rs A ’s case is different, however. In M rs A s case, 
following ‘the rig h f interpretation requires us to accept the request.
The lawyer’s answer allows us to grasp how strong indeterminacy affects the 
diplomat’s attempt to justify denial. The diplomat tries to justify denial by 
claiming that a negative ruling is supported by precedent. As mentioned above, 
the assumption is that, if the diplomat can show that denial of the case follows 
the definition as it has been used before, this would be enough to overcome the 
doubts raised by the sceptical lawyer. The answer given by the sceptical lawyer 
prompts strong indeterminacy by showing that this assumption doesn’t hold.
The compilation of previous decisions invoked by the diplomat in support of 
interpretation #1 might include all instances of previous use. The answer given 
by the lawyer shows that not even this exhaustive list of precedents would be 
enough to dismiss the sceptical claim that the definition should be read 
differently. The list of precedents might include all examples of previous
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decisions to suggest that Conare, in refusing Mrs A’s request, would be 
following the refugee definition as it has been used before. The sceptical lawyer 
can concede that. Still, she simply adds that all these previous decisions would 
be equally compatible with interpretation #2. This subtle nudge in the lawyer’s 
argument undercuts the power of even an exhaustive compilation of precedents 
to determine the meaning of the refugee definition.
So far, we have considered how strong indeterminacy affects the possibility of 
determining the meaning of the refugee definition through reference to past use. 
The upshot of the argument so far is that the diplomat’s (and Dworkin’s) initial 
attempt to justify denial through reference to past use cannot dismiss the doubts 
raised by the sceptical lawyer. As the set of previous use is finite, the use made of 
the definition in a new case can always be shown to be consistent with precedent 
while at the same time being consistent with a non-linear interpretation.120
Now let’s consider a second way in which the diplomat could try to show 
that a negative decision would be in line with the meaning of the refugee 
definition. In the real world, our sceptical lawyer would probably be fired or 
locked in a mental hospital by now. But continuing in our thought experiment, 
let us suppose that the diplomat is still trying to prove that a negative decision on 
Mrs A’s case would be in line with the refugee definition. Let us consider now 
how this diplomat could try to prove that the lawyer is wrong in defending the 
alternative reading (interpretation #2) of the definition. How can the diplomat 
prove that her way of reading the refugee definition (interpretation#!) is what is 
actually meant by the refugee definition and not the alternative reading 
defended by Caritas’s lawyer?
The diplomat’s first reaction -  to make reference to past use -  proved 
insufficient to dismiss the doubts raised by Caritas’s lawyer. To try to overcome 
this, in a second reaction, the diplomat doesn’t try to justify the negative 
decision by making reference to past use. Instead, the diplomat makes reference 
to a set of clarification notes and procedural handbooks in place to settle doubts 
about how the law must be read. In doing this, the diplomat is again following 
in Dworkin’s footsteps, trying to counter indeterminacy by expanding the 
domain of the law to include these interpretative guidelines.
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[Diplomat] We don’t decide on new cases by checking past use. We are capable o f  
following the definition even in cases we haven’t  come across before. This is possible 
because we have clarification notes and handbooks that tell us what the terms in the 
definition mean. So, when the definition says something like ‘refugee status is 
reserved to individuals who have a well-founded fear o f  persecution ’, we know  what 
‘well-founded fear’ means and we decide accordingly. I f  this expression is vague, we 
can rely on a clarification note discussing the standard o f  p ro o f to understand what 
‘well-founded fear’means.
This scene illustrates a second way in which the diplomat can seek to show that 
denying Mrs A’s request would be in line with the refugee definition. Here, the 
diplomat is seeking to demonstrate the absence of legal fit by making reference 
to auxiliary definitions. The underlying assumption in this answer is that, when 
examiners decide on a case, they don’t check past use and try to decide new 
cases accordingly. Instead, they understand the meaning of the terms that 
compose the definition. When a term proves vague or ambiguous, examiners 
can count on clarification notes that define how the term is to be read.121
The idea that the terms used in law can have their meaning clarified sounds 
reasonable enough. It makes even more sense if we keep in mind the many 
handbooks and guidelines published by the United Nations to establish a 
common ‘hermeneutic’ of refugee law. As intuitive as it might sound, however, 
the problem with an answer like this is that the interpretative rule invoked by 
the diplomat is just as affected by strong indeterminacy as the original definition 
it is supposed to elucidate. For example, the diplomat suggests that the meaning 
of ‘well-founded fear’ might be clarified if we check a note on the standard of 
proof. In this note, in turn, we read that, to be well-established, a claim must be 
‘plausible’ and ‘coherent’. Relying on this note to justify the denial of Mrs A’s 
request would thus assume that the diplomat is in a position to prove that she or 
he is interpreting ‘plausible’ and ‘coherent’ in line with the intended meanings 
of these terms.
When our thought experiment gets to this point, we are faced with a strong 
form of indeterminacy, which occurs in the very act of following a rule. ‘How 
can I justify my present application of such a rule, when a sceptic could easily 
interpret it so as to yield any of an indefinite num ber of other results?’122
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On Rule-Following
W ittgenstein developed his insights on rule-following using the image o f a child in a math class. 
As examiners find rules on how to  decide in legal books, the pupil finds in a math book a rule on 
how to  calculate. The teacher gives exam ples o f this rule being applied, writing at the  
blackboard '2+2=4, plus 2=6', continuing this sequence until '998+2=1000'. The teacher then  
asks the student to  'follow this rule, adding tw o from 1000 onwards'. Reacting to  the instruction, 
the student writes '1002, 10022, 100222'. Irritated, the teacher rebukes the student for 'not 
following the rule properly'. W ittgenstein's question is: Is there any way to  prove this student is 
not following what the rule 'actually said'?123
American philosopher Saul Kripke uses a slightly different image to  make this point. As a student 
taking a math test, you are asked to  fill the blank in '68+57=_', to  which you dutifully answer  
'125'. At this point, a sceptic enters the scene, claiming this answer is wrong. 'You interpreted 
the sign "+" as "addition", but what it actually m eans  is that you should follow the rule of 
"quaddition", in which case the right answer would be "5"'.
As my diplomat tries to  answer the lawyer, the student seeks to  justify the results through 
reference to  past use. Although she hadn't done this precise addition before, she claims she has 
interpreted the sign '+' in the way it has been used in countless operations before. To this, the  
sceptic gives the disconcerting reply: 'In all these  previous uses, you would get the sam e result 
by reading "+" as meaning addition or quaddition. But "68+57" is a new case. You might believe  
that you got to  "125" because you were following the rule of addition. But had you follow ed  
what the rule actually m eans, you would have arrived at "5" as a result'.
At this point, Kripke tells us, the student could react by dismissing the argument as nonsense. 
The student could reply that when he learned to  do addition, he learned a formula and not a list 
o f examples. 'When you tell me to  do "68+57", what I read is "step 1: collect 68 marbles. Step 2: 
collect 57 marbles. Step 3: put all these  marbles together in the sam e set. Step 4: count the  
number o f marbles in the final set". Following this algorithm will bring m e to  1251' According to  
Kripke, this reaction can sound correct, but it only postpones indeterminacy. The sceptic can 
immediately rebuke,
'In this formula you just described, you misinterpreted the word "count" in the phrase "count 
the number o f marbles in the final set". When this formula says "count" it m eans that you  
should do the operation o f "quounting". In all exam ples you cam e across before, you would get  
to  the sam e result by "counting" or "quounting" the set of marbles. But this operation is 
different.' and so forth.
What w e have here is the beginning o f a regress. The student can try to  specify the intended  
meaning o f the rule o f addition as much as she wants. But, in invoking 'a rule on how the  
previous rule must be read', she is just postponing the problem. Eventually, 'justifications com e  
to  an end som ew here'124 and w e are 'left with a rule which is com pletely unreduced to  any 
other'.125 The conclusion Kripke takes from this is that the reason why an action is recognized as 
an instance o f rule-following is to  be found not in the meaning o f the rule. Instead, it is to  be 
found in the social conditions by which an assertion to  be 'following the rule' is itself accepted as 
valid.126
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As we have seen at the start of the section, the justification given by Conare 
says that Mrs A’s request was denied because ‘it was not proven the existence of 
a well-founded fear of persecution compatible with the refugee definition’. As I 
notice above, a justification like this assumes that examiners are in a position to 
tell when a case is ‘compatible’ with the intended meaning of the refugee 
definition. The strong form of indeterminacy has its source in the fact that 
examiners have no basis to tell when this ‘compatibility with the rule’ has been 
established or not.
In his first reaction, the diplomat tries to show that denying Mrs A’s request 
would be to apply the refugee definition as it has been used countless times 
before. Indeterminacy is not dispelled here, however: no matter how exhaustive 
is the compilation of precedents, these instances of previous use can be shown to 
be equally compatible with the alternative interpretation defended by the 
sceptical lawyer. Faced with this defence, the diplomat can seek to justify his 
assessment of lack of legal fit by showing that his reading of the refugee 
definition is supported by the procedural guidelines, clarification notes and any 
other rules that specify how the definition must be interpreted. Again, the 
sceptical lawyer can create reasonable doubt by asking the diplomat to 
demonstrate that the use made of these rules of interpretation is in line with 
their intended meaning.
At the end of the day, the upshot of the thought experiment is that, as ‘every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule’ it would seem that ‘no 
course of action could be said to be determined by a rule’. The sceptical lawyer is 
able to show that an alternative interpretation of the refugee definition would be 
just as supported by precedent and by the interpretation guidelines as would be 
the diplomat’s interpretation. That implies that neither the diplomat nor the 
lawyer can claim to be acting in accordance with the refugee definition, which, 
in turn, implicates that neither of them can justify their recommendation 
regarding Mrs A’s request in terms of compatibility with this definition.
In what concerns its reach, ‘rule-following indeterminacy’ is stronger than 
the version of the phenomenon triggered by the open texture of refugee law. The 
problem this strong form of indeterminacy raises for the declaratory model puts
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in question the very distinction between complex and straightforward cases. If 
Wittgenstein’s insights on rule-following are not nonsense, this would seem to 
suggest that cases are never ‘easy’, in the sense of their having been ‘decided by 
being brought under the intended meaning of the law’. To bend a phrase, no 
matter how evidently an asylum request might seem ‘to lack fit with the refugee 
definition’: examiners would be giving a misleading account if they justified 
denial by saying they are following the law. In our thought experiment, a 
sceptical lawyer brought this strong form of indeterminacy to our attention by 
asking questions that would be considered absurd otherwise. In the real world, 
justifications for denial that invoke lack of legal fit can go unchallenged. The 
logical impossibility of showing that an asylum request ‘lacks fit’ with the 
refugee definition remains, nevertheless.
Indeterminacy as a practical problem
It is intuitive to assume that examiners can decide on Mrs A’s request by 
assessing whether it fulfils the refugee definition. But is the refugee law 
determinate enough to tell whether Mrs A is a migrant or a refugee?
The answer this chapter encouraged is negative. W ith my thought 
experiment, I sought to show that accounts that justify denial by pointing to a 
lack of legal fit are subjected to a strong form of indeterminacy that has its 
source in the act of rule-following itself; as any course of action can be shown to 
be compatible with the refugee definition, no course of action can be justified in 
terms of legal fit. This strong form of indeterminacy, I have argued, cannot be 
overcome through reference to precedent or clarification notes. The legal texts 
that define a refugee, including these precedents and interpretative guidelines, 
offer no ground for examiners to stand on to assess the degree of legal fit.
The argument is n o t that refugee law is indeterminate because it is based on 
an untenable distinction between forced and voluntary migration. As the box on 
forced migration was meant to show, this point has been rehearsed in the 
scholarly debate. In this literature, a controversy exists concerning the value of 
the migrant/refugee contrast. Authors who are critical of the distinction 
question the possibility of saying whether a migrant was forced or chose to
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move. Others insist that migrants and refugees belong to different categories and 
strive to establish the difference on new grounds. Both sides invoke danger as 
rhetorical strategies, warning us of eerie policy repercussions that might result 
from insisting or dismissing the distinction.
Although I see truth in both sides of the argument, this chapter sides with 
neither of them. Instead, I have sought to call attention to a stronger sense in 
which the distinction between refugees and migrants is indeterminate. This 
strong form of indeterminacy has to do less with whether the definition is vague 
and more with its capacity to guide a decision. It takes us beyond the trite point 
that examiners can make a cynical reading of the law or that the definition can 
be read in more than one way. The conclusion this form of indeterminacy 
invites is stronger: no matter how evidently a case might seem to lack legal fit, 
attempts to account for a decision in terms of ‘I am following the rule’ are 
ultimately unsound. Examiners could recommend a different decision 
altogether and, still, there would be no reasonable ground to dispute they were 
following the same rule. To paraphrase Kripke, any present intention could be 
interpreted so as to accord with anything examiners choose to do. So there can 
be neither accord, nor conflict with the refugee definition.127
We are starting to invert scepticism here. To say that decisions on asylum 
requests consist in assessing whether the case fulfils the requirement established 
by the refugee law seems almost self-evident. Examiners talk of conflicting rules 
and vague phrases but insist that, at least in straightforward cases, it is possible 
to establish whether the person is a migrant or a refugee by following the law. 
Likewise, in the scholarly literature it is often mentioned that the distinction 
between migrants and refugees is fragile. Yet, this remark is often taken as a call 
for a more precise definition.
W hat this strong form of indeterminacy suggests is that the greatest challenge 
affecting attempts to establish this distinction has to do not with the possibility 
of establishing a rule of differentiation. The challenge lies not in whether it is 
possible to produce a functional definition of refugees that allows them to be 
differentiated from other kinds of migrants. Instead, it has to do with a form of 
indeterminacy examiners face in practice, when they have to assess whether a
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case fits this definition. This strong form of indeterminacy is not a definitional 
problem. It is a practical problem, concerning the very act following a rule.
How is it decided?
Strong indeterminacy puts in question examiners’ capacity to show what the 
refugee definition ‘actually means’ (the possibility of demonstrating intended 
meaning). This, in turn, puts in question the possibility of accounting for an 
asylum decision as the outcome of following this definition. If examiners can’t 
determine what the refugee law actually means, they can’t invoke it to justify 
their decisions. Assuming we accept that attempts at rule following are subject 
to this strong form of indeterminacy, the question then becomes: what 
difference does this make to how we account for asylum decisions?
In Mrs A’s case, examiners considered that the case didn’t meet the criteria of 
refugee-hood established by the national act. That, they claimed, was the reason 
why they voted for denial. If this strong form of indeterminacy is not nonsense, 
it would seem that their recourse to legal fit as a justification for denial ceases to 
be an option. Examiners could go for either a positive or a negative ruling and 
still show this decision to be in agreement with the refugee definition.
By arguing that status determination is subject to strong indeterminacy, my 
goal is not to suggest that decisions are arbitrary, but to restate my initial 
question in stronger terms. In the everyday work of status determination, the 
matter of who is a migrant and who is a refugee is settled, somehow. The 
argument of indeterminacy brings into question the possibility of justifying this 
distinction in terms of a case’s fit with the refugee law. The decision on whether 
the asylum seeker is a migrant or a refugee must then be accounted for in some 
other way. The question this leaves us with is, once again, ‘how?’
It would be easy to consider the argument that asylum decisions are not 
determined by the law as an indication that these decisions are discretionary.128 
It could seem, then, that the reference to the lack of legal fit does no more than 
legitimize what is an arbitrary and discretionary decision. The next chapters will 
seek to tackle this question differently, by showing how decisions are arrived at, 
not as a discretionary exercise, but as a contingent and heterogeneous process.
62




Questionnaire, copy machine, cover letter and goodbye. In the months I worked 
in Caritas, I saw this small arrangement recreated time and time again. I took 
part in it myself. For, in Caritas, volunteers are quickly drawn into the work. 
The staff does the best it can with the limited resources it has. But resources are, 
indeed, very limited. There is not enough money or enough people to do all that 
needs to be done. As a result, anyone who volunteers to do something is more 
than welcomed to give it a go. In a very selfish sense, this had the upside of 
giving me access to all the practices I offered myself to. Less than a m onth in, I 
saw myself carrying out tasks that I had hardly expected to be allowed to 
observe. I worked as an interpreter, led eligibility interviews and even wrote legal 
recommendations. During my time in Caritas, far from being the detached 
observer that is idealized by some versions of anthropology, I was an active cog 
in this heterogeneous array of people, forms, paper piles and copy machines.
In this chapter, I tell some more stories about status determination in Brazil. 
In Chapter 1, I have relied on the notion of strong indeterminacy to 
problematize the use of legal fit as a justification for denial. I also discussed a 
discursive device that enables examiners to circumvent indeterminacy by 
contrasting cases they accept as complex and cases they insist are ‘more evident’. 
This chapter continues the inquiry by discussing the role played by empirical 
support in the declaratory model of asylum decisions.
In its N ote on Burden and Standard o f  P ro o f in  Refugee Claims., UNHCR 
recommends that, in order to assess a case’s strength, ‘the adjudicator should 
take into account corroborative evidence adduced by the applicant in support of 
his/her statements’, as well as ‘consistency with common knowledge or generally 
known facts’ and ‘the known situation in the country of origin.’129 Chapters 3 
and 4 will discuss the image of examiners ‘declaring’ a case’s strength and the
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use of consistency as an indicator of credibility. This chapter focuses on 
examiners’ reliance on empirical support to distinguish weak and strong cases. 
Deconstructively, I take issue with the assumption that examiners can arrive at a 
decision by assessing whether the case is ‘corroborated by evidence’. 
Reconstructively, I will foreground a feature of the examiner’s discourse and 
show how it helps to enact the perception that a case is empirically supported.
The stories that follow pivot around what struck me as a recurrent feature of 
examiners’ talk: when commenting on their decisions, the examiners I met 
would often lay hold of what impressed me as one-sided arguments. Speaking of 
cases that they saw as clearly weak, examiners would tie their negative decisions 
to this intrinsic quality of the case. In contrast, when commenting on 
controversial cases -  especially when the official ruling went against their views -  
these examiners would explain the case’s outcome in more elaborate terms, 
pointing to extrinsic physiological and social factors. Borrowing a term from the 
science studies field, I use asym m etry to name this way of reasoning, in which 
decisions on ‘more evident’ and ‘more complex’ cases are differently justified.
As in Chapter 1, the negative dimension of the argument will seek to 
problematize the declaratory picture of status determination. I will argue that 
decisions to deny asylum requests cannot be accounted for by pointing to a lack 
of empirical support. For, during status determination, which decision is 
supported by the evidence available is itself under-determined and under 
dispute. And here’s the catch: this applies to straightforward cases as well.
W hen an asylum seeker like Mrs A fills in an asylum request, she is making a 
series of statements. According to the default picture, examiners can arrive at a 
decision by considering whether these statements are in line with known facts. 
Accounting for their decisions on asymmetric terms, examiners jump from law 
and evidence to social and psychological bias when justifying decisions on more 
evident and more complex cases. By doing so, they ‘black-box’ the procedure, 
which kills the drive to ask how asylum requests that strike them as empirically 
weak were enacted as such. By the end of the chapter, that is the question I hope 
you will be asking yourself.
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I begin by looking at how examiners justify their recommendations when 
faced with a controversy concerning empirical support. I then look in detail at 
the communications of a Conare examiner and a UNHCR officer to highlight an 
asymmetry in how they account for decisions on empirically-strong and 
empirically-weak claims. Finally, I conclude by spelling out why I am convinced 
that accounts that tie negative decisions to lack of empirical support are self- 
defeating and why we are better off leaving them behind.
Dissent
Caritas’s lawyer takes note. Case number 36: Mr D, male, citizen of Ghana, 
requesting asylum to avoid ethnic persecution. Caritas’s lawyer recommends 
recognition. Conare’s representative argues that the case lacks empirical support 
and recommends denial.
For Conare, there are signs that someone else answered the request questionnaire 
for M r D: phrases used by him  were identical in different documents. The officer 
says M r D  om itted information from Caritas: he said to Caritas that he was in 
hiding, while the evidence suggests that he was arrested. Commenting on the 
political context in Ghana, the Conare officer argues that ethnic persecution is 
restricted to the country's northern region and that the m ost recent report by  
Am nesty International doesn’t support the allegation o f  ethnic persecution. For 
Conare, there is no well-founded fear.
IM D H’s representative disagrees. She accepts defining Ghana as democratic, but 
stresses the existence o f  ethnic conflicts. Commenting on the Am nesty International 
report, she focuses on the human rights elements. In the lawyer’s opinion, she 
claims, whether or n o t there was direct persecution is n o t the key issue in M r D ’s 
case. For her, the basis for M r D ’s request lies in the conflict itse lf and the 
widespread human rights violations i t  generates.
Conare’s officer continues to disagree. While for Caritas the legal basis for the 
request lies in the human rights violations, for Conare the interview made i t  clear 
that the claim o f  persecution is related to the rise to power o f  a political group. The 
ethnic conflict is secondary to the political dispute, the Conare officer insists. He 
m entions that, in a different case, the asylum seeker who was recognized as refugee 
belonged to an ethnic group that opposed M r D ’s ethnicity. This, the officer claims, 
shows that it  would be incoherent to recognize M r D as a refugee.
No agreement. Case sent to the plenary meeting without a recommendation.
In this scene, envoys of different Brazilian ministries, the Federal Police, Conare, 
UNHCR, Caritas and other civil society agencies are gathered in the annex
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building to the Justice Ministry in Brasilia. They are members of the Group of 
Preparatory Studies, which is abbreviated to GEP in Portuguese. Their task is to 
propose first rulings for asylum requests, which are later forwarded to the 
Conare’s plenary. GEP members discuss a list of cases during the day. When 
disagreement is strong, the case is labelled ‘undecided’ and sent to the plenary 
without a recommendation attached to it. Mr D’s case was one of these.
This scene caught my attention thanks to the interpretative flexibility it 
captures: lawyer and officer have different views on what the case recommends, 
based on different ways of assessing the evidence.130 Both examiners make 
reference to the same Amnesty International report as empirical footing. But 
they read the report in rather different ways. Should persecution for ethnic 
reasons be given priority, as Conare’s officer defends, or should we focus on the 
issue of human rights violations, as sustained by Caritas? The lawyer points to 
the report and says that the asylum request should be accepted. Conare’s officer 
points to the same report but argues that the request should be denied. They cite 
different passages and attribute different relevance to them. They find some 
sections worth mentioning while others are ignored. In a case like this, when the 
interpretation of evidence seems laden by different world views, how is it 
decided whose reading of the evidence is right?
[Picture 4 -  Negative Consensus]
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Disagreements like this, about how to read a hum an rights report, might sound 
insignificant, but their potential repercussions are serious. The risk of denying 
asylum to someone who needs it is very real. And, for some examiners, the 
chance of granting protection to someone who doesn’t fit the refugee definition 
sounds equally vexing. So to avoid ‘trivializing the asylum institution’, as some 
officers are wont to say, examiners tend to be rather watchful of the 
justifications they give for their rulings. Examiners avoid psychological 
prejudices and social pressures as sources of error.131 These ‘external’ factors may 
lead examiners to apply the law biasedly or to rely on misleading evidence. So, to 
prevent mistakes, examiners keep constant guard against them. Their ultimate 
goal, as Conare’s coordinator once put it, is the ‘optimum functioning’ of status 
determination: ‘No one who deserves asylum should be deprived of it. And 
those that don’t merit international protection shouldn’t be allowed to wrest it’.
[A Conare officer] Because i t  can happen for both sides, you know? I t can be for 
good or for bad. You can deny for someone that should be entitled or you can’t  
grant i t  for some who shouldn ’t.
Of course, examiners are the first to recognize that an absolutely bias-free 
decision is but an ideal aim. In practice, many will say, it is very hard to avoid 
that some degree of bias interferes with the judgment they make. As examiners 
insist, their unique backgrounds give them different leanings when assessing 
evidence. They can feel more empathy for one asylum seeker and less for 
another. And, as in every profession, they are exposed to different bureaucratic 
pressures, according to the agencies in which they work. Yet few if any 
examiners, I risk saying, would dispute that the interference of psychological 
and social factors needs to be carefully controlled.
[Conare’s coordinator] We have this image o f  status determination, but we know, 
o f  course, that a lo t o f  things that shouldn’t  interfere end up interfering. That is why 
we have all these stages. We have Caritas, we have the civil society, we have our 
officers m aking the interviews, we have GEP, discussing the case again, and we have 
the plenary meeting. The idea is to dilute these things.
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As it is hard to avoid bias, examiners are aware of extrinsic factors that might 
interfere with their rulings. They seek to avoid bias by repeating their assessment 
again and again. Like the ‘good researchers’ described by historians of science, 
examiners ‘restrain from imposing their expectations on the image of nature’.132 
Decisions, I would often h e a r,1 cannot be m ade fo r no reason ’. Rulings must be 
properly founded on a thorough assessment of legal fit and careful empirical 
research. As much as possible, the message is that the case must be allowed to 
speak for itself.
A nd also, ju st imagine: i t  would be k ind  o f  stupid, you know? The guy receives the 
status now  in October and then in December Conare realizes that it  has to remove 
it. I t  wouldn’t  look nice. I t would look like we don’t  have any criteria or that the 
judgm ent was done in a rush. So, we prefer to wait a litde longer, so we can be sure.
Examiners are thus always on the lookout for potential sources of error. They 
aim at reliable rulings, which will not be proved wrong in the long run. Even 
after a decision has been made, a central concern for them is to make sure the 
decision process was not corrupted. For many examiners I talked to, the clearer 
symptom of bias is dissent around cases they see as manifest. If an asylum 
request that is seen as evidently weak is nevertheless accepted, this is taken as a 
sign that the determination process has been crooked in some way. Likewise, if 
the position of the examiner giving the account guides the final ruling, this is 
taken as a signal that other examiners also noticed the manifested weakness of 
the claim. This is taken to show, in turn, that the judgment has been clean.
[A Conare officer] Like in this interview I  did in Caritas in Manaus. What 
happened: I  talked to the whole fam ily (a Congolese m other and two sons). They all 
told basically the same story. A nd  the m other showed m e this old newspaper 
clipping. I t was a real newspaper, crimped and everything. A nd  it showed that the 
rest o f  her fam ily had been murdered. She brought this proof, like this. What was 
written in the newspaper was indeed what she had told me. She said that something 
had happened in her village and it really had happened. In this case, i t  was fairly easy 
to decide. They had to be refugees... they were refugees, all right.
For the Conare officer conducting this interview, a real newspaper, ‘crimped 
and everything’, stands for sufficient proof. The pertinence of the asylum
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request is deemed evident. The fact that this clearly empirically-strong case is 
accepted barely needs to be accounted for. In a case like this, the decision can be 
explained in simple terms. The manifest presence of supporting evidence is 
deemed enough to explain why the asylum request was accepted. Assent around 
cases in which the empirical footing is plain is treated as self-explanatory.
Indeed, this assumption is so entrenched that, when asked to comment on 
decisions on empirically ‘evident’ cases, examiners would often receive my 
request with a puzzled look. I could never say if what their faces expressed was 
surprise for my bizarre question, dismissiveness for its triviality or genuine 
concern for my mental health. For how couldn’t I see why the decision on a 
clearly weak case had been straightforward? Wasn’t it obvious? In cases where 
the lack of empirical support is clear, the decision is straightforward because the 
lack of empirical footing is plain. W hat can be more logical than that?
For examiners, to ask why a decision on an ‘evidently weak’ case was 
dismissed didn’t seem to make much sense. Now, the reaction was usually very 
different when I asked examiners to comment on cases in which a request they 
considered empirically-strong was nevertheless denied. While an examiner’s 
decision on ‘evidently-weak’ cases was explained in passing or not explained at 
all, deviations from what an examiner deemed to be the correct decision raised 
many questions. Mistaken decisions seemed to demand a much more elaborate 
reply. Prejudice, political agendas, economic interests, plain racism, lack of 
education and other non-legal and non-empirical factors were quickly identified 
and used to explain the ‘error’ made by the other examiners.
The particular form these replies would take varied considerably according to 
the examiner to whom I talked. Sometimes, the contradicted examiner would 
turn into a lay psychologist, shifting the register of discussion from the 
cornerstones of legal fit and empirical support to some sort of psychological 
diagnosis.
[A case owner] These guys from UNHCR are like doctors without patients, you see? 
Have you heard this expression, doctors without patients’? They are like doctors 
without patients. I t ’s like they are always looking for someone to save.
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Another reaction I came across often consisted in the contradicted examiner 
turning into a lay sociologist, explaining the wrong decision by reference to 
social pressures of different kinds -  bureaucratic pressures, disputes for funding, 
a desire to gain authority and so on.
[A Conare officer] So, I i l  be very honest; these guys are looking for attention, for 
money, you know? I ’ll  be very honest. As I  told you before: these guys want to bring 
everybody in. They need to ju stify  their office here.
The next chapters will have more to say about remarks like these: of how the 
very pragmatic need ‘not to look stupid’ emerges as a major concern. We will 
also come back to the topic of consistency in Chapter 4. But, for now, it is the 
one-sidedness of these accounts to which I want to attend. W hat I want to 
highlight is this proclivity to ‘shift registers’, as sociologists Michael Mulkay and 
Nigel Gilbert once put it,133 and this ease, to paraphrase Latour, with which 
examiners weigh success and failure using different scales.134 When a case is not 
‘evident’ and the decision goes against their expectations, the cause for this error 
is sought in psychological or social bias. In turn, a decision on a case that the 
examiner deems ‘evidently weak’ barely needs to be accounted for, being 
justified through reference to the lack of empirical support alone.
British sociologist David Bloor uses the term ‘asymmetry’ to describe this 
sort of Janus-faced reasoning, in which truthfulness is taken as intrinsic to the 
claim while only error is to be explored.135 In Bloor’s account, asymmetric 
explanations maintain that if a statement that looks right, smells rights and acts 
right is accepted as right, then the best possible explanation is to entertain the 
possibility that it actually is right. Otherwise, the fact that so many people accept 
the statement as right would be a miracle.136 Following this reasoning, 
sociologists are invited to explain what external factors lead to mistakes. If a 
logically and methodologically sound statement is not accepted as right, or if an 
unwarranted statement is considered to be right, then this needs to be accounted 
for. But, as the reasoning goes, there is little to be gained by asking why a 
decision that is logically and empirically sound is accepted as such.137
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Weak and Strong Programmes
The sc ien ce stu d ies to o lse t  adop ted  in this th esis is heavily indebted to  Bloor's effort to  
extend  W ittgenstein 's strong indeterm inacy th esis into sociology. Taken for granted by 
m any philosophers at Bloor's tim e w as th e  idea that b elief in scientific and logical th e se s  is 
justified, qu ite sim ply, b ecau se  th ey  are right. Philosophers assum ed that scientific and 
logical know ledge w ere  d ifferent from  other kinds o f  belief, like ta ste  and political opinion, 
which w e  acquire for m otives external to  reason. With his rem arks on strong  
indeterm inacy, W ittgenstein  problem atized accou nts for know ledge o f  this sort. Of course  
w e believe that 2+2 equals 4, W ittgenstein  insisted, but th e  reason  w e  b e lieve  cannot be  
th e  rule o f  calculus alone. Bloor's insight w as to  read W ittgenstein 's remarks on rule- 
follow ing as an invitation to  so c io lo g y .138
In th e  conventional im age o f  know ledge Bloor attacks, th ere  is a contex t o f  d iscovery and  
th ere  is a contex t o f  validation, which m ust be kept apart. There is th e  issue o f  proposing a 
theory and then  th ere  is th e  d ifferent issue o f dem onstrating that th is theory  is right or, at 
least, is th e  b est explanation w e  have. In this im age, it d o esn 't m atter th e  kinds o f  factors  
that influence th e  theories' gen esis. After experts claim a theory  is right, th ey  still have to  
dem onstrate  that rightness in a m anner congenial to  logic and th e  b est m ethodological 
practices o f  th e  day. Sociologists can try to  understand w h at g o e s  on inside th e  co n tex t o f  
discovery. They can try to  iso late th e  'eth o s o f  sc ience' in th e se  dem ocratic so c ie tie s  or find  
th e  sociological cau ses o f error in th e  authoritarian o n e s .139 But if o n e  w an ts to  understand  
w hy w hat counts as right counts as right, then  th e  answ er is to  be found in logical 
reasoning and good  m eth od  alone. In th e  academ ic division o f  labour encouraged  by this  
dem arcation b etw een  g en esis and justification, understanding w hat m akes scientific and  
logical th e se s  true is th e  turf o f  ph ilosophers -  no socio logists required.
To attack this picture, Bloor g o e s  straight to  th e  sou rce -  th e  holiest o f  holies, m athem atics. 
Drawing on W ittgenstein 's remarks on rule-following discussed in Chapter 1, Bloor g e ts  th e  
very basic sen ten ce  'add tw o' and asks h ow  w e  learn to  react to  it. W hen faced  w ith a basic  
equation  such as '2, 4, 6...', how  do w e  know  h ow  to  react w h en  so m e o n e  asks us to  'add  
tw o'?  Taking his cue from W ittgenstein  remarks on rule-following, Bloor tells us that, from  
a logical point o f view , w h en  faced  w ith th is situation, th ere  w ould be as reasonab le  ground  
to  answ er '2, 4, 6, 8 ,1 0 ...'  as there w ould be to  w rite '2 ,4 ,  6, 2, 2, 2...'140
Of course, Bloor is m ore than aw are that o n e  only n eed s to  read th e se  tw o  se q u en ce s  to  
know  -  to  f e e l -  which o n e  is right. But if th e  reason behind that feeling is not logical, th en  
this im pression o f logical necessity , this fact th a t w e  fee l co m p e lled  to  answ er in th e  first 
way, is w hat n eed s to  be accou nted  for. As Bloor readily remarks, to  accou nt for this feelin g  
o f  logical com pulsion g o es  far beyond a socio logy  o f  error. It puts into q u estion  th e  very  
division o f labour b etw een  philosophers and socio log ists, b e tw een  g en esis  and justification . 
The estab lishm ent o f certainty itself -  th e  condition  o f  being truth that d istinguishes th o se  
sta tem en ts w e  accept as true -  is o p en ed  for inquiry.141
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Bloor asks why some expert statements are accepted as knowledge by a social 
group. Considering some of the standard answers given by experts, Bloor tells us 
to be aware of asymmetric accounts. Asymmetric explanations tend to be 
circular, he warns. A la Moliere’s opioid, which is said to put people to sleep 
because it is ‘dormitive’, an account that explains why a theory is accepted right 
by attributing this to its truth-quality doesn’t bring us very far. In fact, it only 
moves us around in an idle wheel.142
My interest in how some decisions on asylum requests are accepted as 
empirically strong is directly inspired by Bloor’s discussion on expert 
knowledge. I believe his suspicion of asymmetric reasoning is a healthy warning 
to those interested in how asylum requests are decided. In their talk, many of the 
examiners I met engaged almost precisely in the kind of one-sided reasoning 
about which Bloor warns. The same examiners that would venture on 
psychology and sociology to explain error would resign themselves to a 
predictable reference to legal fit and empirical support when accounting for a 
negative decision on a case for which they considered the lack of empirical 
support to be plain.
A negative consequence of this asymmetric reasoning is that decisions on 
these straightforward cases are barely accounted for. If a case is deemed to be 
supported by law and evidence, there is nothing to be gained by asking why it 
was accepted. Conversely, if the lack of legal fit and empirical support is 
considered evident, there is no point in dwelling much on why the request was 
denied. I hope the general structure of this asymmetric reasoning will be familiar 
by now. The next section unpacks it in finer detail by looking at how asymmetry 
becomes visible in two examples of examiner’s talk.
Shifting registers
We are back at Caritas’s office in Rio, in a crammed office box built from plastic 
beads and grimy partitions that serves as interview room for Caritas’s eligibility 
team. Amid the come-and-go of staff and asylum seekers, Mrs H and I meet for 
the first time. Caritas’s lawyer makes the introduction. He tells me Mrs H used 
to work at UNHCR. Mrs H is a seasoned examiner, he says, having written
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many legal recommendations sent to Conare. ‘She will have a lot to teach you’. 
It is my very first day, so I ask Mrs H about the key challenges I must caution 
for. I tell her I am curious about how examiners distinguish strong and weak 
cases. And Mrs H answers freely, sharing her views on Conare and UNHCR.
[Mrs H ] What should m atter m ost is always the objective evidence. Because the 
subjective judgment, you know, you shouldn ’t try to guess whether the person is 
telling the truth. The law says that there ju st needs to be a reasonable chance that the 
person is fleeing persecution; that should be enough to acknowledge the person as a 
refugee. Now, this issue o f  subjective elements is very complicated. As we follow the 
interviews, there’re indeed things about the case that UNHCR will know  and that 
Caritas will know  and Conare sim ply w on! know; the way the person is telling the 
story, i f  she is crying or sad . . . .
From the start, Mrs H puts a lot of weight in her ability to attain a subtle balance 
between subjective elements and objective evidence to sustain a legal 
recommendation. In a diplomatic tone, which she will soon drop, Mrs H 
reminds me that Conare officers have limited contact with asylum seekers. A 
consequence of this, she suggests, is that their judgments are not always so 
carefully made. Very subtly, Mrs H is already deploying the terms that will later 
allow her to characterize divergent opinions as mistakes.
So, for example, i f  Conare rejected the case because, say, a man says he was a soldier 
but he doesn’t know  the k ind  o f  weapon he had. For Conare, this shows that this 
guy wasn’t  really a soldier. But our work is to analyse the case m ore deeply. Was this 
man speaking the language correctly? Is i t  possible that he actually knows the gun ’s 
name, but he doesn’t know  how  to say it  in Portuguese?
In this intermediary step, Mrs H centres the discussion on the examiner’s ability 
to follow procedural guidelines. Reading the handbooks discussed in the 
previous draft, we came across this warning many times: if they are to build a 
proper judgment about an asylum request, examiners ought to put in context 
eventual inconsistencies in an asylum seeker’s narrative. Mrs H seems convinced 
that, as UNHCR officers spend more time with asylum seekers, their 
understanding of cases is more profound in that sense. Furthermore, there are 
many legitimate reasons for why an asylum seeker’s narrative might be
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perceived as inconsistent. Mrs H describes UNHCR officers as being more aware 
of these possibilities. The interviews they conduct would then be more attentive 
to procedural guidelines.
For example, in this Congolese woman s case: she didn ’t  speak Portuguese well. She 
gave some information that, unfortunately, was later used against her. She gave the 
information and then we realized that she probably m eant other dates and things 
like this. I t was part o f  our work to show that, no, she wasn’t lying, that maybe she 
didn’t  say the right dates because she didn’t  speak the language well, or because she 
was suffering a trauma -  this k ind  o f  thing. These are subjective elements, but which 
can support the case. Unfortunately, Conare officers don’t always consider this. 
They ju st assumed she was lying. So, this subjective aspect we try to use really only 
when it  supports the case, because leaving it  to Conare can easily backfire.
Mrs H is speaking her mind in increasingly explicit terms. She charges Conare 
officers with jumping to conclusions. They err -  she puts it more explicitly now 
-  because they don’t attend carefully enough to special circumstances. As in this 
Congolese woman’s case, Conare examiners are charged for not being attentive 
enough to the trauma and language barrier the asylum seeker might be facing. 
For that reason, Mrs H defends reference to subjective elements only when it is 
done in accordance with a tacit criterion of good faith -  to consider special 
circumstances and cultural relativity. For drawing on subjective elements to 
support a recommendation, she says, ‘can easily back-fire’.
Unfortunately, what we see is that, for Conare, i f  this woman that was raped tells her 
story and doesn’t cry, then she is automatically lying. But we know  this is wrong. 
We know  there are cultural differences, different ways o f  showing grief. Overall her 
story was perfectiy coherent. The dates she gave were all confirmed by the research, 
the places where she says there were attacks, we know  Bom humanitarian reports 
that there really were massacres in that city. But, unfortunately, even after UNHCR 
said, Yes, she is a refugee’, this was a case that Conare rejected because they decided 
based on this completely subjective thing. This happens m any times. Even when you 
research the country o f  origin and this research proves 100% that everything this 
person says really happened, they conclude that the person is lying. B ut this opinion 
is n o t based on anything solid. So, you know, m any times we see cases being rejected 
by Conare because they can’t bother. I t  ju s t happens. By the law, she should have 
been recognized. B ut she wasn’t. This is k ind  o f  unfair.
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Through a subtle nudge in her argument, Mrs H lets asymmetry in. She speaks 
of her recommendation as being 100% proved by the objective research. She 
insists that the statements made by the Congolese woman about dates and places 
were all checked against reality and proved  to be true. The natural question then 
becomes why the case ended up in refusal. As a reply, Mrs H dismisses the 
opposing ruling as mistaken. Asymmetrically, she explains the error by pointing 
to the external, ‘purely subjective consideration’ behind Conare’s position.
To be sure, there are many reasons to take Mrs H’s comments at face value. If 
I were to express judgment at this point, I might as well agree that interviews 
conducted by Conare are often too brief and not careful enough. But, 
although I don’t claim neutrality, this kind of face value critique is not what I 
seek to express. More than using my own judgment, I am interested in how 
those involved in status determination judge: how they decide the rightness of a 
decision to deny or grant asylum.143 And here, when it comes to sustaining her 
recommendation, Mrs H ’s account is asymmetric, as ethically desirable as it may 
sound. Mrs H shifts registers to justify her recommendation and account for 
Conare’s mistake. She jumps from law and evidence to society and psychology 
to account for the outcome she sees as wrong.
fPicture 5 -  The interview rooml
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An account like Mrs H ’s brings us quite far from the image of status 
determination we get from legal texts and procedural handbooks. Asylum 
hearings are not light conversations and Mrs H doesn’t pretend they are. Her 
account is vivid and sad. It speaks of trauma, of rape, of hope. As a case for a 
liberal stance towards asylum, Mrs H ’s argument was one I found easy to accept.
I would feel very different in my encounters with Mr J -  a Conare case owner 
and unblushing apologist of strict immigration rules. As part of the 
determination procedure, Conare officers conduct their own eligibility 
interviews. As there is a considerable case backlog, this stage in the procedure is 
usually behind schedule. So, when the next plenary meeting is close, Conare 
officers leave their offices in the capital and go out in missions across Brazil. 
This happens every three months or so. I met M r J during one of these trips.
We talked mostly about controversial cases. Mr J told me what are for him 
the usual causes for disagreement in GEP and how he seeks to sustain his 
recommendations in the face of dissent. Now, looking at our conversation in 
retrospect, I am tempted to describe my reaction as a loose and unintentional 
version of what ethnometodologist Harold Garfinkel once called a ‘breaching 
experiment’; without really realizing it, I acted in our conversation in a way that 
violated M r J’s expectancies of a background understanding.1441 was annoyed by 
what impressed me as xenophobic overtones in Mr J’s remarks. So, whenever he 
made reference to a taken-for-granted understanding of how a decision on 
asylum requests was established, I made a point to ignore his expectation and 
asked the very awkward question of what he meant by it.
[M r J] To decide is basically to check i f  what the person states -  i f  the things she 
tells -  really happened in her country and whether they fit the law to be an asylum 
case. So, depending on what the person says, you think what you have to do in the 
objective research, and then you raise the information and you bring i t  to be 
discussed in GEP.
In this remark, Mr J invokes the standard understanding of status determination 
as the work of assessing the claim’s legal fit and empirical support. To decide if a 
claim for refugee reality is warranted is to check the statements made by the 
asylum seeker against the reality in the country of origin; it is to consider the
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case against the legal definition of refugee; and it is to evaluate the narrative 
against itself. In these three steps, it would seem, the examiner can check the 
legal fit, the empirical footing and the internal consistency of the narrative.
[Me] A nd  in a situation like this [when disagreement is strong] what do you do?
[M r J] In cases like these, when we discuss a lo t and don’tg e t an agreement, we send 
the case to the main meeting as an open case. I t  goes to the plenary. Then you have 
this issue o f  argumentation. I t ’s like I  told you: those cases where there is 
disagreement go to GEP. They go for discussion. We disagree, then, you know, 
everyone will expose their arguments etc., like that. A nd  it  depends on who makes 
the better argument. When you have doubts about whether the case fits [the legal 
definition] to be a case o f  refuge, then it goes straight to GEP, to be discussed. A nd  i f  
the doubt is about the objective elements, we wait and we do more research.
Mr J speaks of dissent. A listener could be convinced by this quote that GEP and 
plenary meetings are spaces of rational comparison of information and 
exchange of ideas, where the examiner who builds the best case wins the day. 
Sooner or later, one could assume, the recommendation that is in better fit with 
refugee law and better sustained by evidence will be identified. The insistence 
that divergences can be solved through extra research and cross-argumentation 
retain the image of asylum requests as a rational enterprise, properly decided in 
accordance to law and evidence. The recognition that there are cases when 
examiners don’t manage to overcome dissent is immediately followed by the 
suggestion that not all examiners read law and reality equally well.
[Me] A nd  this extra-research usually convinces other members?
(M r J) Sometimes it  does. N ot always. Like this guy’s case, for instance. He was from  
Colombia. I  interviewed him  and he told m e that there were training camps in 
operation at his hom e city and he was afraid o f  being high-jacked. That was in 2010. 
You see? This is ju s t unlikely. So, the week this guy arrived I  did some research at the 
US’s State Department website and there was no report about any camp in that city. 
But, guess what: the case went on to GEP and the UNHCR’s guy kep t saying that he 
had checked his internal reports and that these were in line with what the 
Colombian guy was saying and so forth. So, i t  was like, m e saying the guy wasn’t  a 
refugee and this UNHCR guy saying he was.
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In the first comment, we have a politically correct suggestion that divergent legal 
opinions can be productively reconciled through rational exchange. This image 
starts to give room here to hints that the dissident UNHCR examiner might be 
basing his opinion on dubious internal reports. The ability of GEP members to 
appreciate which case is supported by trustable evidence and the proper 
interpretation of law is gradually brought into question. The discussion starts to 
centre on the choice of sources and their relative credibility. Which source 
should be given priority -  UNHCR’s internal reports or the reports by the State 
Department checked by Mr J? Mr J starts to build his account for why some case 
examiners disagree with his view.
[Me] You disagreed completely, you mean?
[M r JJ Exactly.
[Me] A nd  did you try to prove you were right?
[M r J] Well, I  went on and checked again i f  the guy’s arguments were believable 
[note that the ‘guy’ now is UNHCR’s officer]. The case was discussed in GEP and 
the UNHCR’s guy kept saying that he had seen these reports, etc. ... that the story 
made sense. So I  went on and took a look at his report and, you know, it  was very 
clear. [Mr J pauses. He lowers his voice] I t was very clear, mate. You know? These 
guys from UNHCR, they really want to bring everybody in . . . .
Mr J questions the credibility of the UNHCR officer, in what marks an 
important turn in his reasoning. The focus changes from ‘the Colombian guy’ to 
‘the UNHCR guy’. Mr J’s suspicion is not restricted to the existence of FARC 
camps anymore. The argument is refocused on the issue of how trustable are the 
UNHCR examiners making use of the evidence. Mr J invokes honesty. He 
lowers his voice. He is about to say something that, although sincere for him, 
also risks coming across as too blunt. He will move beyond the limit of what he 
assumes to be politically correct. We are entering the psycho-social register.
[Me] U NHCR... ?
[M r JJ Yeah. I ’ve seen it, mate, a UNHCR agent going to GEP and saying a lo t o f  
bullshit. Because people think, cOww, i t ’s the United Nations, they can’t  make
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mistakes’, but I  saw it man. There was this report prepared by UNHCR’s office in 
Colombia saying like [drawing a small map of Colombia on an A4 sheet], ‘ These are 
the main regions where we have problems with the guerrilla’, and it  said, like, ‘The 
pacific coast, the frontier with Ecuador and the frontier with Venezuela ’. The report 
was saying this, very generally, in the first paragraph. Now  [prolonging the word 
‘now’ as he speaks], in the third paragraph, i t  went on and said where exactly in 
these regions the problem was. Like, Tt’s going on in cities X, Y, Z ’. A nd  the city the 
guy was coming from wasn’tm entioned.
But, what happened: the UNHCR officer brought this map to GEP, showing that 
the city was in one o f  these problematic regions. The city was highlighted in the map 
and you could see that it  really was in there. B ut what he didn’t say is that the report 
didn’t  m ention the city. He ju st quoted the first paragraph saying that the 
Colombia’s Pacific Coast was problematic. H e didn’t  mention the third paragraph. 
He stood there saying, like, Yes, what this asylum seeker is saying is confirmed by  
what we know  about Colombia, but you see? That isn ’t  truth! You see? He m isled  
the committee. The rest o f  the group voted based on that information. But i t  was 
n o t right. I t  was a rather generous reading, to say the least. Now, I  don’t know. I  
don’t know  i f  the guy lied or was just, you kn o w ... though this happened m ore than 
once. I ’m  ju st saying this is very problematic. Because our circle is very small; we 
have very few  people working in this area. We need to trust each other.
Mr J seems convinced that the UNHCR’s officer misled the GEP through an 
overgenerous reading of the report. W hether this was an unintentional mistake 
or a blatant lie, Mr J is careful not to say. At least not until his next remark 
when, plunging further into the psycho-social register, Mr J speaks his mind.
[M r JJ The truth is, i f  really you want to know, that these guys, [lowering his voice 
again] well, these guys study like hell. They are like the military in Brazil. They 
prepare for their whole lives to go to war but they never go to war. These guys are 
like this. Everyone has Master degrees, PhDs, etc. B ut what we see is that the great 
majority o f  requests in Brazil are denied, that there are very few  refugees. Take the 
Syrians, for example. Is there a clearer example than the Syrians? Lots o f  Syrians are 
coming to Brazil. Why? Because they have a support network here already. These 
guys don’t  need UNHCR. Who are the Syrians who need UNHCR? The Syrians in 
Turkey, the Syrians who are in Jordan, in Lebanon, you see? These, OK, bu t the 
Syrians in Brazil? So, you see, that is why they vote for asylum. They want to bring 
everybody in. The more refugees the better, you see, so they will have what to do.
The change of registers in Mr J’s discourse is quite clear. We start in the realm of 
law and evidence and we end up in the much more sombre arena of bias and 
manipulation. Mr J’s account started with a politically correct praise of
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disagreement as an opportunity for a healthy exchange of ideas. It closes with a 
blunt assessment of what he sees as the real source of dissent. As if in a more 
intimate tone, Mr J shares his suspicions about the UNHCR examiner. He 
points to social pressures and personal self-interest that would have biased this 
examiner’s call. ‘Do you really want to know why he didn’t opt for the right 
ruling?’, Mr J essentially asks. ‘Then you have to look at this pathological 
altruism, to his desire to put his Master’s and PhD degrees to good use, to the 
very down-to-earth matter of guaranteeing his job and justifying the existence of 
UNHCR’s office in Brazil.’
[Picture 6 -  Waiting for Conare]
W hen commenting on specific cases, Mrs H and Mr J argue for diametrically 
opposed outcomes. Their recommendations sound as ethically attractive to me 
as they are different in content. Despite these differences, however, I suggest that 
both Mrs H and Mr J’s communications have in common this one-sided 
censure: they rely on law and evidence to justify the superiority of their views 
while reverting to external factors to explain the error of others. They justify
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decisions they agree with as a natural outcome of this legal and empirical 
footing. And they speak of what they see as a deviation from right decisions as a 
consequence of social and psychological bias. Both accounts are asymmetric, to 
borrow Bloor’s term. Rehearsing the old division between genesis and 
justification, they divert our gaze from how a decision to deny or accept a 
request is established as right to the external factors that cause mistakes.145 It is 
for avoiding this asymmetric switch -  which diverts the study into a sociology of 
error -  that I wish to argue next.
The examiners regress
How is the distinction between migrants and refugees established during status 
determination? Judging by Mrs H and Mr J’s talk, law and evidence are the 
cornerstones in which examiners ought to base this call. Compare their 
suggestions. W hat do they have in common? Both warn us that cases are not 
always clear-cut and that falling in error is a constant risk. They insist that 
Conare should adopt the course of action in better fit with refugee law and 
, better corroborated by evidence. Both are concerned by the fact that this is not 
always the case. Some decisions are biased. Some decisions are unfair. When the 
stronger legal fecommendation is not accepted as the case’s outcome, both Mrs 
H and Mr J take this as a sign that other examiners have made a mistake. Letting 
the case’s content speak for itself is for both the best way to avoid error. Despite 
their different political leanings, this is a principle with which both Mrs H and 
Mr J seem to agree.
So far in this chapter, I have been arguing that there is an asymmetry in the 
way Mrs H and Mr J account for decisions. In the previous sections, I have 
sought to make this asymmetry explicit and explored how it becomes visible in 
their talk. I want now to justify my opinion that we are better off eschewing 
accounts like these. I will begin by saying why I am convinced that the 
examiners’ use of empirical support as an indicator of credibility is misleading. I 
spell out the suspicion, at which I have hinted only in passing so far, that this 
way of accounting for decisions is tautological.
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Let me move the narrative into the building of the Justice Ministry in 
Brasilia, where members of the Group for Preparatory Studies consider a list of 
requests. Mr G’s case is discussed: number 45, male, citizen from Pakistan, 
asking for asylum to escape religious persecution.
Conare’s officer, M rs F, tells other GEP members that m any Pakistanis are 
requesting permission to travel to Brazil as tourists before asking for asylum. This is 
an indication, she claims, that they are receiving funding for the trip. She takes this 
to suggest the existence o f  a terrorist network. She is worried that these networks 
m ight take advantage o f  sporting events in Brazil, such as the FIFA World Cup and 
the Olympics, to com m it attacks. In response, Caritas’s envoy, M rs N, argues 
strongly against the generalization. She says that that the fact that there m ight be 
terrorists among Pakistanis doesn’t  entitle the GEP to assume that all Pakistanis are 
potential terrorists. M rs N  argues that the fact that there m ight be terrorists coming 
from  Pakistan makes it  even more important to be careful when processing requests, 
as there m ight be genuine refugees among those wrongly identified as terrorists.
Besides the usual suspicion of economic migration, Mr G’s case is tied by Mrs F 
to the existence of a potential terrorist network. A controversy ensues: Caritas’s 
lawyer rejects the suspicions and recommends the recognition of Mr G’s status. 
The Conare officer insists on denial. She makes reference to Mr G’s answers to 
the request questionnaire and points to a mismatch in his comments during the 
interviews with Caritas and the Federal Police. There is disagreement about how 
reliable is the evidence presented by both officers.
Had the Caritas lawyer and Conare officer agreed that the evidence was 
reliable and that Mr G was a terrorist, a negative decision could have been 
consensual and we would end up with a ‘straightforward’ case.
Caritas’s lawyer and Conare’s officer continue to disagree. Conare says that M r G is 
n o t a refugee. The Caritas officer is convinced that M r G is a refugee. Conare’s 
officer claims to have evidence supporting her position. She presents a picture o f  a 
man whom she claims to be M r G wielding a gun. Caritas’s lawyer counters that this 
image cannot be taken as reliable evidence. She tells other GEP members that the 
photo was found on a Facebook’ homepage and that the picture is blurry. She 
insists that it  is n o t possible to verify i f  indeed the picture is o f  M r G. She tells the 
GEP that M r G’s fingerprints have been checked and that eventual connections with 
criminal groups had no t been found.
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In response, Conare’s officer extends her critique. She raises suspicion about the 
medical clippings and the copy o f  the passport brought by the applicant. She 
suggests that the documents look false and questions whether the work o f  checking 
fingerprints has been well done. Caritas’s lawyer replies saying that the analysis o f  
credibility made by the Conare officer is fragile. She charges Conare’s officer for 
basing her arguments on a subjective judgment. She argues that the Conare officer is 
in no position to judge whether the documents are false and insists that no further 
research has been made to establish their legitimacy. She asks whether the Conare 
officer isn ’t  biased against M r G [ ...]
‘Is Mr G a refugee?’, ‘Is the picture reliable?’, ‘Has the work of checking 
fingerprints been well done?’ W hat I want to highlight in this scene is the way in 
which the controversy moves back. The discussion starts with the issue of 
whether Mr G is a refugee and it falls back to the issue of how reliable is the 
evidence collected and whether the interviews have been adequate. The 
conclusion on whether Mr G is a refugee is conditioned to the conclusion of 
whether the determination work has been properly conducted.
One of the founding fathers of science studies, British sociologist Harry 
Collins, developed the concept of ‘regress’ to capture a formal challenge posed 
by a seemingly technical controversy like this.146 Collins developed the concept 
of regress while dwelling on whether it is possible to assess the strength of a 
knowledge claim by relying on replication. Imagine an expert who claims to 
have discovered a new phenomenon. It is intuitive to assume that, if other 
scientists conduct the same experiment and get to the same results, then this is 
reason to accept this discovery as correct.
That is why a usual solution to the problem of choosing between conflicting 
theories is to conduct a cross-test. First we look into these theories for 
statements in which they contradict each other. Second, we run tests and do 
research to find out which of these conflicting statements are corroborated. If 
everything goes according to plan, we should end up with a result that tells 
which of the competing theories is stronger. For Collins, a technical controversy, 
like the one around Mr G’s case, illustrates that this sort of cross-test might not 
solve the problem, as, in principle, a committed expert can dodge critiques 
indefinitely.
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Under-determination in asylum decisions
In his Law, Truth a n d  R eason, legal th eorist Raimo Siltala develop s an argum ent about 
under-determ ination in law. As part o f  a critique o f  Ronald Dworkin's suggestion  that th ere  
is always o n e  right answ er to  every legal case, Siltala d iscusses how  legal th e se s  relate to  
th e  em pirical ev id en ce  gathered  around them . His starting point is th e  notion o f  holism  -  
th e  insight that th e  com parison b etw een  legal th e se s  involves m ore than th e  im m ediate  
issue being d iscussed. Siltala argues that experts rely on a num ber o f  auxiliary th eo r ies  to  
build legal recom m endation for a case . W hen adjudicators com pare legal 
recom m en dations, th ey  are thus com paring this w h o le  group o f  auxiliary theories, and not 
just th e  issue directly at stake. For Siltala, th e  holist nature o f  legal choice  raises dou bts  
abou t w h eth er  a direct com parison o f  th e se s  can ever tell us that o n e  o f  th e se  is defin itely  
less su sta ined  by ev id en ce. The reason for Siltala's suspicion is under-determ ination . He is 
convinced that th e  choice  b e tw een  tw o  legal recom m en dations is under-determ ined by th e  
collection o f  jurisprudence and facts. In principle, he  argues that 'no m atter how  
im plausible [a legal thesis] m ight prim a  fa c ie  seem , it can always be saved  from  critique, if 
so m e  radical enough  changes are e ffec ted  in th e  fram e o f  legal analysis a d op ted '.147
Siltala takes inspiration for his argum ent from  th e  d eb ate  about under-determ ination in 
crucial experim ents and th e  im possibility o f  relying on th e  com parison o f  results as an 
arbiter to  c h o o se  b e tw een  theories. This issue em erged  as a topic o f  discussion am id th e  
philosophy o f  sc ien ce field, w h ere  it is referred to  in its contem porary dressing as th e  
Duhem -Q uine th es is .148
The classic exam ple o f under-determ ination caused  by holism  is found in th e  work o f  
French philosopher o f  sc ien ce  Pierre Duhem . To m ake his point, Duhem  tells us a fab le  in 
which his expert o f choice, an astronom er, p roposes an astronom ical hyp othesis that 
predicts th e  trajectory o f  a celestial body. D uhem 's astronom er probes th e  sky in search o f  
a celestia l body, but is frustrated in his work. D uhem 's argum ent is built from  th e  holist 
insight that, to  be able to  predict that w e  shall s e e  th is celestia l body in a certain coord inate  
in th e  sky at a certain m om en t, th e  astronom er n eed s to  rely on a series o f  auxiliary 
th eories (theories about how  to  calculate th e  sp eed  and position o f o ther  celestial bod ies, 
am ong others). U nder-determ ination em erges w h en  w e  d evelop  th is holist insight in th e  
suggestion  that, even  if th e  astronom er's prediction is falsified by th e  research (the c o m et  
didn't pass at th e  coord inates anticipated by th e  astronom er), this failure is still not enough  
to  give a conclusive logical proof that th e  astronom er's initial hypothesis w as w rong.
This is th e  case  because, if th e  astronom er is com m itted  enough to  his theory, he can  
alw ays redirect blam e to  th e  auxiliary assum ptions and retain th e  be lie f th at his initial 
sta tem en t is right. ('It w as not my prediction o f  w h en  and w h ere th e  co m et w ould b e  se e n  
that w as w rong. It w as th e  theory  about how  to  place th e  o th er  bod ies in sp ace  th a t w as  
w rong. The celestial body w en t through th e  place I said it w ould  go through. I just m issed  it 
b ecau se  th e se  m isleading auxiliary th eories m ade m e point my te le sc o p e  in th e  w rong  
direction').
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The under-determ ination argum ent is thus tw ofold: it involves th e  first holist insight that 'if 
th e  ph en om en on  predicted is not produced, not only is th e  q u estion ed  proposition put in 
doubt, but also th e  w h o le  theoretical scaffolding u sed '149. And it con n ects th is to  an insight 
abou t th e  formal im possibility o f  arriving at certainty through th e  su ggestion  th at 'any 
sta tem en t can be held true co m e w hat may, if w e  m ake drastic enough  adjustm ents  
e lsew h ere  in th e  sy stem '.150
Going back to  th e  choice b e tw een  legal th e se s  having th e  under-determ ination argum ent 
in mind, I w ould su ggest that Siltala's m ention o f  plausibility hits th e  nail on  th e  head. For it 
g o es  w ithou t saying that asylum  req uests don 't sound all equally plausible to  exam iners. 
Som e req uests co m e across as '100% sustained  by research', as th e  C ongolese w om an 's  
claim se e m e d  to  Mrs H. O thers im press exam iners as 'rather unlikely'. The m ention  o f  
different degrees o f  plausibility is thus a healthy rem inder that under-determ ination is a 
formal challenge that d o esn 't necessarily  translate into a practical challenge. In th e  day-to- 
day tasks o f statu s determ ination , claim s are, o f  course, not indistinguishable, which w e  s e e  
from  th e  fact that exam iners distinguish w arranted and unwarranted claim s all th e  tim e.
Deciding if an asylum  req uest is w arranted is far from  a straightforward exercise . As 
experienced  professionals, m any exam iners don't sh o w  m any qualm s to  agree that refu gee  
law and ev id en ce  are op en  to  d ifferent uses. Yet, w h en  it is tim e to  d ecid e, this lofty issue  
d o esn 't seem  to  stand in their w ay. Som e exam iners are m ore prone than oth ers to  
conceptual d iscussions. But, as a group, it is fair to  say th at they  don't usually spend  much  
tim e in abstractions abou t th e  ultim ately indeterm inate nature o f their work. Examiners 
don't stop  to  deconstruct their logical prem ises. M ore o ften  than not, sta tu s determ ination  
sim ply m oves on. Sooner or later, for each asylum  seeker  com ing through Caritas's door, 
w e end up with a letter  sitting at th e  fax tray. 'This o n e  is a refugee, th is o n e  is not'. That 
m uch, exam iners seem  to  be always able to  say.
If I seek  to  extend  th e  under-determ ination insight to  refugee law, this is then  not b ecau se  
o f  its purely logical im plications (which w ould su g g est that exam iners have no form al basis 
to  dism iss any claim as unwarranted). Instead, I am m ore interested  in th e  argum ent's  
repercussions for social analysis. W hat I find interesting in th e  under-determ ination  
argum ent is that it rem inds us that th e  d ifferent 'd egrees o f  plausibility' th at exam iners  
attribute to  asylum  requests cannot be so  easily attributed to  different d eg rees o f  legal and  
evidential support. To put it o therw ise, th e  central qu estion  that under-determ ination  
encourages m e to  ask is this: if th e  am oun t o f  legal and evidential support cannot explain  
w hy exam iners s e e  so m e  claim s as p rim a  fa c ie  m o re  p lau sib le  than o thers, th en  to  w h at is 
this perception  o f different plausibility due? By inviting us to  find an answ er to  this 
question , th e  application o f th e  under-determ ination argum ent to  asylum  d ecision s paves  
th e  w ay to  a study o f  th e  social practices in w hich th e  plausibility o f  asylum  req u ests is 
defined. In this light, th e  question  w ith which w e  started  th e  chapter can be restated  in 
m uch stronger term s: if law and ev id en ce  cannot by th em se lv es se ttle  w h eth er  a claim is to  
be considered  warranted or unwarranted, th en  w hat do?
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Collins approaches the issue of choice between theories through a study 
about members of a secluded area in the field of physics: those who specialize in 
radiation. He tells us that almost all members of the area at one time agreed that 
this radiation existed in a weak version. They disagreed about the existence of a 
second and strong form of radiation that would be measurable from Earth. One 
expert, W, was convinced that this strong radiation existed and that he could 
measure it. Other critics pointed to problems with W ’s use of statistics, 
suggesting that W should have discarded signals as fake and that W had made a 
mathematical mistake. Collins’s insight is to notice that a controversy like this 
creates a strong case of under-determination.151 The experiment made by W 
concludes that the phenomenon has been detected. We can take this result as a 
proof that the apparatus of experts, instruments and statistical techniques put 
together by W was reliable. In this case, when this apparatus is acknowledged as 
reliable, accepting its success leads us to the conclusion that strong radiation 
indeed exists. We can then develop new theories and propose new experiments 
starting from the assumption that strong radiation exists.
Just as plausibly, however, this result can be taken as an example of a fake 
measurement, resulting from an unreliable apparatus. If we adopt this 
assessment, we are led to the conclusion that strong radiation does not exist. If 
that is the case, the expert community should go on working under the 
assumption that the world in which we live is one in which strong radiation 
doesn’t exist.
This is the situation that Collins calls the ‘experimenters regress’: scientists 
are not sure that they can build a detector. They have to entertain the possibility 
that they ‘might have been fooled into thinking that they now have the recipe 
for detecting gravity waves’. At the same time, however,
They will have no idea whether they can do it until they try to see if they obtain 
the correct outcome. But what is the correct outcome? What the correct 
outcome is depends upon whether there are gravity waves hitting the Earth in 
detectable fluxes. To find this out we must build a good gravity wave detector 
and have a look. But we won’t know if we have built a good detector until we 
have tried it and obtained the correct outcome! But we don’t know what the 
correct outcome is u n til... and so on ad infinitum.’152
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The parallel between Collins’s study of physicists and the controversy around 
Mr G’s case should be plain. In Collins’s story, there is the group who believes 
that the phenomenon is a case of strong radiation and there is the group who 
believes that the signal isn’t a case of strong radiation. In Mr G’s case, there is 
the examiner who is convinced that the asylum seeker is a refugee and the 
examiner who is convinced that the asylum seeker is not a refugee. In Collins’s 
story, the discussion that was at the beginning about the existence of the 
phenomenon evolves to a discussion about how reliable the apparatus of 
examiners is. In Mr G’s case, the discussion about whether the asylum seeker is 
indeed a refugee evolves to a discussion about whether the report is reliable and 
the examiner trustworthy.
As the discussion progresses, Caritas’s lawyer and Conare’s officer cannot 
agree on whether Mr G is a refugee or a terrorist because they cannot agree on 
whether the documents and pictures available are reliable. At the same time, 
they cannot agree on whether these reports and pictures are reliable because 
they cannot agree on whether the research has been properly done. We have 
here the beginning of a regress. In principle, this disagreement had the potential 
to go on for ages.153
The point here is that the possibility of diverting doubt to auxiliary 
assumptions seems to undercut the possibility of using evidence as an arbiter to 
choose between acceptance and denial. Like the phenomenon of strong 
indeterminacy discussed in the last chapter, under-determination implicates 
that justifications for asylum decisions that point to a lack of empirical support 
offer no reasonable foundation for denial. As with claims to rule-following, 
claims to ‘action supported by the evidence’ become problematic. They cannot 
account for the negative ruling. Perhaps, a sceptic could argue, examiners 
arrived at the conclusion that Mr G is not a refugee because they stopped the 
research too soon and missed reports that would encourage the opposite 
outcome. Like the persistent astronomer in Duhem’s example or the sceptical 
physicist in Collins’s anecdote, a committed sceptic could create doubt about 
whether the evidence amassed is enough to dismiss Mr G’s request.
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Being symmetric
As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, when discussing how examiners 
ought to assess a case’s strength, UNHCR’s N ote on Burden and Standard o f  
iVoo/suggests that:
In assessing the overall credibility of the applicant’s claim, the adjudicator should 
take into account such factors as the reasonableness of the facts alleged, the 
overall consistency and coherence of the applicant’s story, corroborative 
evidence adduced by the applicant in support of his/her statements, consistency 
with common knowledge or generally known facts, and the known situation in 
the country of origin. Credibility is established where the applicant has presented 
a claim which is coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, 
and therefore is, on balance, capable of being believed.154
I have been saying that this way of accounting for decisions doesn’t hold water. 
Let me now bring the argument together around this point. Consider Mr G’s 
case again. Suppose the examiners followed UNHCR’s instructions and 
managed to gather evidence around Mr G’s request. Let’s say that, in light of this 
evidence, Conare concluded that Mr G’s request ought to be denied. The first 
reason why I think this way of accounting for decisions doesn’t hold has to do 
with the extent to which choice between legal recommendations is under­
determined by evidence. As extensive as the evidence collected by Conare might 
be, it still offers no reasonable basis for denial.
Methodology becomes an issue at this point. W hat drives me to extend the 
under-determination insight to asylum decisions is not this purely logical 
implication, but what it means for how we study status determination. 
Discussing why we come to accept logical conclusions, Wittgenstein and Bloor 
are quick to remark that it is a matter of course that the great majority of us will 
never dispute that 2 plus 2 equals 4. With them, I also hasten to remark that it is 
a matter of course that some cases will strike examiners as empirically weak. In 
the majority of cases, this kind of consensual perception will remain 
unchallenged. Now, if logically speaking, reference to the ‘intrinsic weaknesses’ 
of a case cannot account for why it strikes us as weak, then what can? 
Wittgenstein proposes that understanding why the student feels logically
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compelled to answer 4 involves the study of a ‘form of life’. In a similar vein, 
Kripke argues that the reason why we feel compelled to answer 125 when faced 
with 68+57 is to be found in the ‘assertibility conditions’ under which an 
assertion to be following the rules of mathematics is accepted. Defending his 
strong programme, Bloor argues that the fact that we feel compelled to accept 
logical theorems as right is to be found in the training and social norms to which 
the student is subjected. The practical consequence I take from the argument on 
under-determination points in a similar (although more practice-focused) 
direction: to get a sense of why a case strikes us as evidently unfounded, I believe 
we need to study the social and technical practices in which the case is brought 
about.
This is where my remarks on under-determination and my critique of 
asymmetry come together. When an examiner talks asymmetrically and points 
to external factors to dismiss other assessments of empirical support, this 
examiner is exploring the possibility of creating doubt, which is opened up by 
under-determination. This possibility of dissent remains open, however, even 
when the case is consensually accepted as empirically unsupported. The 
possibility of creating doubt is never overcome, I want to say, even when all 
examiners agree that the request evidently lacks legal fit. That is why I am 
convinced that avoiding asymmetric accounts is so important. By talking 
asymmetrically, examiners can encourage doubt about other people’s views 
while ignoring the room for doubt in their own. They can charge other 
examiners for being influenced by external factors, while retaining their aura of 
objectivity.
Another way of saying this is to compare the argument I am making for 
symmetry to the argument I made in the last chapter for going beyond weak 
indeterminacy. I suggested in the last chapter that when examiners distinguish 
easy cases (which they claim can .be decided more or less mechanically by 
following the law) from hard cases (which they acknowledge as weakly 
indeterminate), examiners are resorting to a way of speaking -  a discursive 
device -  that enables them to constrain the potential impact of strong 
indeterminacy. My point here is about a similar discursive device: asymmetric
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reasoning enables examiners to make a selective use of scepticism and 
circumvent the continual possibility of doubt about their assessment of 
empirical support.
To say that a decision to deny asylum is justified because the lack of legal and 
empirical footing is plain sounds awfully intuitive. Still, it is precisely this 
intuitiveness -  the fact that we feel logically compelled to accept the decision -  
that we need to account for. And when it comes to that, saying that the request 
was dismissed because it was empirically weak doesn’t help very much. This way 
of accounting for decisions is logically circular; it is tautological. When 
examiners compare legal recommendations on requests, they are not simply 
discussing what recommendation is right. They are also deciding on how  to 
decide about the pertinence of these theses. Now, if that is the case -  if the very 
criterion to judge what thesis is right is at stake -  then how can we hope to learn 
from examiners what thesis is right? Paraphrasing sociologists of science Harry 
Collin and Steve Yearley, if the examiners involved in the work do not know 
how to decide (‘and why would they go through all the trouble of exchanging 
ideas and comparing legal theses if they did?’), then I, the researcher, have no 
way of knowing how they decide, either.155 In a situation like this, the very metric 
I would need to compare the strength of the legal recommendations has not yet 
been settled.
To bend another of Latour’s beautiful phrases, I would make the point like 
this: contrary to the best intentions of case examiners, the case’s content 
obviously cannot speak for itself.156 Law and evidence are never self-compelling. 
They cannot determine the way they are to be used. The characterization of the 
evidence that will become accepted as an interpretative resource is not given 
beforehand. It is defined during status determination. And this, I suggest, means 
they cannot be part of an account for why a decision to deny asylum is accepted 
as right without us falling in a tautology. Historians Yves Gingras and Silvan 
Schweber put it best, perhaps: ‘If one is seeking to investigate the process of 
construction of knowledge [sic] one cannot seriously invoke the outcome of that 
process to explain the process itself without going into a circular argument’.157
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A justification of the kind ‘the case was dismissed because it lacked empirical 
support’ tells us nothing about how this assessment of empirical weakness came 
to be accepted. Instead, the absence of empirical support does all the work. 
Besides being logically circular, it is self-defeating in a very practical way. All that 
is process-like about a status determination process is lost; determination is 
retrospectively demoted to the role of a declaratory act. Plainly enough, I think, 
this sort of account works better as a retrospective rationalization than as an 
account of how asylum requests are decided in practice.
Scientific work, Latour claims, ‘is often made invisible by its own success. 
[...] When a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and 
outputs and not on its internal complexity’.158 Ironically, ‘the more science and 
technology succeed the more opaque and obscure they become’. Status 
determination is no different, it would seem. Like a printer that works too well, 
when a negative decision is consensual, it falls prey to its own easiness. It 
becomes a black box. That is why being earnest in our symmetry (researching 
cases that are deemed ‘evidently unsupported by evidence’ to the same extent as 
we would study the controversial cases) seems necessary when studying asylum 
decisions. Symmetry saves us from the black-boxing effect of asymmetric talk.
Unboxing Decisions
To decide on an asylum request takes hardware and it takes hard work. Who 
would deny this? Still, listening to examiners’ accounts, we don’t hear much 
about these nuts and bolts. In fact, to press the mechanical metaphor a bit 
further, the whole middle ground between claim and decision is often treated as 
one of the many black boxes we come across every day. There is a claim at the 
beginning and a ruling at the end. As long as weak cases are being dismissed, 
there is no need to say much about what goes on in between. Of course, how 
examiners conduct their work becomes important when there are doubts about 
the ruling. But if what is asked was why a case agreed to be ‘weak’ is dismissed, 
then all that happens between claim and decision can be safely ignored. As long 
as examiners are confident that no mistake has been made, the answer is
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considered plain: ‘A weak case is rejected because it is weak’. There is hardly 
anything else to say.
I have been arguing that there are some very good reasons not to treat status 
determination as a black box, no matter how straightforward a case might seem. 
For one thing, beyond the trite point that refugee law can be read in different 
ways, there is a strong sense in which no rule and no set of guidelines can fully 
constrain how examiners are to decide. In this light, following refugee law is an 
indeterminate task indeed, all the way down. And to get a sense of how this 
strong form of indeterminacy is dealt with, we need to open the procedural 
black box and take a look inside.
Something similar can be said about the empirical fit between the case’s 
content and the decision it is supposed to support. Central to telling refugees 
from non-refugees is the ability to distinguish strong cases from weak (which 
are considered so when empirical support seems thin). But here, again, it is hard 
to see how this presence or lack of empirical support can be demonstrated to 
justify either negative or positive rulings. When recommendations to accept or 
deny a request are contrasted, they are compared as wholes. At stake in the 
assessment of a case is also the issue of whether the evidence is reliable and the 
determination work has been well done. This, I suggest, opens the door for the 
possibility of regress and makes the choice between positive and negative 
recommendations under-determined by the content of the case.
Now, if this is the case -  if following refugee law is an indeterminate task and 
if the choice between recommendations is under-determined by empirical 
support -  then it seems fair to ask how the procedure can so routinely produce 
results. Formally speaking, disagreements about how to read reports or on what 
sources to trust are potentially endless. Yet it barely needs saying that these lofty 
matters have never stopped the determination work. In flagrant disregard of our 
best critiques, rulings continue to be issued, every six months or so. Confronted 
with this mismatch, we can insist on giving circular accounts for decisions, or 
we can move on to look at how these decisions are actively built. By paying close 
attention to determination practices, this chapter has sought to move us a bit 
further along this second route.
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Asking the question
‘W hat should matter most is always the objective evidence’. Like this comment, 
made in passing by Mrs H, many of the examiners’ assumptions about status 
determination reproduce a sense of discovery around decisions. Rulings are 
declaratory and not constitutive. If serious, the determination work is objective, 
impartial and free from error. To be considered competent professionals, 
examiners cannot let social pressures and feelings interfere with the judgments 
they make. In its optimum functioning, the procedure must consist of a neutral 
adjudication of the case’s content. As much as possible, it must m irror reality as 
it is, reflecting the right reading of the refugee definition and the objective reality 
in the country of origin. Both in examiners’ speech and in the procedural 
handbook they use, we come across this idealized image time and again.
Beyond credibility assessment, UNHCR emphasises the importance of ensuring 
that key refugee law concepts are presented in a balanced and neutral manner, 
allowing trainees to appreciate their roles as neutral fact-finders and 
discouraging bias against asylum seekers or any tendency to prejudge asylum 
claims.159
‘Neutral fact-finders’ is what examiners are trained to be. A judgment ‘free of 
bias and preconception’ is what is expected from the status determination work. 
This idealized picture reinforces the impression of status determination as a 
purely rational exchange of ideas and the cold blooded gathering of facts. It 
ignores the essentially rhetorical nature of the determination work. It leaves out 
of sight all the hardware and the hard work that goes into enacting a case and 
enrolling support for it. W hat is worse, by treating assent in evidently 
unsupported rulings as self-explanatory, this declaratory account not only erases 
what is process-like about determination processes, it also kills the drive to ask 
why a decision is accepted as right by making the question sound absurd.
In Chapter 1 ,1 adapted the notion of strong indeterminacy from the science 
studies toolset and used it to problematize accounts for denial that justify 
decisions in terms of rule-following. I also highlighted a discursive device that, I 
believe, enables examiners to circumvent indeterminacy by contrasting cases 
they accept as complex with cases they insist are ‘more evident’. In this chapter, I
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continued the inquiry on how asylum decisions are made by dwelling on a 
second aspect of this default picture: the idea that it is possible to arrive at a 
decision by combining the judgment of legal fit with the assessment of empirical 
support.
Looking specifically at how case examiners account for the decisions they 
make, I sought to foreground a proclivity in their talk to shift registers between 
‘law/evidence’ and ‘social/psychological bias’ when accounting for decisions they 
see as correct and decisions they see as mistaken. Borrowing a term from the 
science studies field, I used ‘asymmetry’ to name this way of reasoning, in which 
truthfulness is taken as intrinsic to the claim while only error is to be explored.
The idea that it is possible to decide by judging legal fit and empirical 
support is so entrenched that, when a case is deemed to lack these, the decision 
for denial acquires a quality of logical inevitability as the natural consequence of 
this lack of legal fit and empirical support. The sociological and psychological 
factors that interfere with a decision are worth studying when the decision is 
deemed to be a mistake. But in a case like this, when the lack of legal fit and 
empirical support is deemed plain, examiners didn’t see much point in asking 
why the request was denied.
This sort of asymmetric reasoning is not only tautological; it is also a 
methodological shot in the foot. It assumes that the criteria to identify reliable 
evidence or the proper reading of refugee norms are known beforehand. This, I 
argued, has the effect of black boxing the determination procedure. The work 
that goes into rendering a reading as corresponding to law and a humanitarian 
report as accurate is put out of view.
The practical consequence of this asymmetric trust in legal fit and empirical 
support is that, in cases deemed straightforward, agreement around decisions is 
not accounted for. By telling stories that emphasize contingency and 
heterogeneity, Chapters 3 and 4 will bring the hardware and hard work involved 
in arriving at decisions back into view.
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[Picture 7 - Fingerprinting]
3 
Declaring Strength
Judging by the declaratory picture of asylum decisions, the asylum seeker either 
is or isn’t a refugee before the work of status determination starts. If free from 
error, the asylum decision is supposed to recognize the applicant’s anterior 
condition.
A person is a refugee [...] as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the 
definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee 
status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not 
therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a 
refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.160
So far, in this study, I have been encouraging scepticism towards this declaratory 
way of accounting for asylum decisions. In Chapter 1, I took issue with 
justifications for denial that point to the absence of legal fit. In Chapter 2, I 
disputed the assumption that examiners can arrive at a decision by measuring 
empirical support. This chapter dwells on the implications of the sceptical 
problems of strong indeterminacy and regress to the understanding of asylum 
decisions as declaratory.
The first two chapters developed aspects of the science studies toolset that 
have to do with how we know things. The remaining chapters will rely on 
insights of the science studies toolset that concern the issue of being -  how 
things exist in the world. I want to discuss how cases come to be weak or strong. 
The idea that asylum decisions are declaratory is the ontological counterpart of 
claims to rule-following and empirical support. When examiners justify a 
negative decision by saying that this is what their assessment of legal fit and 
empirical support demands, they are also making the implicit claim that there is 
a pre-existing case whose legal fit and empirical footing they are assessing. That 
is the assumption this chapter will problematize.
97
By encouraging scepticism towards the declaratory picture, Chapters 1 and 2 
were meant to encourage the same question: if not how the declaratory picture 
suggests, then how are cases decided? I closed both chapters by cautioning that 
the fact that cases are not decided through the assessment of legal fit and 
empirical support doesn’t mean that asylum decisions are discretionary. Asylum 
cases, I have been suggesting, are not arbitrarily decided on by examiners. To 
use the term of art in science studies, I could say that cases are enacted as weak.
So far, I have been using the notion of enactment without specifying its 
meaning. This was OK until now, because the image of a case being enacted is 
self-explanatory, to some extent. There is, however, a particularity about the way 
the expression is used in science studies, which I now would like to specify. It 
has to do with the question of ‘who does the deed’ or, in the case of this study, 
‘who makes the decision’.161
Discussing the notion of enactment, British sociologist John Law suggests 
that ethnographers of science are constructivist in a very particular sense:
That is, they argue that scientific knowledge is constructed in scientific practices. 
[...] The process of building scientific knowledge is also an active matter. It takes 
work and effort. The argument is that it is wrong to imagine that nature 
somehow impresses its reality directly on those who study it if they just set aside 
their own biases.162
This, it should be noted, is not at all the same thing as saying it is constructed by 
scientists. Thus we will see that practices include, and imply, instruments, 
architectures, texts -  indeed a whole range of participants that extend far beyond
, 163people.
Taking my cue from Law and other authors in science studies who study 
ontology as socio-material, I want to advocate a focus on decision-practices that 
goes beyond the decision-makers. Instead of focusing on the mental state of 
examiners or the social interests and macro-sociological homologies that explain 
their dispositions, the notion of enactment is meant to emphasize that this 
‘doing of the decision’ should not be reduced to a deciding subject acting in a 
decisive event.
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Contra the notion that asylum decisions consist of decision-makers 
disclosing the pre-existing reality of asylum seekers, to talk' of an asylum case 
being enacted is to emphasize the link between the strength the case assumes 
and the specificity of the practices in which it emerges. An enactment approach 
helps us move beyond the assumption that the difference between migrant and 
refugee is settled in ‘a decision’. Enacting refugees as different from migrants is 
not done by a deciding subject in a decisive event. It is the effect of a contingent, 
highly dispersed and heterogeneous process. That is why it is so important to go 
beyond the declaratory account.
To develop the argument, I start by describing some of the practices that go 
into enacting a case in Brazil. I then look at an instance of dissent concerning a 
request’s pre-existing reality and characterize it as an example of a regressible 
controversy. In conclusion, I spell out how a controversy like this puts in 
question the image of determination practices declaring the pre-existing reality 
of the asylum seeker.
Enacting the case
To set the scene for my critique of the declaratory picture, I want to show how 
what is taken to be the pre-existing reality of the case varies according to the 
determination practice. Let me move the narrative back to Rio de Janeiro, where 
we will follow a case through the maze of Brazilian bureaucracy. I start by 
looking at the work that goes into formalizing a request.
After months working at Caritas, I felt it was time to move beyond its walls. I 
had come to Brazil to watch the day to day of status determination. I wanted to 
look at the work of telling migrants from refugees. After Caritas, the 
Immigration Department was the next practice in the procedural chain. So, 
when the opportunity came, I followed asylum seekers into the offices of the 
Federal Police. Sent to these stations to formalize their cases, these men and 
women were often lost trying to understand what to do and where to go next. 
W hen a case was especially sensitive, someone at Caritas was asked to escort the 
asylum seeker, to avoid delays. I volunteered and ended up playing this role 
many times.
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I t is Friday. I  stand by the door o f  the Federal Police in Rio ’s International Airport. 
Today I  am to escort a Pakistani man while he files his case. A Catholic living in a 
small city near a Taliban camp, M r G claims to have been brutally beaten and 
threatened with death. Leaving his wife and children behind, he has fled to Brazil in 
haste. He is worried now  and wants to be with his fam ily as soon as he can. I  m eet 
M r G at the door and we walk into the station together, where I  introduce m yself to 
the clerk sitting at the front desk. I  show him  the cover letter and copies o f  the 
asylum questionnaire completed in Caritas the day before. As Caritas’s envoy, I  am 
allowed entrance to the restricted area, which is reserved for police officers and 
governmental personnel. Toddling m y  way around the maze o f  office partitions, I  
follow the signs towards the marshal's room. I  shake hands with a secretary inside, 
who asks m e to take a seat. ‘The marshal is extremely busy'she says right away. ‘You 
can start the process now. We can take his pictures and collect his fingerprints and 
have the identification bit done. B ut I  don’t think you will get the affidavit today.3 
Having been dismissed m any times before, I  know  there is no po in t in insisting. 
W ithout much hope, I  add m y  name to the list o f  names waiting to see the marshal 
and leave. I  walk back to the main hall, where M r G is waiting for me. From there, I  
am to escort him  to the so called ‘identification room'.
My Caritas credentials allowed me to observe practices that would be foreclosed 
to most civilians, so I tried to make the most of it. I spent days walking around 
the labyrinths of office partitions that made up the immigration department in 
Rio. After some time, I started to develop shortcuts, moving more surely from 
the front desk to the scrivener’s office and the identification room. As a 
volunteer, I was there to guide asylum seekers through the maze of Brazilian 
bureaucracy. As a researcher, I sought to attend as closely as possible to the 
encounters of asylum seekers and the Federal Police.
Despite its pom pous name, the ‘ID  R oom ' is but another crammed office, where 
asylum seekers and police officers share space with m usty files and dodgy furniture. 
Standing by the door, a police officer shouts M r G’s name and waves for him  to 
come in. M r G takes a seat at the chair facing a webcam, while the officer adjusts the 
camera with her left hand. She takes a picture o f  M r G’s face and asks for personal 
details. When the profile is ready, she moves on to the fingerprints. ‘Our digital 
scanner is n o t working, so we’re going to do this old school. First the four fingers on 
the right hand and no thumb. Then the four fingers on the left hand and no thumb. 
Then the right and left thumbs, always in this order. ’ Ink on fingers and fingers on 
paper, until it  is done. ‘You can clean up your hands with the towel there. ’ She 
points, already walking us to the door. She hands m e the hard copy o f  the 
fingerprint slabs with the ink still moist. ‘D on’t lose these’, she says. ‘H e needs them  
to be identified. ’
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[Picture 8 - The identification room]
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Clerks, forms, laptops, intranets, photographs, ink and paper; and don’t forget 
Mr G’s body -  his face and fingerprints. At the office of the Federal Police, we 
come across this small array once again. Through this assemblage, Mr G’s sad 
story and beaten body can be gathered as information about this new object, the 
formal request, now expected to be looked at and acted upon. Thanks to this 
small array, what starts at Caritas as an oral claim - 1 am a refugee -  is gradually 
materialized as an object of knowledge.
It is hardly a surprise that what I observed in these offices was very different 
from the straightforward image of the procedure described in handbooks and 
governmental websites. Reading formal descriptions of the process, one comes 
across phrases like ‘the foreigner shall present himself to the competent 
authority’164 and ‘the competent authority shall listen to this claimant and 
prepare an affidavit’.165 In Rio, the Federal Police stand for this competent 
authority. But having a request formalized is a much more tortuous process 
than phrases like these would make it seem. Details as small as the tone with 
which a question was asked or a particular word used in translation would often 
make a difference in how cases came to the fore. As the work of taking pictures 
and collecting fingerprints, the work of asking questions and inscribing answers 
allowed cases to emerge in very particular ways.
M r G and I  walk back to the station’s entry hall. I  walk to the clerk and tell him  M r 
G’s story in as shocking terms as I  can. I  tell him  o f  the blood and broken bones and 
o f  M r G’s fam ily still in hiding in Pakistan. I  ask him  to please make sure the deputy 
would see us. Three hours later; M r G and I  are called into the deputy’s room. Inside 
the office, a large police officer dressed in an intim idating police parka tells M r G to 
take a seat. He asks m e to work as translator and immediately takes the lead in the 
interview. ‘What is your date o f  birth? A nd  what is your father’s name? A nd  what is 
your m other’s name? A nd  in which city were you born? Are you married? Is your 
passport from Pakistan?’ The officer poses question after question. M r G barely has 
time to breathe. ‘OK’, the officer says, marking a break in the interview. ‘N ow  tell 
m e the reason you left Pakistan and the reason you are afraid to go back. Just a brie f 
report’ [um breve relatozinho], he insists.166 ‘I t was because o f  the M uslim cleric in 
m y city’M r G answers. ‘H e was trying to force m e to become a M uslim ’. The officer, 
reading out aloud while typing: ‘The asylum seeker was called in by the persecutor, 
who proposed that he become a M uslim ’. ‘I t ’s more like “demanded”’, I  intervene. 
‘He “demanded”more than “proposed”’. The officer, still typing: ‘This way is good. 
You can understand. Go on ’.
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[Picture 9 - Preparing an affidavit]
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After Mr G and I parted company by the door of the police station, I went back 
to my routine, volunteering at Caritas during the day and reading articles and 
writing drafts in the evening. In a distant neighbourhood, deep inside Rio’s 
slum, Mr G went back to his new life, in the house of the Brazilian family that 
had taken him in. Almost three months went by without us seeing each other, so 
I was happy to see him again in Caritas at the day of his eligibility interview. Mr 
G was still worried about his family. But he also looked less sad, I deemed, 
already trying his first words in Portuguese.
The lawyer: ‘So M r G, le t m e start by explaining a b it about this process and the 
steps you will go through. You have been to the police. Now you talk to us. Then 
you will talk to Conare, then we will do our research and send our recommendation 
to Brasilia, and then Brasilia will decide on your case. The whole process takes on 
average six months. What we are gonna do today is this first eligibility interview. I t  
will be a bit like what you did at the Federal Police, but we are gonna ask you to 
retell your story in as much detail as you can. You don’t  need to tell m e anything 
you don’t  want to. B ut the more information you can give the better. This will help 
m e make a better report. I  m ight need to ask you some sensitive questions about the 
things that happened to you. You don’t need to answer i f  you find  it  too hard. B ut 
the more detail you can recall the better. I t would help your case.
At the immigration department of the Federal Police, Mr G’s condition as an 
asylum seeker is made official. At stake is whether Mr G is who he says he is. ‘Is 
Mr G really a Pakistani? Is he wanted by Interpol? Is Mr G, in short, a legitimate 
asylum seeker, entitled to ask for refuge?’ To answer this question, a picture is 
taken, a profile is prepared and fingerprints are marked as black stains on paper 
strips. An affidavit is written, which will stand from there on as the official 
representation of what was said during the interview.
More than to tell the story in detail, the aim of the first meeting was to 
formalize the request. When Mr G tried to tell his story in as much detail as he 
could, this behaviour was not well received. At the eligibility hearing, on the 
other hand, the lawyer is looking for details. Her goal is to assess the internal 
consistency of Mr G’s narrative. In contrast to the case emerging at the 
marshal’s room, the desired outcome is not a summarized version of Mr G’s 
story, but the visualization of his case as an extended transcript.
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The lawyer: ‘So, I  would start asking you to please go ahead and tell us what you can 
about what happened to you. We know  a littie about the religious persecution that 
goes on in Pakistan. B ut at some point, something happened to you in particular 
that made you want to leave. What exactly happened? What are you afraid of? Why 
did you have to come to Brazil?’
M r G: ‘Ohhh sir. I t  started about a year ago. I  was praying and this cleric came 
along with a group and tried to convert m e to Islam at gun point. When I  said no he 
said I  would regret it. He threatened to k ill m e and m y  family. A nd  when I  
continued to say no, he beat me. Here sir, you can still see the bruises. Here, and 
here and here. Can you see it? They almost killed me. I  have these x-rays by m y  local 
hospital showing m y  injuries, i f  you want to see them. A ll these are broken bones. 
Can you see? Still, even after I  went to the police and I  showed them this, they kept 
telling m e that there was nothing they could do. They give m e this report here, 
calling it  ‘an isolated incident’. A nd  they told m e to apologize. Can you believe it? So 
I  decided to go to the courts, although that didn’t  help either. The judge was a 
radical too, you see? When he finally agreed to see m e he ju st said I  was lying. He 
told m e that the cleric was a religious man and that he wouldn ’tlie. He asked for m y  
passport. The m inute the judge saw the word ‘dhim m i’ (unfaithful) in it  I  knew  I  
had no chance. Here, take a look. The government prints this ‘unfaithful’ in our ids. 
Here. Can you read it?’
[Picture 10 - Inside th e  file]
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Like the work that goes into enacting the case as an affidavit, enacting the case as 
an extended transcript puts together its own array of people and things. It takes 
a lawyer asking questions and an interpreter writing answers on a laptop. It 
takes a medical report with pictures of broken bones and a passport with the 
word ‘dhimmi’ marked in it. It takes Mr G, of course -  his voice and his 
gestures. And this is to name just a few of its cogs.
[Picture 11 -  Inscribing bodies]
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When we look at status determination in such detail, it becomes clear that Mr 
G’s claim only becomes a case after an asylum request questionnaire is filled up, 
finger prints are collected and interviews are concluded. Before it can be 
commented upon in legal recommendations, M r G’s stories have to be passed 
along and marked in affidavits and transcripts. As the determination procedure 
moves on, his statements will have to be contrasted with more statements 
harvested from humanitarian reports and United Nations handbooks. And if the 
Conare members sitting in Brasilia are to give a ruling, then all this material will 
have to be somehow brought back to them, be it through the police station’s 
intranet or Caritas’s old fax machine. For all my talk of making Mr G’s case in 
person, actually putting a case together takes much more than gestures and 
words.
Disconcertment
The array of heterogeneous elements involved in making individuals visible as 
asylum seekers is not easy to find. In fact, during the time I spent there, much of 
the work of Caritas’s staff consisted of finding the police stations where this 
assemblage was held. Sometimes what was missing was personnel (‘the marshal 
is on vacation’, ‘the scrivener has been transferred’ or ‘the deputy is out for 
lunch’). Other times, the lack was strikingly material (‘I cannot print an affidavit 
because we are out of paper’, ‘the fingerprint scanner is broken’ or ‘the intranet 
is out’). On one occasion, even the electricity was out, and a whole group of 
asylum seekers remained undocumented while the police station endured a 
blackout.167 When the necessary gathering of people and things wasn’t available, 
the work of status determination was brought to a halt.
After months following asylum seekers into police offices, I came across so 
many of these breakdowns that I began to lose track. I struggled to document as 
many episodes as I could, writing avidly in the hope of pinning down details 
while they were still fresh. In time, this allowed me to build my own little 
archive, which made me happy. As my pile of field notes grew bigger, however, 
it also made the archive increasingly harder to use, which made me tired. 
Deciding which aspects of the practices observed were worth reporting and
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which could be safely left behind took a lot of time. The most basic instinct to 
cut down work brought me to question why was I so concerned with telling of 
these issues in such detail in the first place.
[Picture 1 2 - A  blackout]
From the start, what had brought me to Brazil was a desire to capture the very 
m undane ways in which the border between migrant and refugee is established. 
Denying people visibility as asylum seekers due to the lack of personnel and 
basic material elements certainly felt as deserving a mention in this list. W ithout 
the cover letter signed by a Caritas lawyer and the affidavit signed by the police 
officer, these men and women were not allowed to move on to the next step in 
the determination process, which was something they avidly waited for. They 
couldn’t get work permits, nor access the health system, nor put their kids in 
public schools. Even the small aid of 70 pounds paid by Caritas was restricted to 
official cases. For all that, broken scanners and missing scriveners did seem to 
have rather significant bordering effects.168
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And yet I couldn’t help thinking that it was improper, almost disrespectful, 
to be paying as much attention to questionnaires and fax machines as to asylum 
seekers’ stories and pasts. Listening to their interviews, I was constantly 
reminded that these men and women had seen the worst the world has to offer. 
Many endured torture, lost their families and were subjected to all sorts of 
psychological and physical violence. With this in mind, to sit in my armchair 
and say that their reality as a refugee was not granted according to their 
experiences but was rather ‘a material and semiotic effect’ sounded too 
academic, too detached a point to make.
As my discomfort grew, it got me asking what the point was in devoting so 
much time to these ordinary practices, to speak of questionnaires and 
fingerprint devices with the same interest with which I told of lawyers and police 
officers. W hat was my reason to detail these mundane practices and attend to 
their heterogeneity?
I came back to the research with this question in mind. Instead of dismissing 
my interest in contingency and heterogeneity as an abstraction, I decided to 
think with it.1691 went back to the field of science studies and sought to make 
sense of what I had seen.
I had gone to Brazil to study how  examiners decide who is a migrant and 
who is a refugee. In time, I came to believe that the way I was framing my 
question was itself misconceived. No matter how much effort I would put into 
the question, I could not grasp how examiners set the distinction. I would never 
be able to pin down the decisive moment that I could then subject to critique. 
And this was for the very simple reason that there was none. There was no set of 
‘deciders’ behind the decision. There was no ‘pivotal event’ to which it could be 
traced. Or, better perhaps, there were so many that it made little sense to pick 
one.
The border between migrant and refugee is the effect not of a decision but of 
a decentred and heterogeneous process in which the case is enacted as weak. In 
what remains of the chapter, I spell out how approaching asylum decisions 
through the science studies lens brought me to think this way.
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Why focus on heterogeneity?
In this section, I want to justify why I find it important to focus on 
heterogeneity and detail. I want to explain my suggestion that each 
heterogeneous array allows for the emergence of a particular ‘pre-existing’ 
reality of the case.
As part of my discussion on under-determination in Chapter 2, I 
characterized the controversy around Mr G’s case as an example of what Collins 
calls an experimenter’s regress. I argued in Chapter 2 that this potential for 
regress puts in check the possibility of using evidence as an arbiter to choose 
between the acceptance and denial of an asylum request. The conclusion this 
was meant to encourage is that justifications for denial that point to a lack of 
empirical support are logically untenable. I want now to go back to the issue of 
regress -  this time to make sense of the importance I give to detail and 
heterogeneity. To explain why I find it so important to focus on these, I follow 
British sociologist John Law in an ontological reading of Collins’s argument. 
With other authors in science studies who approach knowledge-making 
practices with an eye to heterogeneity, Law argues that regressible controversies 
do more than raising the question of how a logically unsolvable controversy is 
brought to an end.170 According to Law, regressible controversies teach us 
something about what comes to count as reality as well. That is the ontological 
spin of the argument on regress that I want to emphasize.
For Collins, what makes a regressible controversy like Mr G’s interesting is 
the fact that it is brought to a closure despite its potential for regress. In the 
controversy about radiation, for instance, Collins is puzzled by the fact that the 
thesis proposed by scientist W was rejected by the majority of experts. The 
central question -  ‘Is this signal a signal of strong radiation?’ -  was turned into 
the issue of which apparatus was more reliable. The fact that the controversy is 
regressible means that there is no bedrock on which examiners can stand to 
decide which experimental apparatus is more reliable. This, in turn, implies that 
there is no way to prove conclusively that strong radiation doesn’t exist. 
Notwithstanding, Collins tells us, the thesis of strong radiation was discarded. 
The interesting question for him is, so to speak, a sociological-epistemological
no
one: if it was not the pre-existing reality of the cosmos that led to the rejection of 
W ’s thesis, then what social dynamic did?171
As what counts as the pre-existing reality of the cosmos is itself at stake 
during the controversy, to claim that the reality of the cosmos closed the 
controversy would be to fall into a circular reasoning. What counts as the pre­
existing reality (whether there are strong waves or not) depends on which 
experiment is accepted as being more reliable. At the same time, the potential 
for regress implies that there is always the possibility that we didn’t detect the 
waves because we didn’t adopt the proper experiment. There is no way, then, to 
exclude the possibility that, if we had employed a different experimental 
assemblage, our conclusion of whether there are or are not gravity waves would 
be different. If the thesis that ‘strong radiation doesn’t exist’ is accepted, Collins 
suggests that this is because, for some reason, the particular way of doing the 
experiment that leads to this conclusion became established as ‘the proper way’ 
of doing the experiment. Scientists adopt experimental assemblage ‘w’ as 
standard and end up accepting that reality as ‘real-w’. The version of reality that 
becomes accepted as ‘how reality really is’ is the version of reality that comes out 
of this particular experimental assemblage -  of a particular antenna, a particular 
way of using statistics, a particular way of reading signal and discarding noise, a 
particular scientist, trained to work in a particular way. Experiments made with 
this very particular experimental apparatus tell scientists how the pre-existing 
reality of the cosmos really is. This image of reality becomes diffused and it 
becomes accepted that there are no strong radiation waves.
Following Collins’s insight on regress, Law maintains that we cannot explain 
why one of these apparatuses is accepted as more reliable by saying that the 
reliable apparatus is the one that describes the world. As with Collins, Law takes 
this as an indication that the decision about which apparatus is more reliable has 
to be made in some other way. W hat Law adds to Collins’s insight is a stronger 
emphasis on the coextensive nature of the ontological and epistemological 
questions. According to Law, Collins showed us that at stake in the 
disagreement between W and his critics were two questions that could only be 
answered together: ‘Is this apparatus reliable?’ and ‘Does strong radiation exist?’
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The answers to these two questions, Law stresses, are ‘co-extensive’: if we use 
W ’s apparatus, we will come to the conclusion that strong radiation exists. If we 
use the apparatus favoured by Mr W ’s critics, we will come to the conclusion 
that strong radiation doesn’t exist.
The resolution of the arguments about whose detectors were good ones and 
whose were bad was an interesting social process. [... ] The resolution of these 
arguments is coextensive with the question of whether gravity waves exist. When 
it is decided which are the good experiments, it becomes clear whether those 
which have detected gravity waves or those which have not are.the good ones. 
Thus, whether gravity waves are there to be detected becomes known. On the 
other hand, once it is known whether they are there to be detected, there is a 
criterion available to determine whether any particular apparatus is a good one. 
If there are gravity waves, a good apparatus is one which detects them. If there 
are no gravity waves, the good experiments are those which have not detected 
them. Thus, the definition of what counts as a good gravity wave detector, and 
the resolution of the question of whether gravity waves exist, are congruent
I...].172
This is the key ontological insight to which Law wants us to attend. According to 
the experimental apparatus we favour, Law notes, we end up with a 
corresponding ‘pre-existing reality’ of the cosmos. Depending on which 
experimental apparatus is employed to perform the experiment, we end up with 
a different conclusion about whether the phenomenon exists. To bend a phrase, 
different ways of performing the experiment lead to different versions of what is 
taken to be the pre-existing reality. We end up with different enactments of the 
cosmos, so to speak: one in which strong radiation exists and one in which it 
doesn’t.
That is the ontological spin of Collins’s notion of regress that I want to 
connect to Mr G’s case. In Mr G’s case, depending on whether the image on 
Facebook of a man wielding a gun is taken to be of Mr G, or whether the 
medical reports are accepted as believable, or whether the copy of Mr G’s 
passport is accepted as reliable, we end up with different ‘pre-existing’ realities 
for the case. If the gathering of evidence and statements is organized as Caritas’s 
representative proposes, we end up with a ‘pre-existing’ reality that tells that Mr 
G is a refugee. On the other hand, if these dots are connected as Conare’s
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representative defends, we end up with a pre-existing reality in which Mr G is 
not a refugee. The decision on which arrangement to rely on and which 
conclusion to accepted are co-extensive, to borrow Collins’s term.
When we connect this insight back to the controversy around Mr G’s case, 
we get a much stronger sense of why the default picture of status determination 
as declaratory is misleading. W hat changes when we start to treat determination 
practices as enacting instead of ‘declaring’ the pre-existing strength of the case is 
that the list of conditions for the veracity of Mr G’s claim is brought into view. 
In GEP, Conare’s officer is stating that she has looked into report-X, she has 
done the interview in the way-X, she has checked the legal texts x-1, x-2 and x-3 
and ... she has concluded that Mr G is not a refugee. In this way of speaking, the 
ceteris paribus clause ‘. . . ’ that goes unsaid is the revealing statement, ‘If we use 
this same apparatus, we will conclude that’.
That, I believe, is why paying attention to the heterogeneity of determination 
practices is so important. The particular determination practices through which 
knowledge about the case is produced is responsible for the enactment of the 
specific external reality attributed to this case. The specific apparatus of legal 
texts, the ways of doing the interview, the pictures and the medical reports allow 
for the enactment of a specific ‘pre-existing’ reality of Mr G’s case.
The practical consequence this enactment approach has for how we account 
for asylum decisions is twofold: first, if it becomes accepted that Mr G is not a 
refugee, this cannot be attributed to the pre-existing strength of the case. 
Justifying a negative decision by saying, ‘This is the right conclusion because our 
assessments of legal fit and empirical support have shown that Mr G is not a 
refugee’ ceases to be an option. As Law puts it, ‘It is wrong to imagine that nature 
somehow impresses its reality directly on those who study it if they just set aside 
their own biases’.173 It is not the pre-existing reality out there that the 
determination work declares, but the enactment of this pre-existing reality put 
together in  the determination practices. Examiners might believe that they are 
declaring the pre-existing reality of the case, but the pre-existing reality they 
declare is one of the many ways in which Mr G’s case could have been enacted.
113
Entailed by the concept of enactment is the idea that each assessment 
practice -  the specific assemblage of techniques used, of materials present, of 
actors involved -  not only contributes to disclose the case’s strength. The 
apparatus put together in a determination practice and used to assess whether 
the case is weak or strong is tied to a unique version of what comes to count as 
the anterior reality of this case.
Secondly, looking at status determination as enactment also shows us why 
pointing to this lack of legal and empirical foundations for decisions is not 
necessarily to suggest that the asylum decision is a discretionary act. To question 
the idea that the right decisions emanate from the anterior reality of the case is 
not at all the same as saying it is decided by the examiners, as if they were the 
incarnation of petty sovereigns. Instead, this pre-existing reality -  the ‘anterior’ 
condition of Mr G as either being or not being a refugee -  is the result of the 
very concrete work of making a particular determination apparatus -  of law 
books, of a way of doing the eligibility interview, of particular humanitarian 
reports, and so forth -  become accepted as the go-to apparatus to answer the 
question of whether Mr G is a refugee.
No matter how well-conducted status determination is deemed to be, 
determination practices never simply disclose the case’s pre-existing strength. 
On the other hand, to say that the case is brought to a closure not by its pre­
existing reality isn’t the same as saying that examiners decide. The alternative of 
law and evidence doesn’t need to be discretion. Instead of studying the mental 
state of examiners or the sociological homologies that explain their dispositions, 
this enactment approach requires attention to the details of the practices in 
which cases emerge.
Status determination as enactment work
According to the default picture of status determination, the reality of the 
asylum seeker as a migrant or as a refugee is set prior to the determination work.
A person does not become a refugee by virtue of a recognition decision by the 
host country or UNHCR, but is recognized because he or she is a refugee. In 
other words, the recognition decision is declaratory: it acknowledges and 
formally confirms that the individual concerned is a refugee.174
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To speak of the asylum decision as declaratory is to presume the anterior nature 
of this reality. If free from error, the process will recognize the pre-existing 
strength of the case. The asylum decision consists in disclosing this anterior 
reality, which dictates whether the asylum seeker must or must not be 
recognized as a refugee.
In this chapter I took issue with the characterization of asylum decisions as 
declaratory. My contention is that what counts as the case’s pre-existing strength 
is not so simply brought out by  the determination practices; rather, it emerges in  
these determination practices. To express what I mean by this misleadingly 
trivial differentiation, I borrowed the term ‘enactment’ from the science studies 
literature.
Moving away from the picture of asylum decision as declaratory, I stressed 
here that the strength of the case, the reliability of evidence and the competence 
of examiners are simultaneously negotiated. In Law’s words, ‘none comes first. 
Reality isn’t destiny [...] Indeed it only appeared in the course of scientific 
experiments’.175 As intuitive as the picture of asylum decisions declaring a pre­
existing reality might be, cases like Mr G’s teach us that ‘in practice, such 
realities depend on the particular practices from which they emerge’.176
Realities are made in practice. That is how Law phrases it. Clarifying and 
developing this insight has been a key stake for the study so far. If we understand 
this misleadingly trivial statement, it becomes easier to understand what is at 
stake in the break from a declaratory to an enactment approach to asylum 
decisions. The insight of regress not only encourages us to break with 
asymmetric accounts; taking it to fruition also encourages us to look at these 
determination practices in a fresh way: not as declaratory practices, which 
discloses the case’s strength, but as practices that enact the case, in the strongest 
possible sense of the word.
In his now classic Changing Order; Collins suggests that the perceptions we 
form about the world are like shapes we draw in dot paper. The world, Collins 
tells us, ‘is there in the form of the paper, but mankind can put the numbers 
wherever it wishes and in this way can produce any picture’.177
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I believe the same can be said about the way asylum cases are assembled. The 
stories asylum seekers tell during interviews, the humanitarian reports and the 
evidence asylum seekers bring with them -  these are all there as dots on paper. 
But more than one picture can be formed by connecting them. There is more 
than one way, I want to say, of enacting the ‘pre-existing reality of the case’. 
Depending on the particular way this pre-existing reality is enacted, we arrive at 
different conclusions concerning whether the person is a refugee.
To describe asylum decisions as declaratory is thus misleading in that sense. 
Determination practices do not simply declare the case’s pre-existing reality. 
Instead, it is during these practices that what will be later accepted as the case’s 
‘pre-existing reality’ is defined. To talk of the cases being enacted as weak 
instead of being declared weak is to emphasize the link between the strength the 
case assumes and the particularities of the practices within which it is shaped.
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A ppear  before the Department o f  Federal Police i
and explain the reasons that made you leave [
your country  o f origin. j
The Department o f Federal Police will carry out 
the Term of Declarations.
Go to Caritas o f  the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo to I
receive instructions concerning:
Fill ou t  the request for refuge questionnaire; [
Social Service instructions for referrals in the 
areas of housing, health, education and use of |
o ther community resources;
Interview with Caritas/UNHCR/OAB agreement 
lawyers to prepare their ruling, which will be sent 
to the UNHCR and to  the Caritas representative 
for use in analyzing the case at the CONARE 
meeting;
interview with the CONARE representative;
Receiving of CONARE authorization for 
tem porary protocol.
Issuance of tem porary  protocol by the 
Department of Federal Police.
Issuance of tem porary  C.T.P.S. by the Regional 
Labor Office.
i ssuance of C adastro  de Pessoas Fisicas (CPF).
2 3




Consistency is a key concept in the declaratory picture of status determination. 
Along with the assessment of legal fit and empirical support, the judgment of 
consistency is one of the main indicators on which examiners rely to decide 
requests. The perceived consistency of the asylum seeker’s narrative is taken as a 
reliable indicator of the case’s overall strength.
[An examiners’ handbook] Consistency [... ] is understood to comprise a lack of 
discrepancies, contradictions and variations in the material facts asserted by the 
applicant [... ] The use of the indicator “consistency” is based on an assumption 
that a person who is lying is likely to be inconsistent in his or her testimony, 
presumably because it is considered difficult to remember and sustain a 
fabricated story; and/or when challenged, it is assumed that individuals who are 
not telling the truth try to conceal their inconsistencies by altering the facts. The 
converse supposition appears to be that if applicants actually experienced the 
events they recount, and are genuine in their statements, then they will broadly 
be able to recall these events and related facts accurately and consistently178
In Chapters 1 and 2 ,1 relied on the notions of strong indeterminacy and regress 
to dispute justifications for denial in terms of legal fit and empirical support. 
Chapter 3 sought to justify the importance of attending to the detail and 
heterogeneity of determination practices. This chapter continues the work of 
disassembling and reassembling asylum decisions by taking issue with the use of 
consistency as an indicator of credibility.
I argue here that the idea that it is possible to assess a case’s strength by 
relying on a judgment of consistency is dependent on a misleading assumption 
that determination practices are looking at a singular case. If the versions of the 
case emerging from different practices proved to be consistent, I contend, this 
can’t be written off as a natural consequence of ‘different practices exploring the 
same request’. As an alternative to this consistency-minded, check-box way of 
thinking, this chapter revisits the relation among determination practices using
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an enactment approach. Drawing on the science studies toolset, I adapt the 
notion of ontological coordination to discuss how different enactments of a case 
are arranged.
Step by step
‘Appear before the Federal Police’, ‘Go to Caritas’, ‘Talk to Conare’. It first 
occurred to me that something is off with this checklist during a meeting with 
examiners in Sao Paulo. I had been working as a volunteer in Rio for months, 
driving asylum seekers from all over the world from Caritas’s office in Tijuca to 
police stations in Galeao and Niteroi. W hat I had seen in Rio had strengthened 
my doubts about how examiners tell migrants from the ‘genuine’ refugees. I 
hoped that learning about the procedure in another city would make the 
particularities of what I was seeing in Rio more distinct. I expected the work in 
Sao Paulo to be neither identical nor completely different from what I had been 
observing. That would give me the sort of partial overlap for which I was 
aiming. So I asked my contact in Caritas if he would put me in contact with his 
Paulista counterpart. After a few weeks of arrangements, I started my field trip.
[Picture 14 -  Caritas-SP]
119
During the time I spent in Rio, I had the opportunity to talk to many 
examiners and ended up developing a basic opening line. I would ask the 
examiners to imagine I was a foreigner and explain the procedure to me. The 
answer I learned to expect came usually in the format of this checklist. 
Examiners would list the steps in the procedure and then tell me more about 
their involvement. As I assumed I had a good understanding of the procedure 
already, I asked for this overview mainly as a conversation starter. The idea was 
to get the examiners talking and make up more questions from what they said. 
But the answer I was given in Sao Paulo really surprised me.
[Mrs T] Well, i f  you want the official checklist you can read this leaflet in your 
folder. We give i t  to asylum seekers when they first get here. I t  lists all the steps. ‘The 
process starts at the police, then you come here to talk to us, and then the Conare 
agent comes down and so forth and so on ’. Now, o f  course, you have to take this 
with a pinch o f  salt. Because officially the person only becomes an asylum seeker 
after formalizing the request at the Federal Police, bu t in practice what happens is 
that the process usually starts here. ’Cause, as you know, we now  have a waiting 
time o f  about six m onths before the foreigner gets to do the affidavit at the police. 
And, o f  course, during this time this person will have been here already. He will 
have told us a bit o f  his story and so forth, and will already be talking to our social 
workers and getting some help. So although the process can only be considered 
official after the person has gone through the fingerprinting etc., here at Caritas the 
person already is an asylum seeker long before that.
W hat struck me as unusual in Mrs T’s way of describing the procedure was 
more the idea of asylum seekers having different practical realities than the 
contrast between ‘the real world’ versus ‘in theory’. That a checklist doesn’t 
represent the messiness of practices can hardly be news to those involved in the 
work. Even the most ivory tower-entrenched expert would assume that the 
transition from step to step is likely to be less smooth than this sort of checklist 
makes it seem. Cases don’t follow a standard line. Examiners don’t know when 
hearings will take place. In practice, the procedure is complicated, of course. 
Although this situation says a lot about the transparency of the determination 
procedure in Brazil, Mrs T’s contrast between official description and the work 
in practice was one I had come to expect. Her talk of a foreigner having different 
realities in different practices, on the other hand, really gave me pause.
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While writing about the practices I observed in Rio, I struggled to make sense 
of why I was finding it so important to write about their heterogeneity in detail. 
I took the notion of enactment from science studies to insist that status 
determination allows for the emergence of a particular version of the case. Now, 
looking at the relation between practices in enactment terms, I worried that I 
was being bewitched by my own terminology. But here I had it: an examiner, 
talking of a foreigner at the same time being and not being an asylum seeker, as 
if it were the most ordinary notion in the world.
[Picture 15 -  Being an asylum seeker]
The person can only be said to be an asylum seeker after fingerprints have 
been collected and an affidavit has been written. In Sao Paulo, foreigners usually 
wait six months to have access to these practices at the Federal Police. B u t here 
at Caritas, talking to our social workers, the person already is an asylum seeker 
long before that. ‘Here and there.’ ‘Now and then.’ The notion of a same 
foreigner oscillating in status disconcerted me. I had listened to the procedure
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being described as a checklist so many times that I came to assume a continuous 
progression: from foreigner to asylum seeker and from asylum seeker to refugee 
or failed applicant. Listening to Mrs T speak of a foreigner’s reality as something 
that changes from site to site was encouraging in that sense. It made me realize 
that the versions of the case enacted in different practices can hang together in 
ways that are much less coherent than the image of a status-to-status 
progression imbued in my checklist.
Hanging together
I got the image of different versions of the case hanging together from  the Dutch 
philosopher Annemarie Mol. Coordination is the more formal term Mol uses to 
speak about this. Listening to the examiner in Sao Paulo taking issue with the 
checklist overview made me confident that studying determination practices as 
enactment wouldn’t be a lofty endeavour. But I doubt I would have taken these 
critiques so seriously if I hadn’t been sensitized by Mol to think of reality as a 
local achievement. With Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law, among other 
authors, Mol is part of a small group of scholars in science studies who study 
knowledge practices with an eye to contingency and heterogeneity. I read Mol’s 
The B ody M ultiple early on my research and her arguments on coordination 
stayed with m e.179
Mol is a philosopher who spent many years studying diagnostic practices in 
medicine. Like status determination, the practices she studies are supposed to 
assess a person’s fit  with a certain definition. Is this patient anaemic? Is this a 
patient suffering from atherosclerosis in her foot? Like status determination, 
Mol tells us that producing an answer to these questions takes a lot of work. 
Each area of the hospital has its own saying. Each practice brings its own 
diagnostic standard, its own instruments and diagnostic techniques. In her 
terminology, Mol tells us that each of these practices enacts a particular reality of 
the disease. In practice, she says, a disease like atherosclerosis is multiple. It is 
enacted in multiple ways. And Mol insists that if these multiple enactments can 
be treated as manifestations of a single condition, then this is the result of 
coordination. Singularity is not given by the order of things.
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Ontological Coordination
M ol's argum ent on coordination can be described as a study on th e  relation b etw een  
different 'diagnostic apparatuses' -  som eth in g  like th e  experim ental apparatus used by th e  
physicists m entioned  in th e  last chapters. As d iscussed  in Chapter 3, John Law gives an 
ontological spin to  Collins's insight o f  regress and argues that w e  m ight end up w ith a 
co sm o s in which strong radiation exists or d o esn 't exist depend ing on th e  experim ental 
apparatus experts use. The choice o f  th e  cosm os' reality and th e  choice  o f  th e  experim ental 
apparatus used to  study th is reality are 'co-exten sive', as Collins and Law put it. Likewise, 
th e  idea that th e  reality o f th e  d isea se  being d iagnosed  is not disclosed by diagnostic  
practices but rather enacted  in them  is th e  starting point o f  M ol's argum ent on ontological 
coordination . 'Reality d o es  not p recede th e  m undane practices in which w e  interact w ith  
it', sh e  w rites, 'but is rather shaped  within th e se  practices'.180
In her work, Mol experim ented w ith m any w ords to  express w hat this shaping is about. In 
earlier works, w e  find her talking abou t doing and perform ing. To m ake a stand in th e  
fem in ist literature with which sh e  engages, sh e  adop ted  th e  notion o f  en a c tm en t.181 M ol's 
m ost distinctive argum ent is not abou t enactm ent, how ever, but about th e  co -ex isten ce  o f  
m ultiple enactm en ts. That is w h at her d iscussion on coordination is about.
Think o f  a patient entering a hospital and going through a series o f  diagnostic practices. 
W hen this patient leaves th e  hospital, her discharge letters read that sh e  has been  
diagnosed  with atherosclerosis on  her low er limb. Mol insists that each o f  th e  diagnostic  
practices th is patient w en t through did m ore than exam ine th e  patient from  a d ifferent 
perspective. Faithful to  th e  en a ctm en t principles, Mol sh ow s h ow  each o f  th e se  diagnostic  
practices allow s for th e  em erg en ce  o f  a unique reality o f  th e  condition from  which this  
patient is suffering. Sliced and put under th e  m icroscope in th e  haem atology  lab, for  
exam ple, th e  reality o f  atherosclerosis is th at o f  a th ickened blood v esse l. In th e  radiology  
departm ent, th e  reality o f  a therosclerosis is that o f  a shadow graph. Strictly speaking, th e  
atherosclerosis th e se  tw o  practices are enacting is not th e  sam e. And yet, in th e  patien t  
chart and th e  discharge letter  th e se  m ultiple w ays o f  enacting atherosclerosis are reduced  
to  d ifferent m anifestations o f th e  sam e d isease .
This is th e  puzzle with which Mol is in terested: this oscillation b e tw een  m ultiplicity in 
practice and singularity in th e  w ay that doctors talk abou t and deal w ith th e  d isease . W hat 
m akes this oscillation possib le, Mol claim s, is th e  work o f  ontological coord in ation .182 The 
en actm en t insight breaks w ith th e  idea that our reality is anterior and in d ep en d en t o f  th e  
practices that bring them  about. The notion o f  coord ination , in turn, breaks w ith th e  idea  
that th e  singu larity  o f  th e  objects w e  study is anterior to  th e  practices in which th at  
singularity em erges. A patient en ters into a hospital w ith a com plaint. She g o e s  through a 
series o f  diagnostic practices. At th e  end o f  th e  day, sh e  g e ts  o u t o f th e  hospital carrying a 
letter saying sh e  suffers from  atherosclerosis. W hat Mol is telling us is this: this singular  
diagnosis is never given by th e  order o f  things. It is always brought about. Singularity is 
contingent. It n eed s  to  be enacted  itself.
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The questions that practitioners try to answer are, of course, not identical in 
status determination and in medical decision making. Whether the diagnostic 
emerging from different practices is consistent is not always relevant for the 
doctor’s decision on how to treat the patient. As long as the two diagnostics ask 
for the same treatment, whether they are consistent or not is a secondary 
concern for the doctor. This makes medical decision making different from 
status determination, in which the judgment of consistency is a central concern. 
Yet, although it is important not to downplay their particularities, the two 
decision-making processes also have more in common than one might assume. 
Like the work of diagnosing a disease, the work of determination status is 
complex. It involves a myriad of determination practices: from the collection of 
fingerprints to the ruling at the plenary meeting. Each of these practices puts 
together its own array of humans and things. Each relies on its own standards of 
what qualifies a strong claim and its own techniques for producing information. 
As with the medical objects Mol studies, asylum cases are multiple in practice.
What Mol encourages us to do is reconsider the relation between these 
multiple enactments beyond the linear progression that checklist thinking leads 
us to expect. As different diagnostic practices are not complementary ways of 
bringing out a same underlying condition, different practices are not just steps 
in the assessment of the same and singular underlying case. Determination 
practices do more than approach the same underlying case from different 
perspectives. They enact different realities for the case. And, following Mol’s 
advice, I would suggest that if these enactments somehow align and allow for a 
consensual decision, then this alignment needs to be accounted for.
At the Federal Police, a very specific array of officers, interpreters and 
interview techniques allows for the emergence of the case as an affidavit. At the 
interview room in Caritas, questions are posed in a tone that invites details, 
medical reports are added to a folder and the case emerges as an extended 
transcript. We can look at these practices as boxes to be checked in the 
assessment of the case, or steps in the path towards the final decision. Or we can 
look at status determination with an enactment gaze.
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Beyond the wordplay, an enactment way of studying the relation between 
these practices entails the denaturalization of the alignment between their 
outcomes. In an enactment approach, agreement between different enactments 
of the case emerging at different practices can’t be written off as a natural 
consequence of the presumed fact that ‘different practices are bottom  line 
exploring the same and singular case’.
Lost on the way
To illustrate how attention to multiplicity and coordination destabilize the use 
of consistency as a decision criterion, let me move the narrative back to my 
fieldtrip. After leaving Sao Paulo, I asked my contact in Rio to arrange meetings 
for me at Caritas’s sister agency in Brasilia, IMDH. My suspicion of check-list 
overviews was strengthened by the stories I heard there.
At that point in the research, I was in the process of writing my critique of 
accounts for decision that resort to empirical support, which I report in Chapter 
2. The need for symmetry when studying decisions on complex and ‘more 
evident’ cases was very much in my mind. W hat I had read about rule following 
and under-determination had made me rather sceptical about the possibility of 
using law and evidence as arbiters to choose between competing 
recommendations. So, whenever examiners mentioned strong and weak claims, 
I made a point of interrupting them and asking them to justify this contrast. 
How, I would ask, could they tell the difference? What was the standard they 
used?
The notion of consistency came up often in the answers I got:
[Brief 1] M r X, Syrian, requesting asylum to escape generalized human rights 
violations. The asylum seeker’s credibility has been satisfactorily established. The 
asylum seeker offered enough details o f  events and showed calm, tranquillity and 
conviction when reporting his story. His narrative has been consistent across the 
affidavit prepared at the Federal Police and the asylum request questionnaire filled 
up at Caritas. There are no reasons to doubt his motivations to ask for asylum. 
Ruling: positive.
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[Brief 2] M r E, Bangladeshi, requesting asylum to escape political persecution. The 
asylum seeker lacks credibility. The statements made by the asylum seeker in his 
asylum request questionnaire are inconsistent with the story reported at IM DH and 
the Federal Police. There are reasons to believe the asylum seeker om itted  
information about the events that led  him  to leave Bangladesh. During the 
interview, the asylum seeker seems to have been directed in his answers and 
oscillated in his description o f  events. There are reasons to suspect his credibility 
and to question his motivations to ask for refuge. Ruling: negative.
The briefs above are excerpts of plenary rulings to which I had access during my 
time in Brasilia. In brief 1, the case enacted at the Federal Police as an affidavit 
and the case enacted in Caritas as a questionnaire are compared and agree with 
each other. The versions of the case fit consistently. The claim’s credibility is 
reinforced. In brief 2, the case as affidavit and the case as questionnaire are 
bridged again, but this time the two enactments don’t cohere. The asylum 
seeker’s credibility is put in question and the case comes across as weak. 
Described in terms of validity or correctness, the reference to consistency across 
practices often figured in the answers I received when I asked examiners about 
their criteria for telling strong from weak claims.
At my last day in Brasilia, I interviewed a social worker, Mrs K, and asked her 
opinion about the use of consistency as an indicator of credibility. Her 
insistence on localizing the applicant’s status in terms of ‘here and there’ 
resonated with what I had heard in Sao Paulo. ‘Of course’, Mrs K answered, ‘if 
an asylum seeker tells a story at the police and another story here, then we will 
need to understand what is going on. But still, I have learned that there’s just so 
much you can take from this’.
[Mrs K] Like in this case I  go t in volved with a few  m onths ago: a young boy, M r E, 
from  Bangladesh. He got here with a group o f  six other men. They entered Brazil 
through Bolivia and asked for asylum when they got here. They did the interview at 
the police and all made some very vague com m ents... about the economic situation 
in Bangladesh and so on. A ll very general, you see? A nd  when our lawyer 
interviewed them, they said pretty much the same thing. They said they had come to 
Brazil because they needed to w ork... because their country was very poor. So you  
see? When you ask what happened and the person keeps saying, like ‘oh, I  didn’t 
have a job, la m  poor, etc. ’, we try to help, but i t  is very likely that the request will be
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dismissed. And, indeed: GEP did a recommendation, saying that it  saw no well- 
founded fear; that it  looked like economic migration and so on.
Luckily, we work with eligibility but we work with migrants as well. We give aid 
to migrants in other dimensions: the social, the physical, the psychological. I f  the 
migrant has a health problem or needs pocket m oney he can come here and we try 
to help. A nd that is what happened with this boy. This boy came back here after his 
process, telling us that he needed m oney and that he needed a job. So we booked 
him  an appointment with our social worker to assess his needs. A nd  again, at first he 
pretty much repeated what he had said at the hearing. Just this time we went on 
asking for other things. He ended-up explaining that he wanted a job because he 
needed to send m oney to his wife and his children, who were starving in 
Bangladesh. We asked how  come and he told us, ‘Oh, it  is because they have been 
expelled from our house’. When we asked why he said, ‘Oh, i t  is because m y  house 
has been burned down’. A nd  we asked what happened and he said, ‘Oh, i t ’s because 
m y enemies burned down the house’.
‘But which enemies?’ ... and he kept going ... and we let him  speak ... ‘Oh, it 
was this and that’. A nd  it  so happens that, though his case wasn’t  about politics, it  
qualified as religious persecution.
In Mrs K’s story, a young Bangladeshi arrives at IMDH office and fills out a 
questionnaire. A police officer asks questions and prints an affidavit. IM DH’s 
lawyers and Conare officers ask more questions and write their legal views. At 
GEP and the plenary meeting, the multiple versions of the case that emerge in 
these practices are actively bridged. Questionnaire and affidavits are read side by 
side. Legal recommendations are compared. How consistent they are when 
contrasted to each other is a central concern. At the end of the day, as Mrs K 
puts it, everything points to migration. Mrs E’s case, one might think, illustrates 
a fault in the procedure. But far more is happening, I think.
[Mrs K] But you see? During the eligibility process he didn’t  mention any o f  this. 
N ot to the police nor to the Conare officer nor to our lawyer here. So everything 
pointed to migration. He spoke very little English and no Portuguese at all. H e came 
along with these other guys from Bangladesh and repeated the same story they told. 
He pretty much repeated the same discourse we are used to getting from migrants. 
Only later, when a social worker did the social interview, with a different logic, he 
ended up revealing these details. So we rushed back to Conare, saying that the case 
was no t what it  looked like. That i t  was much more complex; that we had new  
elements and so forth.
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What Mrs K’s story shows should not be dismissed as a fault in the procedure. 
Quite the opposite, in fact; judging by Mrs K.’s recollection, the procedure 
seems to have progressed smoothly, in the almost seamless progression from 
step to step that we are led to expect by the government’s leaflet. The versions of 
Mr E’s case enacted at the Federal Police and at Caritas cohered. All practices 
encouraged the same conclusion on whether this young Bangladeshi was an 
economic migrant or a refugee. They ‘pointed in the same direction’. Given this 
consistency across practices, denial was the decision plenary members had been 
steered towards. That this young man wasn’t a refugee was a fact, I want to say, 
considering how the possible versions of the case had been arranged. There was 
consistency across practices, indeed. But this was not because all practices were 
looking at the same underlying case. Instead, consistency was achieved at the 
price of keeping the alternative enactment of the case that emerged from the 
social interview out of sight. Much more relevant than evidence of a fault in the 
system, this story points to the sort of ontological coordination that Mol tells us 
about.
Living with inconsistency
In Mrs K’s story, Mr E arrives at IMDH and claims to fear political persecution. 
His case goes through a number of determination practices that are supposed to 
tell whether this claim is credible enough and fits the refugee definition. In 
Mol’s stories, a patient enters a hospital and claims to have pain when walking. 
Her case goes through a series of diagnostic practices, which are supposed to tell 
whether her condition fits the medical definition of atherosclerosis. Mol insists 
that, by tying a range of heterogeneous ingredients in a particular way, each of 
these practices enacts a unique version of the condition from which this patient 
is said to be suffering. What puzzles Mol is how the versions of the patient’s 
condition that emerge in these different practices can be drawn together as 
‘instances’ of the same and single condition and described using a single name. 
While looking at the practices that make this possible, Mol ends up contrasting 
two general variants of coordination: a first, in which consistency between
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different enactments of a patient’s case is strived for, and a second, in which 
inconsistency between enactments is simply ‘lived with’.
W hat is particular about forms of coordination that strive for consistency is 
that different enactments of the patient’s condition are openly bridged. 
Different ways of enacting the condition are put side by side and compared. 
Doctors create common standards so they can choose among these 
enactments.183 If these enactments do not map up to each other, these standards 
are used to decide what enactment will inform the diagnostic. When two ways of 
enacting the diagnosis are openly bridged and don’t align, one of the diagnostic 
apparatuses wins the day.184 Sticking to one enactment and ditching the other is 
one of the forms in which multiple enactments of a patient’s condition can 
relate when there is disagreement and consistency is strived for.
But here is the thing, Mol tells us: consistency is not always strived for. We 
might end up with a consensual diagnostic saying that this patient is 
atherosclerotic. That doesn’t mean that all diagnostic practices concurred. Nor 
does it does mean that potential mismatches between the versions of the case 
emerging from different practices have been actively considered and dealt with. 
Singularity in the diagnostic is not synonymous to consistency. Alternative ways 
of enacting the condition might remain in tension, even though this tension 
does not always come to the fore.
Modes of coordination that strive and don’t strive for consistency are 
different in this respect. If openly bridged, alternative ways of enacting the 
diagnosis can prove inconsistent. But these incompatible enactments are not 
necessarily bridged. They can be kept apart somehow. They can be displaced, so 
that their inconsistency might remain potential and doesn’t lead to open 
disagreement. What we have, when this happens, is inconsistent singularity.
In Mr E’s case, if actively bridged, the version of the case being enacted at the 
interview with the social worker and the version of the case being enacted at the 
Federal Police would clash. Had not Mr E gone back to IMDH, these two ways 
of enacting his case -  as an economic migrant pretending to be a refugee or as a 
refugee fleeing religious persecution -  would not be allowed to meet. Their 
potential for conflict would not have come to the fore.
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Bacon and eggs
Mol gives an exam ple o f tw o  w ays o f enacting atherosclerosis that relate in an inconsistent  
fash ion w ithou t this inconsistency resulting in op en  controversy: th e  first is th e  en actm en t  
o f  th e  patient's condition w e  co m e across at th e  practice o f  vascular surgery. The second  is 
th e  en actm en t o f  th e  patient's condition that em erg es during th e  practice o f  internal 
m edicine.185 In th e se  tw o  settings, Mol says, atherosclerosis is enacted  as a problem  that 
has d ifferent tem poralities. The doctor involved w ith vascular surgery approaches 
atherosclerosis as a p resen t condition. The vascular surgeon is not so  concerned  with th e  
process that led th e  patient to  develop  atherosclerosis. To th e  vascular surgery, an egg and  
bacon-breakfast is o n e  that patients m ight be happy to  ea t after their veins have been  
unclogged. For th e  internist, on th e  other  hand, identifying w hat caused  atherosclerosis is a 
main concern: th e  fact that th e  patient ea ts  eggs and bacon for breakfast is w hat n eed s to  
be avoided if th e  patient is not to  develop  th e se  c logged  veins again.
Mol n o tes that th ere  is a lot o f potential ten sion  b e tw een  th e se  tw o  practices. She says  
that, 'in theory', th e  clash b etw een  th e se  tw o  w ays o f  enacting th e  condition 'is full blown'. 
For th e  internist, vascular surgery is a palliative. The fact th at vascular su rgeons p o se  as 
saving lives is c lose  to  hypocrisy. Vascular surgery rather enab les death-threaten ing habits 
by dealing only w ith th e  clogged vein instead o f  attacking th e  cause o f  th e  condition. And 
yet, Mol tells us, although all th e  necessary  'ingredients' for a full blown clash are in place, 
controversy d o esn 't happen. The tw o  w ays o f  enacting atherosclerosis don 't m atch up to  
each other; But this inconsistency is lived w ith. The inconsistency is th ere, but th e  
controversy rem ains potential.
To illustrate h ow  this sort o f  'cold' inconsistent is possib le, Mol com m en ts on  a 
conversation  sh e  had with an internist. This internist explains that, w h en  a patient is 
diagnosed  w ith clogged arteries, th e  doctors' main concern is w h eth er  th e  patient is at risk 
o f  suffering a heart attack or contracting gangrene. So, th e  patient w h o  g ets  into th e  
hospital is im m ediately referred to  th e  vascular surgeon . W hat brought th e  patient to  
develop  th e  condition is trea ted  a secondary concern. This, Mol argues, is a key asp ect o f  
how  tw o  en actm en ts that are incom patib le can n ev erth eless co-exist.
'Here, a th erosc lerosis is e n a c te d  a s  a  p re se n t condition , there , a s  a  p ro cess  th a t  h a s a  
history. Tensions b e tw e e n  th e se  w a ys  to  e n a c t th e  rea lity  o f  th e  d isea se  a re  articu la ted . B ut 
i t  d o e sn 't co m e  to  a  fu ll-b low n  figh t. Instead, th e  d ifferen ces b e tw e e n  th e  condition  
a th erosc lerosis a n d  th e  a th erosc lero tic  p ro c e ss  a re  d is tr ib u ted .'186
The en actm en t o f  atherosclerosis as encroached  v esse ls  (presen t condition/vascular  
surgeon) and its en actm en t as v esse l encroachm ent (process-like/internal m edicine) are  
potentially  incom patible: favouring o n e  co m es at th e  ex p en se  o f  th e  other. But this 
potential incom patibility d o esn 't flare up in op en  m ism atch. This, Mol te lls us, is due to  th e  
very practical issue o f  distribution: th e se  tw o  w ays o f  enacting th e  patient's condition are  
distributed in such a w ay th at th e  practice that g ives rise to  th e  first en a ctm en t is part o f  
th e  standard diagnostic path, w hile th e  practice th at g ives rise to  th e  o ther  is circum vented .
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For me, that is one of the most important aspects of Mol’s argument on 
coordination: her insistence that singularity can be achieved without open- 
bridging. Compare how different medical diagnostics relate and the way 
different determination practices are arranged. In the hospital, different 
diagnostic practices took place. There was not open disagreement between those 
practices that were openly bridged. The diagnosis of the condition encouraged 
by those practices that were compared all encouraged the same diagnosis. And 
doctors ended up with a consensual diagnosis at the end. Yet, Mol warns us that 
this singularity in diagnostic doesn’t allow us to exclude the possibility that there 
were possible alternative ways of enacting the condition that didn’t agree and 
that were simply kept out of the comparison. She reminds us of the alternative 
enactments that didn’t have a chance to make themselves present -  enactments 
that were kept out of our field of vision or enactments that were Othered, so to 
speak. This sort of inconsistent coordination, I want to say, is what Mrs K’s story 
points to. If there is no open disagreement between practices as concerns Mr E’s 
status, we may assume that the lack of disagreement exists ‘because all practices 
were exploring the same underlying case and managed to assess it properly’. But 
no, Mol insists: singularity takes continuous work. Enacting singularity takes 
ontological coordination: it involves arranging determination practices in a 
m anner that somehow displaces alternative case-enactments.
In Mr E’s case, this coordination work takes the form of asking questions 
with an ‘eligibility logic’ and arranging hearings in such an order that the case 
enacted at the social-work interview gets lost on the way. Beyond Mr E’s case, 
we see potential for this in the way the marshal asks question after question and 
translates ‘demanded’ for ‘requested’ while writing down Mr G’s affidavit or the 
way the UNHCR officer highlights some aspects of the human rights report and 
downplays others. These are examples of contingent details in the determination 
practices that contribute to steer alternative enactment out of sight. Instead of 
by dint of an underlying singularity, it is thanks to little nothings like these that 
difference can be arranged during determination procedures, defining what 
enactment of a case gets to guide Conare.
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Checkbox overviews as discursive devices
In this section, I rely on Mol’s insights on difference and coordination to go 
beyond the ‘as it is versus in theory’ contrast and express what I find 
problematic about check-box overviews.
In 1994, Mol published an article with the Dutch ethnographer Marc Berg 
under the title ‘Principles and Practices of Medicine’. These two notions are 
central to the textbook image of how the work of diagnosing and treating 
patients is organized.187 W hat Berg and Mol find relevant in this principles and 
practices narrative is its rhetoric effect. Medicine is full of diversity, they say. 
Even a relatively banal condition like anaemia is prone to different definitions, 
each with their own diagnostic standards and practices.
Berg and Mol are puzzled by the fact that, when the diagnostics emerging 
from two of these apparatuses don’t match, this discrepancy doesn’t necessarily 
translate into a clash between defendants of different diagnostics. Two ways of 
diagnosing and treating anaemia might be incompatible, both in terms of the 
standards of normality they use and the diagnostic devices they demand. Even 
so, Mol and Berg say, it is very common in medicine that doctors will continue 
to use both treatments as complementary, without this causing the sort of open 
clash that might be expected if we take consistency as a necessary aim.188
To make sense of this situation, Berg and Mol suggest that, on top of the 
practical arrangements that keep alternative arrangements distributed, this sort 
of cold inconsistency is facilitated by a principle and practice rhetoric. When 
two ways of diagnosing anaemia lead to discrepant diagnostics, doctors can 
make sense of the discrepancy in terms of an assessment being ‘ideal’ (belonging 
to the sphere of principles) but unpractical. ‘Here, at the clinic, the laboratorial 
way of diagnosing anaemia would give more certainty but would be too costly or 
too fussy’. That is a powerful way of justifying the use of a diagnostic logic 
without having to take a stand on the overall pertinence of the other approach. 
A principle and practice rhetoric works thus like a sort of pacifying discourse. It 
makes it possible for discrepant diagnostics to co-exist in tension without this 
discrepancy coming to anyone’s attention.
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The checklist way of describing the relation between determination practices 
holds, I believe, a similar effect. When there is inconsistency, we might take it 
for granted that we need to strive for consistency. In turn, when we take 
consistency as a necessary goal, we might end up expecting controversy between 
those case enactments emerging from different practices. My point is that, like 
the practice and principles rhetoric, the way of talking about different 
determination practices as if they were steps in a checklist also works as a 
pacifying discourse.
This pacifying potential is not necessarily a good thing, however. Checklist 
talk leads us to expect consistency in the way that same and singular cases come 
to the fore in different determination practices. When that consistency is 
achieved, we don’t take into consideration the possibility that alternative ways of 
enacting the case might have fallen out of sight. By pacifying potential tensions 
between alternative enactments, checklist talk facilitates the Othering of 
alternative enactments.
In Mrs K’s story, the interviews with the Federal Police and the eligibility 
lawyer at IMDH were consistent. They encouraged the conclusion that this 
young Bangladeshi’s claim for refugee reality was weak. At a different interview, 
however, done with ‘a different logic’, the social assistant gives more emphasis to 
the process-like sources of the claim. The questions asked and the way the 
interview was conducted were not the same. The version of the case emerging 
from these practices didn’t match. Plenary members would therefore be steered 
towards opposing assessments depending on which experimental apparatus was 
used to make each assessment Judging the version of the case enacted during 
practice 1 and 2, plenary members were steered to conclude that this 
Bangladeshi was not a refugee. If they were to judge the version of the case as 
enacted at practice 3, then this young Bangladeshi’s claim for refugee reality 
would likely come across stronger. And yet, the inconsistency between these 
alternative ways of enacting the case would probably remain cold, were it not for 
the unexpected interview that, conducted with a different logic, allowed other 
elements to come up.
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To paraphrase Mol, all the ingredients for a full blown controversy were in 
place in Mr E’s case. And yet, were it not for the unexpected interview, the 
alternative enactment of this case would have been lost. The controversy 
wouldn’t have become overt. This mismatch between alternative ways of 
enacting Mr E’s case would have remained cold. It is in such a context that the 
critiques of checkbox overviews I heard in Sao Paulo and this Bangladeshi’s 
story resonate. This Othering, I want to suggest, is facilitated by checkbox 
overviews. By encouraging us to think of social care as belonging to a different 
dimension of refugee protection and to think of status determination in terms of 
steps in the assessment of the underlying same and singular case, checkbox 
overviews make this sort of practical displacement harder to grasp. As 
asymmetric talk kills the drive to ask how a case was enacted as having legal and 
empirical support, checklist talk kills the drive to consider whether alternative 
ways of enacting the case have been Othered along the way.
Mol’s terminology thus helps make sense of what I find problematic about 
checkbox overviews. The notion of enactment encourages us to treat each 
practice as enacting a unique reality for the case. These check box descriptions, 
however, still work under an assumption of singularity. They take as a given that 
different practices are ways of collecting information and producing a decision 
about the same and single case. Check box overviews thus reinforce an 
assumption of singularity that gives consistency across practice such a relevant 
role. It naturalizes the assumption that, if all practices are dealing with the same 
case, they should arrive at the same conclusion.
I take issue with the assumption that common assent occurs ‘because they all 
looked at the same case free from bias and thus, as expected, got to the same 
assessment’. We gain something when we leave this sort of checklist talk aside: 
we get to notice the ontological coordination happening in the space between 
singularity and open controversy. We get to see how details as small as the order 
in which hearings are arranged, questions are asked and evidence is organized 
might affect the outcome of asylum requests. We become more aware of how 
these little nothings end up making the difference between the asylum seeker 
emerging as a bogus applicant or as a refugee.
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Steering decisions
The procedural handbook cited at the start of the chapter reads that if applicants 
‘actually experienced the events they recount, and are genuine in their 
statements, then they will broadly be able to recall these events and related facts 
accurately and consistently’.
In this chapter I extended the same logic to the justifications examiners give 
for denial and considered whether this logic holds. Suppose examiners all agree 
that Mr E’s case is weak. Their assessment of the request is completely 
consistent, in the sense that all examiners involved in all steps of the 
determination work got to the same conclusion that Mr E is most likely an 
economic migrant instead of a refugee. Does this absolute consistency give 
reasonable basis for the denial of Mr E’s request?
The argument I put forward is that the fact that a case is consistently assessed 
as weak across different determination practices (or is shown to be inconsistent, 
to phrase it the other way) gives no reasonable basis for the denial of the request. 
This applies not only when there are small inconsistencies that might be shown 
to be false in the long run, but also when all determination practices agree that 
the case is weak.
As argued in Chapter 3, to speak of enactment is to keep in mind that each 
determination practice ties together a range of heterogeneous phenomena in a 
very specific way. It is to acknowledge that the answer to whether the request is 
strong and the adoption of a particular apparatus to make this appraisal are 
simultaneous social processes. Extended to how we conceive of the relation 
between determination practices, this enactment approach problematizes the 
assumption of singularity embedded in checklist overviews.
By reinforcing the assumption that different practices are assessing the same 
underlying case, this sort of step-talk contributes to hide the practical 
arrangements that keep alternative ways of enacting asylum claims out of sight. 
This checklist way of thinking about status determination encourages us to 
expect consistency in the way the case should come to the fore. When that 
consistency is achieved, we don’t take into consideration the possibility that 
alternative ways of enacting the case might have been Othered.
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During status determination, an asylum case moves through a rich 
range of practices: the request at Caritas, the formalization of the case at the 
Federal Police, an interview with a lawyer, a hearing with a Conare officer, a chat 
with a social worker, debates at GEP or a deliberation at a plenary meeting.
In an enactment imaginary, these practices are not boxes to be checked or 
steps in the path towards a decision. They are not complementary tasks in the 
work of collecting information about a same and single case. As we get to 
appreciate if we look at status determination through enactment lenses, the way 
practices are arranged does more than to disclose the strength of the case. It 
allows for the emergence as a fa c to i the conclusion that the asylum seeker isn’t a 
refugee.
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; P O S IT IV E  DECISION:
Caritas informs CONARE's decision about the 
recognition o f  refuge;
The refugee requests an Identification Card at the 
Department o f  Federal Police;
The refugee signs the Term o f  Responsibility at the
i Department o f  Federal Police.
■ NEGATIVE DECISION:
I N otification o f the decision by the Department o f
Federal Police.
An appeal can be filed with the M inistry o f Justice 
within 15 days;
Caritas can provide guidance about the appeal to 
be filed.
Mote: the person requesting refuge has obligations 
in relation to the country he/she is in. They 
should obey the laws and regulations and the 
means to maintain public order.
Negative decision from the Ministry of justice 
If the M inistry o f Justice denies the appeal, the 
person who requested it will be subject to the 
foreign legislation in effect in the country.
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I t is 10:00 in the m orning in Brasilia. Envoys o f  different ministries, the Federal 
Police, Caritas and UNHCR are gathered in room 304 o f  the Justice M inistry 
building, waiting for the plenary m eeting to start. The list o f  participants makes for 
a curious crowd. Case examiners sit among lawyers and priests. Police officers rub 
shoulders with nuns and diplomats. A few  formalities are dealt with before the 
quorum is verified: new  members are welcome, announcements are made, dates for 
future meetings are confirmed. A nd  then it  is time to vote. ‘Case num ber 
08451/2012-13, M rs Z, citizen o f  the Democratic Republic o f  Congo: the asylum 
request is denied. The request doesn't fit the eligibility criteria’. ‘Case num ber 
08505/2012-13, M r F, citizen o f  Pakistan: status is granted. The eligibility criteria 
fixed by article 1 o f  Law9474has been fulfilled’. The meeting goes on like this. Some 
cases are accepted and some cases are denied. Some processes are singled out for 
discussion while others go straight to vote. A fter the m eeting records are reviewed, 
the session is declared closed. Taken back to Conare’s office at the fourth floor, the 
results are typed into letter-headed paper. With the help o f  a fax machine, a final list 
is passed on to police stations and Caritas’s offices across Brazil.
When the fax machine blips back in Rio, many months have gone by since Mrs 
Z filed down her request. Between claim and decision, an endless number of 
determination practices have been put in play. A lot of hardware and a lot of 
hard work have been mobilized so that plenary members could enter this 
meeting room in Brasilia a year or so later, carrying Mrs Z’s file in their hands. 
For months, examiners have collected evidence, conducted interviews and 
carried out inquiries. All these steps have finally brought them here, to the day 
when plenary members reopen Mrs Z’s file and decide.
With the pre-analysis executed, the cases go to the Conare’s plenary to be 
decided. In the plenary each member is entitled to one vote, and decisions are 
made by majority. If the decision is positive, the asylum seeker is recognized as a 
refugee in Brazil. If the decision is negative, [...] the person is subject to the 
general foreigner’s regimen and is not a refugee in Brazil.189
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After months of deliberation, legal opinions are forwarded to the plenary 
meeting, where high-ranking envoys sit together and decide. Judging by the 
declaratory picture of asylum decisions, this eccentric meeting in Brasilia is the 
pinnacle of the determination work. If there is a pivotal m oment when the 
decision on whether Mrs Z is a migrant or a refugee is made, then this meeting 
must be it. Or is it not?
G O V E R N O  FED -
[Picture 17 -  Arriving at CONARE]
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This chapter takes issue with the image of asylum decisions as something that 
happens at the end. So far, I have encouraged scepticism towards the declaratory 
picture of status determination. In the previous chapters, I have disputed the 
image of asylum decisions as declaratory and explained why I don’t believe 
decisions can be arrived at by judging consistency, assessing empirical support 
and measuring legal fit. This chapter dwells on the fifth and final aspect of the 
default picture: the assumption that the answer to whether the person is a 
migrant or a refugee is defined by a set of deciding subjects at a pivotal event.
In the literature on migration and border controls, there has recently been a 
lot of talk about decentring decision. The image of high-ranking politicians 
declaring who belongs to the community has been criticized as ‘too unitary’ and 
‘too top-down’.190 Besides being misleading as a sociological portrait, the image 
of welcomed and unwelcomed individuals being set apart in a pivotal moment 
has been charged as politically disempowering.191 It is criticized for being tied to 
a picture of politics that happens in exceptional moments, instead of as 
something in which we are invested in our everyday lives.192 In contrast to this 
event-centred picture of decision, we are told that the border between welcome 
and unwelcome is brought about in ‘multiple and dispersed’ ways.193
As I anticipated in the introduction, I was influenced by this decentred take 
on decision while following the work of status determination in Brazil. W ith my 
stories, I have sought to show that the practices that steer a case like Mrs Z’s 
towards denial are happening throughout the procedure. W hat comes to count 
as the anterior strength of the case is affected by matters as contingent as an 
examiner’s decision to ask questions in a certain tone, by the order in which 
interviews are arranged, the quality of a photo or by a fingerprint scanner’s 
insistency not to cooperate. My hope is that the stories told in the previous 
chapters will have contributed to tip the interest away from this pivotal moment 
of decision and towards the dispersed, more decentred bordering work that 
occurs between claim and ruling.
Now, as we start to change focus, it is tempting to overstate the argument 
and say something like “there is no decision at all’. But here a more down-to- 
earth reader could quip, ‘Then what about this meeting you just described, with
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all the nuns and diplomats?’ W hat about this event that takes place in Brasilia, 
when plenary members sit together in room 304 and, in a very concrete sense, 
make a decision on Mrs Z’s request? If the enactment of Mrs Z as unwelcome 
happens in a decentred way, how come we continue to see this meeting in 
Brasilia as being so pivotal, nevertheless?
This chapter argues that maintaining the perception that there is a pivotal 
moment of decision is a central aspect of how status determination can arrive at 
an official closure, in spite of the fact that the case’s weakness is never 
conclusively demonstrated. I hope to show in this chapter that talk of a pivotal 
moment of decision defers the task of showing that the case is weak to an elusive 
moment of definition, which never actually takes place. Drawing on the science 
studies toolset, I borrow the notion of phase work to refer to this way of talking.
I start the argument by introducing the notion of phase work and sketching 
how it becomes visible in examiner’s talk. I then move on to unravel the official 
justifications given for the denial, to give a closer example of phase work at play 
in Mrs Z’s request. Finally, I conclude by spelling out how this decentred mind 
set challenges the declaratory picture of asylum decisions.
Phase work
Let us start by considering how examiners talk about the moment of decision, to 
get a first sense of how phase work unfolds. We are back at the annex building of 
the Justice Ministry in Brasilia, crossing the dim hallway that leads to the fourth 
floor, where Conare’s eligibility team operates. At the door of room 422 ,1 cross 
paths with Conare’s coordinator, whom I had met during a hearing in Rio. We 
shake hands and I ask if he would be OK answering a few questions. At this 
moment in our conversation, we are talking about where decisions take place.
[M r V:J A t the m om ent o f  the request, the police is n o t actually doing a judgm ent o f  
merit. The guy is no t actually assessing the case. The officer is ju st writing what he 
can write at that moment. So, there is no judgm ent at that point. The actual debate 
about eligibility starts later, in the proper instances that exist for this sort o f  debate, 
at the GEP meeting and at the plenary meeting. Here, in Conare, is the place we 
have to have these discussions. I  can }t  ju st go to the police and say, like, ‘Oh, this is 
n o t right, this is wrong ... the police is n o t working well here at the beginning’. 
Nooo no n o ... i t  doesn’t work like that.
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[Picture 18 -  Inside Conare's HQ]
[Picture 19 -  Plenary cases]
142
In this remark, Conare’s coordinator is telling me about the participation of the 
Federal Police in the determination procedure and on its significance to the 
determination work. He insists that, during the hearing at the police station, the 
main concern is not to assess the case’s strength, but simply to formalize the 
request. The police officer is there to write down a first version of the claimant’s 
narrative. This is part of the determination procedure, he claims, but it 
shouldn’t be mistaken as an assessment practice in itself. To decide on the case is 
to assess whether it has legal and empirical support, whether the narrative is 
consistent, whether the case is strong. At the Federal Police, the officer preparing 
an affidavit has no say in this work. The police officer is not doing any such 
assessment of merit. This assessment, he insists, belongs to the ‘formal spaces’ 
reserved to this task by the Brazilian law: the group for preparatory studies and 
the plenary meeting.
When we have a chance to talk more informally, we sometimes talk with the officer 
and with the interviewers who are there, down the line. When this is possible, we do 
try and discuss the case at the source. B ut the decision itse lf is restricted to formal 
forums.
Mr V underscores that the final assessment on whether the asylum seeker is a 
migrant or a refugee is to be done properly, at the formal forums specified by 
the law. When possible, it is OK to engage the officer interviewing the asylum 
seeker ‘down the line’. But if due process is to be observed, then there are certain 
formalities that need to be followed. Mr V remarks again: for each task, there is a 
proper moment and place.
There is no t such a thing as getting to Conare’s office and asking to talk with the 
officer who went to the mission because I  disagree with the way he did the interview  
... that wouldn’t happen ... there is no t such a thing! [nao existe isso]. These things 
have to be done formally, at the proper moments, at GEP and the plenary, when we 
decide on the case together.
Mr V talks of the moment of decision with much confidence. Even in a quick 
remark like this, however, this moment of decision is localized in more than one 
way. When talking about where and when this ‘proper moment of decision’ 
would be, Mr V oscillates. At first, GEP is presented as distinctly decisive in the
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process of assessing requests. The resolution by the plenary is pictured almost as 
a formality, which simply confirms the decision already taken in GEP. By the 
end of the passage, however, the proper moment for assessing the case is 
specified to exist in a different moment and place. This time, the pivotal 
decision is located in a more predictable way, with all decisiveness being 
attributed to the moment in which the request is brought to a vote at the 
plenary meeting.
We first discuss the case at GEP, to make sure everybody is on the same page. M ost 
o f  the time, this is enough to close the issue. When that happens, that’s good, even 
better. The case w ill come to the plenary and the plenary w ill vote. B ut i f  the 
disagreement remains and the arguments are strong for both sides, or i f  the case 
brings elements that depend on a position by Conare, then we bring it to the plenary 
to be discussed. Now, even i f  GEP is in consensus that [a case] is positive, that 
doesn’t mean that GEP’s recommendation is the decision. I f  the plenary judges that 
i t  wants to open the case for discussion even though GEP has consensus, the plenary 
can do it. Because GEP is a space for study. I t is n o t a space for decision. I t doesn’t 
em it a ruling. GEP emits legal opinions, but no decisions. The plenary, yes, makes 
the real decision. I t is here that i t  is decided.
Mr V wavers when defining the specific time at which the pivotal m om ent of 
decision is supposed to take place. He claims that, ‘most of the time’, the 
discussion at the GEP will be enough to close the matter on whether the asylum 
seeker is a migrant or a refugee. At the same time, however, M r V insists that it 
is at the plenary meeting that ‘the real decision’ takes place. This is the feature of 
Mr V’s discourse that I want to attend to: this way of referring back to a m oment 
of decision even though it is not clear when and where it takes place. It is 
tempting to dismiss this ambivalence as incoherent speech or as an example of 
Mr V being convoluted. But something more significant is going on around this 
slippage, I think.
In Chapter 4, I discussed how Mol and Berg reacted to the co-existence of 
conflicting diagnostics. To make sense of this situation, Berg and Mol suggest 
that, on top of the practical arrangements that keep alternative arrangements 
distributed, cold inconsistency is facilitated by a principle and practice rhetoric. 
When two ways of diagnosing anaemia lead to discrepant diagnostics, doctors
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can make sense of the discrepancy in terms of an assessment being ‘ideal’ 
(belonging to the sphere of principles) but unpractical. That, Mol and Berg 
argue, allows doctors to justify the use of a diagnostic logic without having 
to take a stand on the overall pertinence of the other approach.
Giving a temporal spin to the idea that discourse can have a pacifying effect, 
American ethnometodologist Michael Lynch coined the expression ‘phase work’ 
to describe a similar proclivity in expert talk. Lynch shows how, thanks to a way 
of speaking that oscillates when specifying a moment of decision, experts can go 
on saying that a controversy has been settled, even though the technical 
controversy has never been overcome. Beyond a symptom of convoluted speech, 
that is the more significant effect I believe can be attributed to Mr V’s talk. By 
suggesting that there is a moment of decision while at the same time oscillating 
when specifying it, this way of talking allows status determination to move 
towards an official ruling, in spite of the fact that the case’s weakness is never 
conclusively demonstrated.
Lynch’s experts of choice are lawyers, scientists and forensic experts involved 
in a controversy about the use of DNA fingerprinting as evidence in the US.194 
Lynch and his colleagues developed the notion of phase work when trying to 
make sense of the fact that the controversy was brought to a practical closure, in 
spite of the continuous potential for technical dissent.
They argue that controversy on matters related to laboratory error and the 
calculus of statistical match are still viable in principle. Still, cases relying on 
DNA fingerprints often proceed as if these controversial matters had been 
addressed. To account for this, Lynch and his colleagues suggest that the 
possibility of circumventing this potential for dissent is facilitated by deferring 
these controversial matters to an elusive moment. The solution of controversial 
matters is deferred to a moment of discussion that never really takes place. As 
sarcastically explained by one of Lynch’s interviewees: ‘at the admissibility stage, 
you can’t raise any of these issues because they are weight issues [meaning that 
they must be dealt with by the jury], but when you get to the jury you can’t raise 




The notion o f  phase work has a long conceptual pedigree. It can be read as a sp in-off o f  th e  
discussion on boundary work, which is a distant relative o f th e  d eb a te  on how  to  
dem arcate sc ien ce  and pseu d oscien ce . Dem arcation has been a central problem  in th e  
philosophy o f sc ien ce  for m any years, and has attracted th e  atten tion  o f m any renow ned  
thinkers. Karl Popper, for instance, d efen d ed  that only th eories that can be proved fa lse  
should count as acceptab le  know ledge (to th e  anger o f Freudians and Marxists alike).196 
Historian o f sc ien ce  Thom as Kuhn argued, in turn, that it is th e  ability o f  a scientific th esis  
to  so lve  relevant puzzles that defines w h eth er  it is accep ted  or n ot.197 In a similar to n e , th e  
black sh ee p  o f ep istem ology , Paul Feyerabend, criticized norm ative prescriptions for th e  
g en esis o f  know ledge as both artificial and counter-productive, which led him to  th e  m uch  
abused form ula that 'everything g o e s '.198
As th e  socio logy  o f know ledge took  flight, argum ents put forward by Bloor and Collins, 
am ong others, raised qu estion s about th e  pertinence o f  taking this asym m etry b etw een  
right and wrong th eo r ies  as a m ethodological starting point. The notion o f  boundary work  
w as d evelop ed  by Am erican socio log ist Thom as Gieryn under this sym m etric spirit.199 In his 
w idely q u oted  'Boundary-work and th e  dem arcation o f sc ien ce  from  non-science', Gieryn 
proposes to  rep ose  th e  dem arcation problem  in term s o f practical action . Instead of 
discussing th e  fea tu res that differentiate sc ien ce  from  non-science, he  su ggests that w e  
look at how  th o se  living th e  everyday work o f doing sc ien ce  have m anaged to  reinforce this 
distinction in practical settings. Dem arcation, as Gieryn put it, 'is not just an analytical 
problem '.200 It is som eth ing  that experts do -  w hen  editors se lec t so m e  drafts and refuse  
others, or w hen  scien tists m anage to  characterize op p o n en t sou rces o f  know ledge as 
lacking scientific qualities. This practical work o f  establishing th e  d ifference b e tw een  good  
and bad know ledge is w h at Gieryn m eans by boundary w ork.201
Gieryn's call for th e  study o f boundary making in everyday settings has been  ex ten d ed  to  
law by Sheila Jasanoff. Jasanoff qu estion ed  how  th e  dem onstrations by sc ien ce  stu d ies o f  
th e  contingent nature o f scientific kn ow ledge can be reconciled w ith th e  authority that  
scientific experts are granted w h en  invited to  participate in legal procedures.202 Her 
suggestion  is that boundary work allow s for 'the provisional nature' o f  scien tists' claim s to  
be 'screened  from public v iew '.203
With th e  notion o f phase-w ork, Lynch and his co lleagues can be se e n  as restating Gieryn 
and Jasanoff's u se  o f  boundary-work in tem poral term s. Along with adm inistrative and 
technical fixes that m ake it hard to  sustain doubt about th e  reliability o f DNA fingerprinting, 
talking o f proper m om en ts, th ey  say, works as a tem poral dem arcation  device. It allow s th e  
discussion to  co m e to  a closure in sp ite  o f  th e  potential for continuous question ing o f  
m undane technical issues. The correct w ay o f calculating statistical m atch is not resolved  
from a technical point o f  view . But cases can progress, as it w ere , as th e  sources o f d issen t  
are consigned  to  a proper m om en t o f definition that never co m es to  pass.
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Something similar takes place during Mrs Z’s case. Procedural issues that are 
potentially controversial like ‘which report is reliable’ or ‘what counts as 
inconsistency’ are never conclusively settled. Yet, the work of status 
determination somehow goes on. This, I argue, is made possible in part by phase 
work. When justifying their decisions, examiners talk as i f  these potentially 
controversial matters had been settled. As the procedure goes on, the assessment 
that Mrs Z’s case is weak becomes a fact. The where and when an answer to 
these potential controversies is supposed to have been given remains elusive, 
however. As in Mr V’s description of the GEP meeting as being decisive and 
indecisive at the same time, the decisive event is first postponed and then 
referred back into the past, so there is never a ‘now’.
A practical consequence of this consists in a toughening of the standard 
proof, which, in time, translates in an inversion of the burden of proof. The 
procedural note on these topics reads that ‘there is no necessity for the 
adjudicator to be fully convinced of the truth of each and every factual assertion 
made by the applicant’.204 Thanks to phase-work, Mrs Z’s statements are held to 
a standard that is much stricter than Conare’s justification for denial upholds. 
Conare’s initial conclusion that the case lacks legal fit, consistency and empirical 
support is accepted, even though technical controversies remain open. When 
the initial denial is brought to an appeal, the burden for showing that dissent is 
still possible falls in full on Mrs Z.
Deferring Dissent
So far, I have sketched the general outline of this phase work using Mr V’s talk 
as an example. This section will unpack this work of phase making in closer 
detail. Mrs Z’s case is especially suitable to this.205 As it develops into an appeal, 
all justifications given for denial are gathered in the same folder. The excerpts 
below were produced during the very last stages in the decision making. These 
comprise the legal recommendation and internal communications prepared by 
GEP, the resolution produced by the plenary members and the justifications for 
denial given by CONARE’s chair and the justice minister. By following these
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justifications, step by step, I want to foreground how potential sources of dissent 
are gradually left behind, even though they are not addressed.
Justice Ministry
National Justice Secretary
CONARE -  National C om m ittee for R efugees
Reference: DELEMIG/RJ 0 5 6 2 4 .0 1 4 5 6 8 /2 0 1 0 -1 9
Mrs Z, citizen o f  th e  Dem ocratic Republic o f  Congo, born on 0 3 /0 4 /1 9 8 5 , daughter o f  Mr K 
and Mrs Q, single, arrived in Brazil at 1 7 /0 1 /2 0 0 9 , landing in th e  city o f  Rio d e  Janeiro, 
arriving from  her native country, requests th e  recognition o f  her refu gee status alleging  
fear o f  death  in case  o f  return.
After th e  appreciation o f  all th e  inform ation produced by th e  asylum  seeker's s ta tem en ts  in 
her asylum  req uest questionnaire, police affidavit and interview s with CONARE, it has been 
verified that there is no reason to speak of well-founded fear of persecution, in 
agreement with the eligibility criterion fixed by Law 9474/97, as seen from the following.
Preliminarily, th e  asylum  seeker  sta tes that sh e  cam e to  Brazil in 20 0 9  to  study  
m athem atics, having previously studied P ortuguese for foreigners at th e  sta te  university. 
H owever, in her passport it reads that th e  tem porary visa w as granted for th e  'Portuguese  
for Foreigners' course, th ere  being no m ention o f  m athem atics, which m akes unclear the 
reason for her stay in Brazil.
To th e  Federal Police, (the claim ant) m entions that, in May 2009 , her father, a hum an rights 
activist, w as kidnapped by th e  Kabila governm ent. H owever, before CONARE, sh e  te lls th at  
after a m onth in Brazil, that is, March 2009 , her father w as arrested and not kidnapped, as 
claim ed earlier.
Another contradictory point resides in th e  fact that th e  claim ant said her father had been  
arrested and after that, a lm ost a year later, w h en  released  from  prison, his body w as  
found. This allegation is false, given that th e  inform ation found indicates that th e  claim ant's  
father w as found dead on 02 June, but had been  with his fam ily a day before.
Furtherm ore, it is crystal clear that the asylum request happened for migratory reasons.
The claim ant stayed  a year in Colombia, w h en , theoretically , her father had already been  
arrested, and could have req uested  asylum  there, but didn't. Only w h en  sh e  returned to  
Brazil th e  claim ant req uested  asylum . It rests evident that the asylum request has been 
made to solve a merely migratory issue.
For all that, CONARE's Group for Preparatory Studies d o es not recom m end th e  recognition  
o f  refugee sta tu s to  th e  claim ant, given th e  a llegations that sh e  is th e  daughter o f  a hum an  
rights activist haven't been  proved, that th e  claim ant lacks credibility, and also b eca u se  it 
hasn't been  dem onstrated  th e  ex isten ce  o f  w ell-fou nded  fear o f persecution , for which  
reason th ere  is no fit with th e  eligibility criteria fo reseen  in incise I, article 1, Law 9 4 7 4 , 
from 22 July 1997.
Mrs R, full m em ber, CONARE /  Mr N, full m em ber, CONARE
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The brief above is an excerpt of the recommendation for denial prepared by 
GEP members. According to it, it rests ‘crystal clear’ that Mrs Z’s drive is 
migratory. Lack of legal fit, weak empirical support and internal inconsistency 
are all mentioned as indicators that her claim for refugee status is unwarranted. 
The justification states assertively that the request lacks legal support, as there is 
no reason to speak of well-founded fear of persecution. Mrs Z’s case is also 
empirically weak, the justification claims, as her condition as a daughter of a 
human rights activist could not be verified. GEP members also point to 
inconsistency as an indicator that Mrs Z’s story lacks credibility. The 
justification mentions a disparity in the statements made to CONARE and the 
Federal Police. Mrs Z misplaces the date of her father’s death by one day. The 
reasons that drove her to Brazil are deemed dubious as well: she could have 
stayed in Colombia, examiners suggest. And it is not clear which topic she was 
studying in the first place: Portuguese or mathematics. There seems to be little 
doubt that Mrs Z would be better characterized as a migrant than as a refugee.
It is important to notice from the start that all these justifications would be 
susceptible to the sceptical challenges I put forward in the previous chapters. 
Take the issue of legal fit, for instance. The conclusion states that Mrs Z’s 
request lacks legal fit as ‘it hasn’t been demonstrated the existence of well- 
founded fear of persecution’. A dissenter could challenge GEP members to show 
that this is indeed the case, asking them to specify the exact meaning of ‘well- 
founded fear’ and other terms like ‘race’ or ‘belonging to social group’. 
Scepticism could also be raised about the claims related to empirical support. 
The justification states that Mrs Z could have asked for asylum in Colombia. To 
this, a committed enough dissenter could object whether Colombia should be 
considered a safe country. GEP members could then bring reports to 
substantiate their point of view. But, at this point, our dissenter could question 
the reliability of this evidence and lock the controversy in a regress. Finally, 
reacting to the conclusion that Mrs Z’s narrative is inconsistent, a committed 
enough dissenter could challenge GEP members to explain what is the criterion 
used to judge what inconsistencies were relevant and what were not, what 
inconsistencies can be attributed to trauma and what cannot, and so on.
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Methodological horrors
Harry Collins proposes an amusing thought experim ent to  illustrate the complexity involved in 
comparing experim ents. Imagine, he asks, that you are a 'philosopher-mouse' and a com plete  
stranger to  scientific work. Now imagine you have been asked to  write down a manual on how  
scientists compare the result of their investigations. Scientist A puts together a test and arrives 
at a result. Scientist B puts together a test and arrives at a result. You, the philosopher-mouse, 
are interested in explaining, in as much detail as you can, each step that these scientists need to  
take to decide w hether their results are aligned.206
For instance, suppose scientists want to  know whether it is possible for som eone to  m ove an 
object with the power o f the mind (this is the subject o f psychokinesis, picked by Collins). To 
start with, being a com plete stranger to the scientific work, you could be brought to  ask how it is 
decided what experim ents are experim ents on psychokinesis in the first place. For instance, 
should the use o f my mind to  m ove my arm count as a test on the power of mind to  control 
matter? The proposition might sound ridiculous, but, you, the philosopher-mouse, will have to  
spend som e tim e trying to  explain what criterion o f demarcation you are using. Assuming you 
find a way to  m ove beyond this first sieve of complexity (Collins's speaks wittily o f 'murine 
solutions'), you will then see  yourself having to  decide what o f the activities you accepted are 
scientific enough to  deserve being used in the cross-test. Here again, Collin's philosopher-mouse 
ends up embroiled in com plexities concerning the demarcation o f what counts as science and 
what counts as pseudo-science.
Collins follows this reductio ad  absurdum  until after the experim ents have been done and their 
results com pared.207 He asks us to  assum e the unlikely scenario that 'the philosopher-mice can 
squeak their way through all this and, invoking murine-rules as the need arises, arrive at a set of 
scientific experim ents on topic "r"' and that these  experim ents 'have all been done com petently  
by suitable investigators and unambiguously assigned with negative or positive results'. 
Collins asks: even if our philosopher-mouse could muster the superhuman ability to  settle  all 
these  stages o f potential controversy, 'does it then follow naturally that "r" has been  
replicated?'209
Collins's answer, once again, is m eant to  stress the potential for controversy. For instance, let's 
assum e that all these  Y  tests have arrived at results that are com pletely inconsistent to  each  
other. How can w e be sure that enough tests have been conducted to warrant that conclusion? 
'How long must the series be?'210 Conversely, assum e that all experimental practices have 
yielded perfectly consistent results. Having in mind all the variables that need to  be taken into 
consideration, wouldn't a 100% match be too  good to  be true? This, as Collins puts it, opens the  
issue o f 'proper ration o f success'.211 Finally, if the results are mixed and don't point conclusively 
to  either a positive or a negative match, h o w to  overcom e the potential for under-determination  
and regress that com es with this?
Collins' argument is a very detailed reductio ad  absurdum. His thought experim ent works to  
show  us that 'at each level o f the siege', w hether they are aware o f this or not, experts work 
under the spell of these  formal and m ethodological sources o f controversy.
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The reason why I link these justifications to potential sources of dissent is not to 
question the possibility of moving on with the procedure. In Mrs Z’s case, the 
procedure was not brought to a halt. The point is simply that the fact that the 
procedure continued doesn’t authorize us to conclude that the lack of legal fit, 
empirical support and consistency has been demonstrated at this stage. To bend 
a phrase, I establish this parallel between reasoning and potential sources of 
dissent as an illustration of the ‘methodological horrors’ that continue to haunt 
examiners, whether they are aware of them or not (see box above).212 Granted a 
committed enough dissenter who is willing to take scepticism to the very 
bedrock of decision, it is possible to envisage all the arguments given by the GEP 
as justifications for denial being picked apart and deconstructed.
With that in mind, we can now get back to the justifications for denial 
produced around Mrs Z’s case. The two documents that follow are the 
Portuguese original and my English translation of the internal certificate 
confirming the decision for denial that was forwarded to Caritas’s office and 
police stations across Brazil.
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CERTIFICATE
I h ereb y  certify  for  all d u e  p u rp o ses th a t  th e  N ational C o m m ittee  for  R e fu g e es  -  
CONARE, in its Plenary M eetin g  realized  at 2 6  N o v em b er  2 0 1 0 , a c c e p tin g  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n  o f  its  G roup fo r  P rep a ra to ry  S tu d ies , d ec id ed  for  th e  n o n ­
reco g n itio n  o f  r e fu g ee  s ta tu s  for  th e  asylum  se e k e r , fo r  lack o f  f it  w ith  th e  elig ib ility  
criteria fixed  by art. 1° from  Law 9 .4 7 4 , from  22  July 1 9 9 7 .
The d ec is io n  has b e e n  c o m m u n ica ted  to  UNHCR, Caritas Rio d e  Janeiro , Caritas Sao  
Paulo, PF-RJ, PF-SP, PF-RS, PF-AP, P F-D ivinopolis/M G , PF-PE and IMDH, th ro u g h  
d o c u m e n ts  OFs/CONARE 4 9 5 , 4 9 6 , 4 9 9 , 5 0 0 , 5 0 1 , 5 0 2 , 5 0 4 , 5 0 6  and  5 0 7 , r esp ectiv e ly , 
d a ted  from  3 0  N o v em b er  2 0 1 0 .
G eneral C oord inator/C O N A R E
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Mlnisterio da Sustiga
C E R'T I P A 0
Certifico para os devidos fins que o Comite Nacional para os Refugiados -  
CONARE, na reuniao plenaria reaiizada em 26 de novem bro d e  2010 , acolhsndo 
proposicio de seu Grupo de Btudos Previos, decidiu pe!o n lo  reccnhecimento da
enouadrar o caso r>as condigocs de eiegibilidade previstas no art. 1°, da Lei n° 9.474, 
de 22.07.1997.
A referida decisao foi comunicada ao ACNUR, DICRE/ CGPI-DF, Caritas Rio 
de Janeiro, Caritas Sao Paulo, PF-RJ, PF-SP, PPRS, PF-AP, FF-Divinopo!is/MG, PF-PE e  
IMDH, atreves dos OFs/CONARE 4 9 5 , 4 9 6 , 4 9 7 , 4 9 8 , 4 9 9 , 5 0 0 , 5 0 1 , 5 0 2 , 504 , 
5 0 6  e  507, respectivamente, datadcs de 30 de novembro de 2010.
condigao de refugiado (a) do (a) soiicitante
Coordenador-Gerai/CONARE
At this point in the decision making process, we can see that the perception that 
Mrs Z’s request lacks legal fit is stated in more assertive terms in comparison 
with GEP’s initial report.
According to Conare’s general coordinator, Mrs Z’s request has been denied 
because it was determined that it didn’t fulfil the eligibility criteria fixed by the 
Brazilian law. The document makes reference to the GEP as the site where this 
lack of legal fit is supposed to have been demonstrated. According to the 
document, the plenary was simply following the assessment arrived at by the 
GEP when it concluded that Mrs Z’s case lacked legal fit. This might make it 
seem as if the potential for dissent concerning the measurement of legal fit has 
been dealt with in GEP, while, as I have suggested above, this was hardly the 
case. The methodological horrors I listed above, concerning the examiner’s 
ability to assess legal fit, empirical support and consistency, continue to be 
viable even when the decision process has arrived at this point. In principle, 
these sources of dissent would still be open for a committed enough dissenter. 
Just like this document is raising doubt about the justifications for acceptance 
given by Mrs Z in support of her claim, the justifications given by Conare in 
support for the negative ruling could be picked apart and deconstructed.
In this move from one phase of the justification process to the other -  from 
the recommendation prepared by GEP to the decision taken by Conare’s plenary 
-  the perception that Mrs Z’s request is weak seems to have become more 
certain. This allows the work of status determination to go on and allows the 
decision by the plenary to come across as justified.
In spite of the continuous potential for dissent, the need to tackle these 
controversial matters is deferred to a moment of discussion that never really 
takes place. The moment in which it has been shown that Mrs Z’s request lacks 
legal fit is gently referred back into the past (‘The plenary meeting ‘accepting the 
recommendation of its Group for Preparatory Studies’ decided to [ ...] ’). 
Eventual sources of dissent that could be directed towards Conare’s ruling are 
pacified through this phase-work. The responsibility for showing legal fit, 
empirical support and consistency starts to turn towards Mrs Z.
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R eferen ce: DELEMIG/RJ 0 5 6 2 4 .0 1 4 5 6 8 /2 0 1 0 -1 9
Subject: A ppeal to  th e  Illustrious Sr. S ta te  M in ister  o f  Justice regarding th e  d ec is io n  
a n n o u n ced  by CONARE, w h o  d en ied  asylum  req u est, accord in g  to  article  2 9  from  Law 
9 .4 7 4 /9 7 .
Claim ant: M rs Z
Mr CONARE P resident,
On 1 7 /0 6 /2 0 1 0 ,  Mrs Z, c itizen  o f  th e  D em ocratic  Republic o f  C ongo, a sk ed  
CONARE th e  recogn ition  o f  her sta tu s  as r e fu g ee  in th e  term s o f  LAW 9 4 7 4 /9 7 ,  
from  22  July 1 9 9 7 .
A fter th e  en d  o f  th e  d e term in a tio n  p ro ced u re , th e  req u est has b e e n  a p p rec ia ted  
by CONARE w h o , adopting an early ruling emitted by its Group for Preparatory 
Studies, d e n ie d  th e  r eq u e st on  its p lenary  m e e tin g  rea lized  on  2 6 /1 1 /2 0 1 0 ,  for  
co n sid er in g  th a t the facts reported for asylum seeker didn't configure the well- 
founded fear of persecution for  political, relig iou s or e th n ic  rea so n s, w h ich  
e x c lu d es  th e  c la im ant from  th e  elig ib ility  criteria fixed  by artic le  1, Law 9 4 7 4 , from  
2 2  July 1 9 9 7 .
Duly n o tified , th e  asylum  se e k e r  a p p ea ls  from  th is  d ec is io n  b e fo r e  His E xcellency  
th e  S ta te  M in ister o f  Justice , in th e  te rm s o f  artic le  2 9 , law  9 4 7 4 /9 7 ,  w ith o u t  
add ing  any n e w  fa ct th a t w o u ld  m ake th e  c a se  su ited  for  reco n sid era tio n  a fter  
a p p ea l.
In th e  te rm s o f  article  18 , paragraph 1 o f  CONARE's internal reg im en t, the appeal 
does not possess any support in fact of law th a t  w o u ld  justify  including th e  
c la im ant in any o f  th e  eligib ility  criteria fo r e se e n  in th e  a b o v e m e n tio n e d  law , for  
w h ich  reason  it sh ou ld  n o t prosper.
T h erefore, for  all sa id , w e  p ro p o se  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  d ec is io n  ta k en  by th e  
C o m m ittee  th a t d en ied  th e  r eq u e st for  reco g n itio n  o f  th e  r e fu g e e  sta tu s  o f  th e  
cla im ant, for lack of legal support.
Brazil, N o v e m b e r  2 0 1 1
G eneral-C oord in ator /  CONARE
\
M ln istc rio  tia  J u t i i f a  
CONARE - Comite National para os Refugiados
Referenda: Prccesso
Assunto: Rccurso ac Excclentissimo Senhor Ministro de Estcda da Justiqa da dedsao  
proferida pelo CONARE que indeferiu a solicitagao de rcrucio, nos termos do art. 29 da 
Lei n® 9 .474 /97 .
Recorrente:HHHH^HHH
Senhor Prcsidcntc do CONARE,
Em 17.06.2010 naciona! da Rcpubliea Demccratica do Congo,
solidtou ao CONARE o reconhedmento do "status" de refugicdo r.os tcrmos da Lei n°
- Apos o termino dos proccdimcntos, a so'icifaqco foi aprcdada peio CONARE que, 
ccatando pcreccr previo emitido pcio seu Srupo de Estudos, indeferiu o pca’ido na 
reur.iGO plendria reoliacda em 26.11.2010, por considcrar que os fatos relatados pelo 
solicitante nao ccnfiguravam o fundado terrxir de perseguigao por raxoes de ordcm 
politico, religiosa cu etnica, o quc o cxclui das conduces de elegibilidcde prcvistas no 
art. 1°, da Lei n° 9.474, de 22 dc julho de 1597.
- Devidamente notificcdo, o solicitante rccorre daquela dedsao  co Excclentissimo 
Senhor Ministro de Estado da Justi'ga, nos termos do art. 29, da Lei n° 9 .4 7 4 /9 7 , 
sem cduzir qualquer fc to  novo que tcrr.e o ccso passlvel de reaprccicgao em grcu de 
recurso.
- Nos termos do art. IS, 5 1° do Regimcnto Interno do CONARE, o rccurso nco possui 
qualquer fundamento de fc to  ou dc dircitc, que enquadre o requcrente em qualquer 
dos crsterios de elegibilidcde previstos no supradiado diploma legal, motivo pcio qua! 
noo deva prospcrar.
Portcnto, do exposto, s.m.j., prcpomos seja  mcntida a decisdo do Comite que indeferiu 
a solicitagco do reconhedmento da condiqao de refugiado do reccrrcnte, por fc lta  de 
cmparo legal.
9 .474/97.
Brasilia, de novembro de 2011.
Coordcnador-Gera! /  CONARE
Mrs Z formalized her appeal in June 2010. As part of the appeal process, 
CONARE’s coordinator was asked to produce a further justification report. In 
the document above we find Conare’s answer to Mrs Z’s appeal, in which 
Conare’s general coordinator restates the reasons for denial. The original 
decision taken by the committee, ‘which denied the request for the recognition 
of refugee status of the claimant for lack of legal support’ must be maintained, 
the document states.
Notice that, at this point in the decision making process, the reason given for 
denial doesn’t match the justification given by GEP anymore, even though the 
plenary continues to claim to be following the GEP’s recommendation when 
ruling for denial.
As we have seen, the legal recommendation produced by GEP mentioned 
narrative inconsistency, lack of legal fit and lack of empirical support to justify 
the conclusion that Mrs Z’s request was motivated by economic migratory 
drives. Here, the negative assessment originally built on three criteria is reduced 
to a simplified version. A generic reference is made to lack of legal support. To 
justify the maintenance of the negative decision, CONARE’S general 
coordinator stresses that the plenary followed the recommendation of its group 
for preparatory studies. He says that ‘the appeal does not possess any support in 
fact or in law’.
Here the discrepancy in the standard of proof demanded from examiner and 
asylum seeker is becoming visible. Having my sceptical challenges in mind, it 
would seem that the justification for denial offered by Conare so far is just as 
open to questioning as the justifications given for Mrs Z in support of her claim. 
Yet, in spite of that, as the procedure moves into an appeal, it falls to Mrs Z to 
convince the GEP that there is enough support ‘in fact or in law’ to reconsider 
her case. During the appeal stage, it becomes Mrs Z’s responsibility to prove that 
the appeal possesses support in fact or in law, even though Conare has not 
fulfilled this requirement when it denied the request in the first instance.
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R eference: DELEMIG/RJ 0 5 6 2 4 .0 1 4 5 6 8 /2 0 1 0 -1 9
Illustrious Mr S ta te  M in ister o f  Justice,
Mrs Z., c itizen  o f  th e  D em ocratic  Republic o f  C ongo, a sk ed  CONARE for  th e  
recogn ition  o f  her sta tu s  as r e fu g ee  in th e  te r m s o f  LAW 9 4 7 4 /9 7 ,  from  22  July 
1 9 9 7 .
Su b m itted  to  th e  C o m m ittee 's  a p p recia tion , th e  c la im an t's r eq u e st has b e e n  
d en ied , as t h e  p len a ry  u n d e r s to o d  th a t th e  rea so n s u n derp inn ing  th e  r eq u e st  
did n o t fit th e  eligibility  criteria fixed  by article  1, Law 9 4 7 4 /9 7 .
U n satisfied , th e  asylum  se e k e r  a p p ea ls  th e  d ec is io n , c o n so n a n t to  artic le  29  
from  th e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  law , w ith o u t  p ro d u cin g  a n y  n e w  fa c t  or  a r g u m e n t  
t o  ju stify  t h e  rev isio n  o f  th e  in itia l d en ia l.
T h erefore, for all sa id , I su b m it to  th e  high ap p rec ia tio n  o f  yo u r  E xcellency a 
p roposa l for th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  n eg a tiv e  d ec is io n  b e in g  a p p ea le d .
Brasilia, N o v em b er  2 0 1 1 .
CONARE P resid en t
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Ministerio da Justiga
CONARE - Comite Nacional para o s  Refugiados
R eferend a: Proeesso DELEMIG/RJ\
Excel entissim o Senhor M inistro dc Estcdo da J u stigc ,
-  nacional d a  Republica D em ocrdtica do Congo, so lid tou
co Ccmitc Nacional para o s  Refugiados -  CONARE, o reconhedm ento do 
“status" d e  refugicdo nos term os da Lei n° 9 .4 7 4 , d e  22  de julho d e  1997.
- Subm etido a aprcciagao do Comite, o pcdido do recorrcn tc  fo i negado, por 
cntender aquele <5rgao que as razoes que fundcmentavam o pleito nao s e  
enquadravam nas condigoes d e  elegibilidade previstas no art 1° da Lei n° 
9 4 7 4 /9 7 .
- Inconform cdo, rcccrre  dcqueia decisco, conSoante a s disposigoes do art. 
29 do supracitado diploma legal, sem  aduzir qualquer fa to  cu argumento  
que ju stifiqu e a reviscc do indefcrim ento inicial.
- Portanto, do exp osto , subm eto o p resente  a elevada consideracao d c  
Vossa Excelencia com a proposta de manufengao da decisao recorrida.
Brasilia, d e  novembro d e  2011.
P residentc do CONARE
v
V
When Mrs Z’s appeal arrives at the desk of the Justice Minister, the inversion of 
the standard and burden of proof are consummated. Mrs Z has been held to a 
standard of proof that examiners themselves have not upheld. Had Conare 
demanded the same standard of proof in its justifications for denial, the benefit 
of doubt might have been given and the case might have been accepted. Yet, the 
principle of ‘in doubt for the refugee’ has by now been turned on its head. It has 
become Mrs Z’s responsibility to bring in new significant information to justify 
a reviewing of the initial ruling. There is no mention to the fact that the initial 
judgment was based on what in principle would be disputable assessments of 
legal fit, empirical support and narrative consistency. Whereas the general 
coordinator sees the plenary as following the GEP’s recommendation, 
CONARE’s president makes reference to ‘the plenary understanding’. The 
moment of relevant assessment is displaced once again. The generic 
formulations ‘for all said’ glosses over it. The minister can finally dispatch. It is 
not surprising that it only takes two lines.
Justice  M inistry  
M inister's C abinet
D ispatch by th e  M inister  
On 18  N o v em b er  2 0 1 1
A ppeal N * 1 7 6 0  -  In regards to  p ro cess  n u m b er  0 5 6 2 4 .0 1 4 5 6 8 /2 0 1 0 -1 9 . C laim ant: M rs 
Z. In a g r e e m e n t to  article 2 9 , Law 9 4 7 4 / 9 7 ,1 d ism iss th e  app eal.
J o se  Eduardo C ardozo  
Justice  M in ister
P ublished on th e  U n ion 's Official Diary on  N o v em b er  2 0 1 1
It cannot be emphasized enough that, in principle, all the justifications for 
denial offered by Conare would be susceptible to the sceptical challenges I have 
introduced so far. Yet, when the procedure gets to this stage, none of these seem 
to matter anymore. Phase work has worked. All the potential for dissent is left 
behind, deferred to a pivotal moment of definition that never took place. W hat 
we are left with is a proper, strictly ‘declaratory’ and ‘properly founded’ ruling, 
just as the law demands.
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The idea that there is a moment when all the info is taken into consideration 
reinforces the aura of balanced reasoning behind the official ruling. It 
encourages the perception that the negative decision has been arrived at after a 
careful assessment of consistency, legal fit and empirical support. This 
oscillation, I have been arguing, should not be dismissed as convoluted speech. 
By deferring potential sources of dissent to this elusive where/when, this way of 
talking about decision plays an important role in bringing the determination 
procedure to its practical closure.
So far, I have relied on Mrs Z’s case to unpack this game of avoiding 
potential sources of dissent by deferring them to an elusive moment of 
resolution. In this section, I want to bring the argument together around my 
suggestion that the way some migration and border scholars treat decision ‘as 
something decision makers do at some point’ is politically disempowering.
As mentioned earlier, some authors writing on migration and borders have 
also arrived at the conclusion that decisions on who is welcome or unwelcome 
into the political community are not founded on law and evidence. The way 
they support this conclusion and the implications they derive from it are, 
however, very different from mine.
Let me give an example. In 2014, the lournal of Refugee Studies published an 
article by scholar of migration Adam Saltsman under the title Beyond the Law: 
Power, Discretion and Bureaucracy in the M anagem ent o f  Asylum  Space in  
Thailand. At first sight, Saltsman’s research has a lot in common with mine. Like 
me, Saltsman is interested in how the decision on who is a refugee is arrived at 
beyond the official image of status determination. Like me, Saltsman chooses to 
approach this question as a practical problem, examining the functioning of 
Thai camps to get a sense of how the difference between refugee and other 
migrants is performed by ‘street level bureaucrats’. Where our approaches start 
to part is in the centrality Saltsman gives to the discretion he believes is yielded 
by these bureaucrats. One of his subtitles says everything: ‘Where the Law Ends, 
Discretion Begins’.
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While discretion is fundamental in the translation of law and policy into practice 
and is a key part of a street-level bureaucrat’s job, it nevertheless reinforces the 
extent to which protracted refugee situations are extra-legal spaces set apart; a 
zone of exception in which interconnected groups of power brokers enact their 
interpretations of asylum space, refugee identity, and state sovereignty upon the 
bodies of forced migrants.213
‘Where the law ends, discretion begins’. Saltsman is not the only author in the 
migration literature to follow this syllogism. Establishing this connection 
between lack of legal foundation and discretion is a reaction adopted by many 
authors in the migration literature.214 From the conclusion that the decision on 
who is entitled to refugee protection is not founded on the proper bedrock of 
law and evidence, they derive the conclusion that the decision is made on a 
discretionary basis.
Institutional discretion is a potent force mediated by the underlying values, 
stereotypes, and assumptions authorities harbour and develop regarding their 
subjects as well as by the material constraints exerting pressure on these 
authorities.215
Adopting this reaction usually works as an invitation for sociological research of 
a fairly standard kind. If we want to account fo r how  examiners decide as they  
do, we need to study how the decisions these individuals make are informed not 
by ‘regulations or laws but their own categorizations, rules and values derived 
from ambiguous stereotypes nurtured by officers’ experiences and social 
prejudices’. The outcome of these studies usually takes the form of listing the 
underlying sociological prejudices and dispositions, which are taken to inform 
the perceptions that examiners form of asylum seekers.
Note that, in this picture, the basic understanding of what is a decision 
doesn’t change much. We are still talking of a distinction between migrant and 
refugee been defined by a set of decision makers. Just now, instead of vehicles 
for law and evidence these decision makers are characterized as mouthpieces to 
prejudices, stereotypes and bureaucratic pressures, to which they are subjected 
due to their social positioning.
I find the acceptance of this basic understanding of decision politically 
disempowering. As I sought to illustrate by looking at Mrs Z’s case, even though
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the case progresses towards a closure, the potential for dissent is still there. 
Sources of controversy relating to the measurement of legal fit, empirical 
support and consistency have not been settled.
As the decision-making process moves towards closure, however, we end up 
with the perception that these problems have been dealt with and that decision 
for denial has been properly founded. Part of how examiners are brought to this 
perception is practical (the order interviews are arranged, questions are asked, 
how much evidence is collected and so forth). But part of how closure is 
achieved is also rhetorical. This rhetorical aspect, I want to suggest, involves the 
reproduction of the understanding of decision as a pivotal event.
This is where the politically disempowering effect of this centred way of 
conceiving decision comes to the fore. Authors like Saltsman substitute the 
conclusion that decisions are not founded on law and evidence with the 
conclusion that they are discretionary acts, founded on examiners’ socially 
acquired dispositions and prejudices. This reaction criticizes the official image of 
status determination but doesn’t problematize the underlying model of what a 
decision is. Because it doesn’t problematize this underlying model, it ends up 
reinforcing the centred understanding of decision that is turned into a rhetorical 
resource in examiners’ talk as part of phase work.
Take Mrs Z’s case again, for instance. Conare’s coordinator says that the 
assessment of whether Mrs Z is a migrant or a refugee happened at GEP. Then 
he says that the moment in which the real decision was made was at the plenary 
meeting. The where/when of this moment of definition remains elusive. My 
point is that this oscillation is facilitated because we are in the habit of thinking 
of decisions as taken by deciding subjects in a pivotal moment to start with.
The way Saltsman criticizes the official picture of status determination help 
us move beyond the idea that decisions are founded on law and evidence. But 
when it replaces the bedrock of law and evidence for the bedrock of 
discretion/social dispositions, it also inadvertently feeds this basic assumption of 
what a decision is. By doing so, it lends authority to the event-centred 
understanding of decisions, which, when turned into a rhetorical resource by 
examiners, contributes to foreclose potential sources of dissent.
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Closure as a practical achievement
June 2010: Mrs Z enters the Caritas office in Tijuca and fills out an asylum 
request questionnaire. December 2011: a resolution is published, stating that 
Mrs Z’s appeal has been denied. W hat happened then? W hat happened in the 
meantime between claim and decision that can account for this negative ruling?
[A procedural handbook] The eligibility officers report to the Group of 
Preparatory Studies, formed by representatives of Conare, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, UNHCR and Civil society. This group prepares a legal opinion on 
whether to grant or deny asylum. This opinion is then forwarded to decision by 
the full Conare plenary, where the case is discussed and has its merits 
appreciated. If the decision is positive, the applicant registers with the Federal 
Police and receives documentation as a refugee. If the decision is negative, the 
applicant has 15 days after notification to leave Brazil [... ] .2I6
The declaratory picture of status determination maintains that decisions on 
asylum requests are arrived at by disclosing the case’s anterior strength through 
an assessment of legal fit, empirical support and consistency. A decision is taken 
after the legal opinion forwarded by the GEP has its merit appreciated. The 
plenary meeting in Brasilia is described as the pinnacle of all the previous 
determination steps.
I have been arguing in this study that this way of accounting for decisions is 
misleading in all its aspects. Taken together, my chapters point to the conclusion 
that it is not possible to isolate a pivotal moment when the distinction between 
economic migrant and refugee is established. There is no set of deciding subjects 
who get together at a decisive event and define whether an asylum seeker is to be 
recognized as a refugee or not. During status determination, the border between 
migrant and refugee is a heterogeneous and decentred achievement. Of course, a 
final ruling is issued at the plenary meeting. But the coordination work that 
steers the process is happening all over, in many contingent and heterogeneous 
ways. Reducing an asylum decision to the final assessment and ruling published 
by the Conare plenary gives too much weight to the final pronouncement. In an 
enactment approach, asylum decisions are decentred. If they continue to appear 
pivotal, this perception is what we need to account for.
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That is the issue this chapter set out to address. If we adopt an enactment 
approach, what are we to make of this event that takes place in Brasilia, when 
plenary members sit together and make a decision on Mrs Z’s request?
In this chapter, I have drawn on the notion of phase work to offer an initial 
answer to this question. I have sought to explain this puzzling situation by 
studying closure as both a practice and a rhetorical achievement. I have argued 
that the official ruling produced in Brasilia is not decisive in the sense of being 
technically conclusive. It doesn’t solve potential sources of controversy that 
could be raised in legal and empirical grounds. Instead, this ruling is itself part 
of the work of achieving closure. It contributes to diffuse among the parts 
involved in the case the perception that the relevant sources of controversy ‘have 
been dealt with’ and that examiners ‘are in a position to decide’.
When we understand closure like this, talk of decision as ‘something 
decisions makers do at some point’ acquires a new relevance. As Lynch and his 
colleagues put it, this centred way of talking about decision is itself a discursive 
element in the work of producing closure.217 In Mol and Berg’s terminology, this 
centred way of conceiving decision can be seen as a discursive device that has the 
effect of ‘appeasing’ tensions between alternative ways of enacting the case. 
Along with the practical moves mentioned in the previous chapters (diffusing 
one determination apparatus as the go-to apparatus and arranging 
determination practices in a specific order), talk of a decisive m oment allows the 
procedure to move on without regard for the continuous potential for dissent.
To put it in another words, the fact that the determination procedure arrives 
at a ruling is not to be mistaken for the fact that the case’s weakness has been 
demonstrated in any conclusive way. Instead, it is possible to arrive at this 
official resolution because the potential sources of dissent are -  not overcome, I 
insist -  but, as Lynch et al put it, gradually shut-down. This way of phrasing 
takes care not to attribute this shutting down of the controversy to any form of 
proof. The procedure is closed not because a pivotal decision has been made, 
but rather in the sense that the enactment of the case as weak becomes diffused 
among practitioners and gets to inform the official ruling.
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This way of understanding closure not only challenges the idea that decisions 
are made by examiners after a rational appreciation of the case’s content, but it 
also avoids the other side of the coin, which is represented by an emphasis on 
discretion. Phase work is a way of allowing the determination work to continue 
by hiding the potential for dissent, which is not the same as fixing this potential 
for dissent through a discretionary decision. It is important to remember the 
cautionary note I have been making against substituting the idea that decisions 
are based on law and evidence with the idea that decisions are discretionary.
To replace law and evidence with discretion leaves unchallenged the 
underlying understanding of decision. When we say that asylum decisions are 
extra-legal, we put in check the idea that asylum decisions are arrived at after a 
careful assessment of consistency, empirical support and legal fit. But we are also 
retaining the basic understanding of decision as a ruling made b y  examiners 
(now accounted for in terms of prejudices and social dispositions) at some 
point. By adopting the emphasis on discretion, this move risks lending authority 
to the same centred understanding of decision on which phase work relies to 





How can a western and democratic country like Brazil tell the difference 
between migrants and refugees? This question brings together all the stories I 
have told so far. In exploring this topic, my aim has been to make room in the 
scholarship on migration and borders for an alternative way of thinking about 
decisions -  a way that is more comfortable with the contingent, heterogeneous 
and decentred manner in which the distinction between migrant and refugee is 
enacted. In this conclusion, I arrange the arguments developed earlier around 
the three themes that were present throughout the study -  scepticism, 
enactment and decentring -  before discussing how they brought me to 
reconsider the authority of my own account.
Encouraging Scepticism
It is common to read in justifications for denial that examiners were not 
convinced by the reasons given by asylum seekers in support of their claim. 
W hat happens if we invert scepticism and ask whether the justifications given 
for denial fare any better?
To invert the direction of doubt, this study tied ethnographic stories with 
arguments borrowed from science studies and other fields that study 
knowledge-making practices. By reworking arguments developed in this 
literature into the discussion on status determination, I sought to take issue with 
the declaratory picture of asylum decisions, which relies on criteria like ‘lack of 
legal fit’, ‘want of empirical support’ and ‘narrative inconsistency’ as 
justifications for denial.
The measurement of legal fit was the first aspect of the declaratory picture 
that I sought to problematize. The assumption at stake is that it is possible to 
determine whether a foreigner is a migrant or a refugee by considering whether 
this foreigner’s case meets the refugee definition fixed in law. To dispute this
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assumption, I relied on the concept of strong indeterminacy derived in science 
studies from the work of Wittgenstein, which challenges justification for action 
in terms of rule-following.
To speak of the refugee definition as indeterminate is to acknowledge that 
there is something about this definition that makes it insufficient as a guide for 
action. The difference between a weak and strong form of indeterminacy has to 
do with this phenomenon’s source and reach. The weak form of indeterminacy 
is more familiar to determination practitioners. Its terms are also closer to the 
scholarly debate on the distinction between migrant and refugee.
In its weak form, indeterminacy is tied to the vague and ambivalent way in 
which the refugee definition is phrased. An example is furnished when 
examiners find themselves at a loss on whether to read ‘well-founded fear’ with 
an objective or subjective spin (‘a fear that is well-founded in facts’ as opposed 
to ‘a convincingly demonstrated presence of the subjective quality of fear’). In 
what concerns its reach, this form of indeterminacy is weak because it is 
circumscribed to so-called ‘hard cases’, which leaves open the possibility that it 
might be overcome as the definition becomes more precise and further clarified. 
This weak form of indeterminacy is closer to the scholarly debate on migration 
because it is possible to envisage it being overcome through further specification 
(as Hathaway tries to do in the discussion on whether refugees and migrants are 
distinct categories, when he redefines the distinction between refugees and 
migrants in terms of disfranchisement and unqualified access).
Going beyond this weak form of indeterminacy, the reason I am sceptical of 
the idea that it is possible to decide on a request by following the law has less to 
do with ambivalence and vagueness in law and more to do with the act of 
following law. To be able to justify a decision in terms of rule following (‘we 
decided for denial because that is what the refugee definition compelled us to 
do’), examiners would have to come up with some sort of proof to show that, in 
taking this negative decision, they were observing the intended meaning of the 
refugee definition. The strong form of indeterminacy I articulated questions the 
examiners’ capacity to provide any such proof that their decisions are aligned to 
the intended meaning of the refugee definition. It suggests that attempts to show
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intended meaning are constrained by the fact that the number of instances in 
which the definition has been used before is finite. Given a committed enough 
dissenter, these instances of past use can be shown to agree with a new and 
alternative reading. The practical consequence of this is that examiners have no 
way of showing that a decision for denial is in fact following the definition.
This leads me to a second aspect of the declaratory picture of status 
determination: the notion of empirical support. Even among those examiners 
who concede that the refugee definition is weakly indeterminate, many would 
insist on the possibility of deciding by relying on an assessment of empirical 
support. If a request is supported by evidence and is corroborated by the known 
facts, then this is a sign that the request is strong and the foreigner is to be 
recognized as a refugee. Conversely, if there is little empirical support and if the 
statements made by the asylum seeker go against what is known about the 
country of origin, then examiners take this as an indicator that the case is weak 
and that the asylum seeker is probably better characterized as a migrant of some 
other kind. This trust on empirical support as a guide for decision is the second 
aspect of the default picture that I sought to problematize.
The use of empirical support as an indicator for decision is built on two 
premises. First, it assumes there is some sort of objective reading of the evidence 
on which examiners can rely to tell which course of action this evidence 
encourages. Second, it also seems to assume that this objective criterion allows 
examiners to differentiate courses of action in terms of whether they are 
supported and non-supported by the evidence. So, for example, in M r G’s case, 
it would be possible to decide between a positive or negative decision by using 
evidence as an arbiter to choose between acknowledgment and denial. The 
recommendations made in favour and against Mr G’s request would be crossed 
against each other and the empirical evidence gathered would allow examiners 
to tell which proved more supported. To take issue with these premises, I 
relied on the arguments in favour of symmetry and on the notion of 
experimenter’s regress developed in science studies.
Let me start with the argument for symmetry. When examiners justify a 
decision saying that ‘this is a decision that the evidence encouraged us to take’,
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they are claiming access to the objective reality of the world. When the case is 
acknowledged as complex, factors like the examiner’s background, prejudices 
and social interests are accepted to impair the assessment other examiners make 
of this objective world. When the case is deemed straightforward, however, it is 
often assumed by examiners that they have found a way to reach the unimpaired 
version of this objective reality.
The argument for symmetry calls into question the possibility of arriving at 
objective knowledge free from the interference of non-legal and non-empirical 
factors. It is built from the conviction that, in both cases -  when the case flares 
up in controversy but also when it is decided straightforwardly -  decision are 
not arrived at by letting the case’s content to speak for itself. W hether this 
becomes an issue or not, in order for a decision to be arrived at, some degree of 
concerted perception is required around issues like ‘what counts as reliable 
evidence?’ and ‘how much evidence is enough?’ As Bloor tells us, asymmetric 
accounts are problematic because they hinder the study of how these concerted 
perceptions are achieved in practice.
This argument in favour of symmetry is closely related to the second insight I 
adapted from science studies to problematize accounts in terms of empirical 
support: the experimenter’s regress. The thrust of this argument is in the insight 
that at stake during status determination is not only the question of which 
recommendation is more supported by evidence, but also the question of ‘how 
to assess which course of action is more supported by evidence’. W hat evidence 
is reliable and what is not? W hat aspect of a report deserves to be highlighted 
and what can be ignored? How much evidence is enough? These background 
questions are all at stake during  the work of status determination. The 
consequence this has on how we seek to account for decisions is that any 
argument that invokes empirical support as justification can be brought into a 
regress if the basis for the assessment of this empirical support happens to be 
questioned. Take Mr G’s case, for example: GEP members could not agree if the 
photo and medical reports were reliable and so could not agree on whether these 
elements provided empirical support for Mr G’s claim or not. As there is no 
agreement on what counts as reliable evidence, there can be no agreement on
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whether the case is supported by evidence. Logically speaking, this regress can go 
on for ages. The notion of experimenter’s regress directs our attention to the 
social and material factors that bring examiners to stop arguing.
With the notion of regress in mind it is easier to understand why the use of 
consistency as an indicator of credibility is problematic. If we phrase it with an 
epistemological spin, the issue can be explained as a technical challenge related 
to replication. The scientists in Collins’s study need to be able to show that they 
are reproducing identical laboratorial conditions in order to claim that results 
have been replicated. Likewise, case examiners need to be able to show that they 
are examining the same underlying case (that they are replicating the same way 
of putting the case together), so they can rely on consistency to decide. As with 
the experiments conducted by Collins’s scientists, however, the determination 
practices conducted by examiners are never identical. Examiners cannot be sure 
that they are examining the same case (the same gathering of evidence, legal 
documents, interview transcripts, country reports and so on) and so have no 
reasonable basis to say whether the outcome of these practices suggests 
consistency or inconsistency.
A more ontologically attuned way of explaining this would be to say that the 
use of consistency as an indicator of credibility takes as a starting point a 
questionable assumption of ontological singularity. It presumes that all practices 
are looking at the same case (at the same gathering of ways of doing interviews, 
of legal texts, of evidence and so on), whereas the case enacted in these different 
practices is never exactly the same. There is no one same and single case that all 
determination practices pivot around. W hat there are, instead, are different and 
partially overlapping ways of enacting the case in different practices. If, in spite 
of these different ways of putting the case together, we still have the impression 
that the case is the same in all practices, than this appearance of singularity is 
what needs to be accounted for.
Take Mr E’s case, for example. The way of putting Mr E’s case together at 
the Federal Police (its enactment as an affidavit, so to speak) and the way of 
putting Mr E’s case together in Caritas (its enactment as a questionnaire) were 
deemed consistent to each other. Conare concluded that the enactments of Mr
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E’s case that emerged out of these practices encouraged the same ruling: ‘Mr E is 
an economic migrant and not a refugee’. Still, to paraphrase IMDH’s social 
worker, there is only so much we can deduce from this. All that this lack of 
disagreement shows is that the ways of enacting this condition tha t were actively 
bridged  happened to agree. The possibility remains, however, that other ways of 
enacting the case that could lead to a different assessment were displaced and 
thus n o t actively bridged.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that my sceptical challenges are not 
restricted to those cases that examiners characterize as legally hard or 
empirically controversial. My scepticism about using legal fit, empirical support 
and consistency as indicators for decisions extends to those cases taken as legally 
easy, empirically straightforward and clearly inconsistent. Even in those cases in 
which examiners agree that the decision to deny the request was the right one 
because the case clearly lacked legal fit, empirical support and consistency, 
referring back to these in trin sic qualities is  n o t enough to account fo r how  th is 
negative decision has been arrived at. The difference between migrants and 
refugees is often debated with an eye to its legal basis and sociological 
soundness, as well as to its ethical and policy implications. These sceptical 
challenges show that asking this question gets us entangled with rather powerful 
formal and methodological challenges as well. They affect not only the 
distinction when considered in abstract. They cut against some entrenched 
assumptions about what a decision is and how it can be justified.
To be clear, I encourage scepticism about the use of legal fit, empirical 
support and consistency as indicators not as an end in itself but as an 
argumentative device. My aim in encouraging scepticism toward the policy’s 
inherited understanding is to open space for an alternative way of looking at 
how the border between migrant and refugee is enacted. These sceptical 
arguments open up this space by inviting an analysis of the social and material 
factors that lead a case to emerge as weak, and thereby lead the decision for 
denial to come across as the right one. To illustrate what this change in 
methodological sensibility looks like was my reconstructive aim in this study. To
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capture what is at stake, I have established a contrast between a declaratory and 
an enactment way of approaching status determination.
An enactment approach
To speak of the asylum decision as recognizing  strength and declaring status is 
not an innocent nuance of legal jargon. It is to insist on ontological assumptions 
about the anterior nature of the case’s reality and in epistemological 
assumptions about what we can learn from it. In the declaratory approach, the 
work of status determination is supposed to disclose the strength of the case 
and, in this way, declare the anterior reality of the asylum seeker. As this default 
picture goes, the asylum seeker either is or isn’t a refugee before status 
determination begins. This reality is set. before the determination work starts. 
‘Asylum seekers do not become refugees because of recognition, but are 
recognized because they are refugees’. If free from bias, the work of assessing 
legal fit, empirical support and consistency is supposed to bring examiners as 
close as possible to the pre-determined right answer to the question of whether 
to accept or deny the request.
In contrast with the image of asylum decisions as declaratory, I argue for the 
treatment of status determination as enactment work. Instead of taking 
determination practices to be disclosing the strength of the case as if this 
strength had been defined before and independently of the determination work, 
an enactment approach focuses on how what counts as the case’s anterior reality 
is defined in  the determination practices. Latour spells out succinctly the driving 
insight behind this change in outlook: ‘Since the settlement of a controversy is 
the cause of Nature’s representation, not its consequence, we can never use this 
consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has been settled’.218
One of the things that an enactment approach highlights is that this anterior 
and independent reality is not as present during the determination work as one 
might assume. Examiners don’t go to Angola or Colombia to assess whether the 
asylum seeker is telling the truth. They are informed about the condition in the 
country of origin through representations of the situation in these countries, to 
which they have access through humanitarian reports. The body and voice of
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the asylum seeker, which are present in the initial stages of the determination 
work, are quickly turned into representation as well, inscribed in fingerprint 
slabs and photographs. Asylum seekers don’t tell their stories in person during 
the GEP and plenary meetings. Examiners read what becomes accepted as their 
stories as they are written down in questionnaires and transcripts. Noticing all 
this is, of course, nothing new. W hat is  new, perhaps, is the realization that 
access to the reality of the case is always mediated in this way. When combined 
with the notion of regress, this realization has crucial consequences for how we 
conceive the determination work.
To make the point less abstractly, consider Mr G’s case again. The 
recommendation for denial offered by the Conare officer was that Mr G’s reality 
is not that of a refugee. During the work that led him to this conclusion, this 
officer didn’t check Mr G’s case against an unmediated world out there. He 
checked it instead against a very particular representation of this reality, to 
which he arrived by relying on a very particular determination apparatus. This 
examiner makes reference to interviews made in a certain way, to a specific list 
of humanitarian reports and legal documents, to a particular compilation of 
facts about the country of origin, to a judgment of consistency derived from a 
particular arrangement of hearing and so forth. When this officer states that, 
after studying Mr G’s case, he concludes that Mr G is not a refugee, he is asking 
us to accept that this is a reliable determination apparatus and that he has 
conducted the determination work is the proper way. The questions of ‘which 
representation of the case’s anterior reality is right?’ and ‘which way of bringing 
out this anterior reality is proper?’ are answered together. And so it seems that 
there is no objective point on which examiners can stand to say which 
representation of the case’s anterior reality is the ‘actual’ one ‘out there’. If the 
conclusion that Mr G is not a refugee is accepted, this is because the way of 
enacting the case advocated by the Conare officer happened to become the one 
used to inform the ruling.
Keeping in mind the commitment to symmetry, it is important to remember 
that this sceptical challenge applies also to the case that examiners characterize 
as straightforward. The declaratory picture encourages us to believe that, at least
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in straightforward cases, a negative decision can be justified because the case has 
been contrasted against the anterior and independent reality and shown to be 
weak. The problem with this is that if we are to trust this assessment, we need to 
trust that the work of disclosing this reality has been well conducted, while, at 
the same time, if we are to trust that this work has been well conducted, we need 
to trust that its results correspond to the reality.
Here we can finally make sense of the misleadingly trivial suggestion that 
status determination doesn’t consist in declaring the anterior reality of the case 
but rather in enacting what counts as this anterior reality. The acceptance of a 
particular version of the case as its anterior reality and the acceptance of a 
particular determination apparatus as the proper way of getting to this anterior 
reality happen together. They are co-extensive processes, as Collins and Law put 
it: as the apparatus becomes accepted as proper, the ‘anterior’ reality that comes 
with it becomes accepted as well.
Approaching status determination with this outlook has direct practical 
consequences for how we can hope to account for asylum decisions. If a case is 
dismissed as weak, this conclusion cannot be accounted for by saying that the 
case was dismissed because it was weak. Even in a decision deemed easy and 
more evident, if a case comes across as weak, this says more about the success of 
the determination apparatus that brings the case to emerge as weak than about a 
presumed correspondence with the anterior reality of the case. Translated in the 
practice of ethnography, if we want to get a sense of why a case is decided one 
way or the other, it becomes necessary to pay attention to how apparently 
insignificant changes in the array of people and things put together during 
determination practices affect how the case emerges.
Perhaps the best way to explain why adopting this approach makes a 
difference is to contrast it with the way some borders and forced migration 
scholars rely on the notion of discretion to account for asylum decisions. Their 
starting point is concisely captured in Saltsman’s quip that ‘where the law ends, 
discretion begins’. In this approach, the insight that the distinction between 
refugees and non-refugees has no bedrock in law and evidence is taken as a 
springboard for the study of the socially received stereotypes and bureaucratic
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pressures that inform examiners’ dispositions. In a first step, this reaction 
consists in ‘challenging] the notion that status determination is a process 
enclosed within official proceedings’.219 In the second, it concentrates on 
showing how discretion is ‘mediated by the underlying values, stereotypes, and 
assumptions authorities harbour and develop regarding their subjects as well as 
by the material constraints exerting pressure on these authorities’.220
This reaction shares its starting point with the enactment approach for which 
I argue. Adopting an enactment approach also involves accepting as a 
methodological principle that reference to qualities supposed to be intrinsic to 
the case, like consistency, legal fit and empirical support, is not enough to 
account for the case’s outcome. The adoption of this enactment approach takes 
us in a different direction than this discretion approach, however, when it comes 
to the underlying model of decision with which it works.
The image of decision makers exercising socially-informed discretion to 
decide on requests retains a ‘centred’ understanding of decision already present 
in the declaratory picture. Instead of vehicles for law and evidence, these 
deciding subjects are characterized as conduits to socially acquired prejudices, 
stereotypes and bureaucratically encouraged dispositions. But whether the 
asylum seeker is acknowledged as a refugee or classified as a migrant is still 
traced back to a decision taken by a set of decision-makers. It is this centred 
understanding of decision that the enactment approach seeks to avoid.
Decentring Decision
Let us consider the question of where and when the distinction between refugees 
and migrants is brought about. According to the default declaratory picture, the 
many practices that take place during status determination flow into the 
moment of the decision. They are steps in the road toward the final ruling. In 
this way of looking at status determination, there is a difference in gravity 
among the ordinary determination practices, like doing interviews and 
collecting fingerprints and the final political decision that is taken by plenary 
members in Brasilia. The politically relevant moment is mainly circumscribed to 
this pivotal event.
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In an enactment way of looking at status determination, the balance is 
inverted between these ordinary determination practices and the moment of 
official decision. Stress is placed on these much smaller, apparently insignificant 
aspects of determination practices, which might make a difference for how 
strong the case emerges.
Take Mrs A’s case, again -  the Congolese mother, who entered Caritas 
carrying her daughter with her. The justification letter sent to Caritas tells us 
that the plenary members discussed the case and voted for denial. The 
justification they offered for this negative decision states that plenary members 
have considered the relevant information and concluded Mrs A’s case ‘did not 
possess support in fact or in law’.
If we stick to this justification, what we see is a ruling being arrived at after 
the information collected in the previous determination steps has been put 
together and transferred to the plenary meeting (pivotal moment) where 
plenary members (deciding subjects) assessed the evidence and brought the case 
to a vote.
W hat stays out of sight is the mundane work of downloading some 
humanitarian reports but not downloading others; the tone of voice with which 
Mrs A has been interviewed or the fingerprinting device that didn’t work. 
Perhaps the examiner writing the legal recommendation missed just that treaty 
or report that would increase its legal and empirical support. Perhaps, if Mrs A 
had been allowed to tell her story freely instead of being posed questions by the 
police marshal, her story would emerge as perfectly consistent. Perhaps, if Mrs A 
had talked to a psychologist before being interviewed by Conare, the fact that 
she misplaced her father’s date of death by one day wouldn’t come across as so 
significant after all. All added up, little contingent matters like these might make 
the difference between Mrs A’s case emerging as strong or emerging as weak. 
But they are kept out of sight when we insist in pinning down the act of 
demarcating migrant and refugee to a particular where and when, to a pivotal 
moment in which contingency is supposed to have come to an end.
A consequence of questioning the centrality of the official decision is that the 
perception that there are deciding subjects arriving at decisions in pivotal events
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needs to be turned into a topic in itself. To talk of decentring decision is, of 
course, not to deny that there are actors and moments that come across as 
decisive, as with the decision makers voting the case at the plenary meeting. 
Entailed by the notion of decentring are two much humbler insights.
The first suggestion is that this appearance of being decisive that exists 
around the ruling taken in Brasilia is something that needs to be enacted itself. It 
is retained, among other things, by dint of a subtle rhetorical play of postponing 
and invoking the moment in which the potential for dissent is supposed to be 
dealt with.
The second suggestion is that, if we want to grasp how migrants are 
distinguished from refugees during status determination, we need a decentred 
understanding of decision to be able to appreciate the influence exerted by 
heterogeneity and contingency over asylum decisions. During status 
determination in Brazil, the border between welcome and unwelcome foreigner 
is an interactive achievement. It is enacted when people talk and write to each 
other. It is affected by the way things behave. It is being enacted here and there, 
now and then. It is an effect of a much messier process than the image of 
declaratory decision allows us to appreciate.
Approaching status determination as enactment involves challenging the 
policy-inherited understanding of decisions as rulings taken by examiners after a 
rational appreciation of the case’s content. Beyond that, however, it also requires 
us to avoid the flipside of this picture, which is represented by the image of 
examiners establishing the border in an exercise of socially-informed discretion. 
To substitute law and evidence with discretion leaves unchallenged the 
underlying understanding of decision. It problematizes the idea that asylum 
decisions are arrived at after a careful assessment of consistency, empirical 
support and legal fit. But it also retains the basic metaphor of decision that 
underlies the declaratory picture. W hether the asylum seeker is acknowledged as 
a refugee or classified as a migrant is still traced to a judgement made by a set of 
decision-makers. As intuitive as this image might sound, by reinforcing it, we 
risk lending authority to the same event-centred understanding of decision that 
forecloses the possibility of dissent in the face of denial.
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Writing Reflexively
If a case comes across as weak, this outcome is not convincingly accounted for 
by pointing to a supposedly intrinsic weakness of the case. This, I have 
contended, is just as valid to those cases taken to be straightforward as it is to 
those cases that examiners acknowledge as complex. The social and material 
factors that bring about a case as weak deserve to be examined not only when 
the case is deemed hard and the decision is questioned as wrong. The 
particularities of the array of people and things that goes into establishing a 
negative decision merits examination perhaps especially when the decision is 
accepted as correct and the case is deemed straightforward.
But what happens if I turn this insight towards my own account? I would be 
the first to concede that this study is no less dependent on the array of people 
and things out of which it emerges than are the cases enacted during status 
determination. Just like the work that goes into enacting a case and bringing 
about a ruling, the work that went into producing this account involved an 
endless number of small contingent turns.
In the day-to-day tasks of status determination, I have argued, the aspects of 
a report that are highlighted and those that are downplayed might be the 
difference between a strong and weak enactment of the case. In the day-to-day 
task of writing a dissertation, the same could be said about what aspects of the 
practices described are made quiet and what aspects are brought to the fore. In 
the day-to-day procedure of status determination, whether a hearing with a 
social worker comes before or after the interview with Conare might make the 
difference between a consistent and an inconsistent case. In the day-to-day task 
of thesis writing, the same could be said about the way sections are divided and 
chapters are arranged.
I could continue with the parallel, but the point will be clear enough by now. 
As sociologists of science Latour and Woolgar once put it, I don’t think there is 
any ‘essential distinction’ between the account I give and the default one I have 
sought to problematize.
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Now, in acknowledging this, am I not arguing against myself? After all the 
work to encourage scepticism and defend an enactment approach, am I not 
pushing the rug from under my own feet? How can I convince someone to study 
asylum decisions with enactment lenses if I am the first to admit that whether 
my account is deemed strong is not defined by how well it corresponds to what 
really happened in Brazil? At worst, I would be a self-refuting fool, unwittingly 
undermining the basis of my own work. At the very least I am a hypocrite, a 
half-hearted defender of symmetry, compelling others to consider the 
contingency and heterogeneity behind the success of asylum cases while 
invoking authority to my own account by dint of its ‘improved accuracy’.221
I take the point very seriously.
When accounting for where the authority of my narrative comes, it would be 
easy to dismiss the issue or defer it to a later stage in research. As this reaction 
usually goes, there would be no problem in admitting that the accounts I 
developed are just as tied to my position in society as are the actors I analysed. 
Like these actors, I am ingrained in the habits I inherit as member of the 
academic circle I live in. But thankfully, I could claim, this academic circle 
encourages self-awareness. I go into the field and do research. No matter how 
careful I am, my socially ingrained prejudices will usually sneak in. The 
objectivity of my account can be retained, however, as long as I bring my study 
to be objectified in the academic field.
An answer like this would make my life easier, no doubt. It taps on the 
appeal of science and empiricism to justify why the default picture of status 
determination should be debunked and my alternative picture embraced. But 
what happens to a statement like this if we read it as a knowledge claim itself? 
Why should we accept this statement as correct? In its own terms, assessing 
whether this statement is correct would demand objectifying it in light of my 
social position in the academic field. Doing this, however, implies accepting the 
claim that is smuggled in passing, about my capacity as an expert to delineate 
this field. Like the examiner who says a request was dismissed because the case 
was weak, the veracity of a statement like this assumes an edge in expertise to 
account for how this edge in expertise is to be retained.
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In this study, I sought to deal with reflexivity in another way. I didn’t dismiss 
it as a nuisance. Nor did I defer it to a second step. Instead, by stitching stories 
and concepts together, I sought to take reflexivity on board from the start. In 
adopting this writing style, I wanted to emphasize that this account is not a 
mirroring description. That it was not written from some sort of higher ground. 
In a very concrete sense, the stories I told here are mine. They are the product of 
my thinking with sociologists, philosophers and anthropologists. And they are 
also the product of my time among nuns and priests, among social workers, 
lawyers and asylum seekers. Telling these stories has been my way of honouring 
the many lessons I have learned with them.
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